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THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The financial turmoil that originated in 2007 and
developed into an unprecedented crisis battering
financial and real markets is the latest manifestation,
on a grand scale and with new attributes, of a well-
defined pathology in the process of market liberaliza-
tion and integration in the post-Bretton Woods era.
At the root of the crisis lies a fundamental inconsis-
tency between financial globalisation – the process of
liberalization and deregulation driving the impressive
growth of world financial markets – and existing pub-
lic rules and policies at both domestic and interna-
tional levels. This pathology underlies virtually all the
episodes of instability that have affected the develop-
ing and the emerging economies since the constraints
on capital mobility started to be removed during the
1970s: from the debt crisis in the early 1980s to the
financial and currency crisis in South-East Asia in
1997–98 (see e.g., Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini 1999).
Globalisation of financial markets has systematically
and vastly outpaced the development of their gover-
nance: governments have lagged behind in reshaping
domestic and international institutions as well as in
changing and adapting policy behaviour.
In a nutshell, three are three main features of the cri-
sis. The first two consist of excessive risk-taking and
excessive leverage by financial institutions. These
reflected an inconsistency between globalisation and
market governance that created the possibility of
originating and trading assets under massive under-
estimation of their risk characteristics; financial
institutions were willing to accept excessive risk in
part because the same inconsistency created expecta-
tions of contingent public guarantees on financial
and real assets, in part because, in the presence of
widespread agency problems, markets operated con-
sistently with puzzlingly exuberant beliefs about
asset price dynamics. Governments may have identi-
fied but failed to neutralise these agency problems,
i.e., widespread conflicts of interest between asset
managers and their clients, and between rating agen-
cies and sponsors of securitisation programmes.
Government guarantees and subsidies, exuberant
expectations and agency problems reinforced each
other, leading to snowballing effects on leverage and
risk-taking.
It is the third feature however that sharply differenti-
ates this from previous crises: the extreme level of
opacity regarding the size and incidence of risks in the
portfolios held by investors and intermediaries.
Several layers of securitisation of loans and mort-
gages resulted in a loss of information and created
network externalities across interconnected institu-
tions, which made intermediaries and investors
increasingly unable to assess how much risk was in
their portfolio, eventually causing the illiquidity of
markets directly or indirectly exposed to asset backed
securities. 
The cost of opacity vastly offset potential benefits
from risk diversification – the motivation of securiti-
sation in the first place – not only directly (by causing
illiquidity of assets whose risk structure became
impenetrable even to the owner) but also indirectly.
This is because, at the onset of the crisis, banks and
near banks felt obliged to buy back a large share of
the “toxic” asset-backed securities they had previous-
ly sold to households and institutional investors with
guarantees, and placed them in their balance sheets.
As the crisis developed, losses from mortgage-related
securities and market illiquidity eroded the viability of
leveraged institutions, especially those relying on
short-term financing. As losses caused depleted equi-
ty, intermediaries scrambled for new capital but over
time started to reduce their target leverage, arguably
implying less lending available for business and house-
holds (see Chapter 1 of this report). This is an impor-
tant difference from other episodes of large market
adjustment, which, while producing a dent in the
stock of households’ wealth of similar if not larger
proportions did not undermine the working of the
global financial system.
A crucial casualty of the crisis is the confidence in the
models that financial intermediaries and markets
adopt to assess risk. Especially, but not only, in the
US, agents operated persistently as if the risk of
downward adjustment in asset prices was quite con-tained (e.g., Shiller 2008), and most importantly,
underestimated the risks of illiquidity and the prob-
lems of over-the-counter markets.
Because of opacity, excessive leverage and excessive
risk-taking, a crisis that originated in a relatively small
market segment (the subprime mortgage segment)
grew out of proportion, causing a world-wide loss of
confidence in private financial intermediation and
markets – undermining the presumption that policy-
makers had learnt enough from the past to be able to
effectively manage financial turmoil and contain its
effects on the real economy. It is the loss of confidence
in markets, but also in policies, that have created the
conditions for a severe slowdown. Interestingly, while
many observers appeared to be aware of the risk of a
severe implosion like the one experienced since
September 2008, few would actually go as far as pre-
dicting it.
The loss of confidence in markets, but also on poli-
cies, have now sowed the poisonous seeds of a severe
slowdown in the years to come but also, and worse,
of a sharp regress in international economic integra-
tion and cooperation. While the full extent of the
damage is unclear at the time of the writing, we are
fully aware that containing it will take decisive
action, and time. 
What to do crucially depends on one’s view of the
causes and nature of the crisis. For this reason, this
chapter will first address the question: what caused
the global financial crisis of 2007–2008? In this part
of the chapter, we will lay out the main theories and
pieces of evidence to understand the deep as well as
the proximate causes of the financial turmoil. First,
we will analyse the subprime mortgage markets and
the process of securitisation, and reconsider the
macroeconomic imbalances underlying the crisis.
Second, we will account for the dynamics of the crisis
and public intervention, distinguishing different phas-
es: the first from 2007 to the end of summer 2008, cor-
responding to hopes for a soft-landing; the second,
from autumn 2008 on, where the crisis exacerbates
(hard landing at last!), with global contagion to finan-
cial and real markets. Third, we look ahead, dis-
cussing the main challenges to policy-makers from the
deepening of the banking crisis and address issues in
the reform of the international financial architecture.
In this section, we will specifically analyse problems
and perspective of reforms in the European Union
and the link between fiscal and financial aspects of
the crisis. 
1. What created overleveraging, excessive 
risk-taking and opacity of financial markets?
1.1 A close-up analysis of subprime mortgages and
their securitisation
The first step in our analysis consists of clarifying
the nature and the functioning of the subprime
mortgage market, and the way in which intrinsically
heterogeneous contracts were securitized, i.e.,
pooled together and turned into homogeneous assets
to intermediaries and investors. This is because,
while the losses from the crisis have far exceeded the
dimension of the losses from subprime lending and
now has spread to many other parts of the interna-
tional financial system, the origin of all the evil is
commonly placed in this particular segment of the
mortgage market.
Subprime is lending to individuals with a high per-
ceived level of default risk, either because they have
low income, or because their records show a less than
perfect credit history relative to the standards of
“prime” borrowers. Subprime lending has been
around for quite a while. But it is only in the last few
years that it became one of the fastest growing seg-
ments in the US mortgage markets – its exceptional
growth being driven by a number of factors discussed
below.
As is well known, credit markets are plagued by
information asymmetries: the borrower is generally
better informed than the lender about the merit of
the project he/she is asking funds for; the borrower
can take actions that affect the value of the project
but are unknown to the lender. Economists refer to
the former as “adverse selection”, to the latter as
“moral hazard”. Information asymmetries explain
why prices are not and cannot be the only mecha-
nisms that clear credit markets. In the adverse-selec-
tion model of credit rationing by Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981), for instance, if the lender sets high interest
rates for projects with a given high level of risk, these
high rates end up attracting a pool of borrowers with
even riskier profiles. In an attempt to clear the mar-
ket, the lender could try to raise the interest rate even
more, but this clearly would be to no avail. In fact,
the only outcome of raising prices would be that of
discouraging some of the relatively safe borrowers
from applying for funds. In the standard moral haz-
ard model, a party in a contract takes on excessive
risk because he/she does not face the full conse-
quences of his/her action, leaving other parties to
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bear responsibility.1 One example of moral hazard is
between borrowers and lenders: borrowers are
tempted to take risky actions that are inefficient to
the extent that they reduce the value of the firm to
the creditors in the likelihood of bankruptcy. Since
the borrower does not get anything in that event,
they do not factor in this kind of loss when making
their decision. Another example is due to the
prospect of a government bailout: financial interme-
diaries may then invest in projects that are too risky
because they gain from the prospect of greater gains
while the associated greater losses are expected to be
borne by the taxpayer. 
Adverse selection and moral hazard are two key mar-
ket pathologies needed to understand the subprime
mortgage markets. With adverse selection and moral
hazard, financial intermediaries allocate funds resort-
ing to a number of instruments and mechanisms
other than pricing, namely, they use screening of cus-
tomers and credit rationing, and they request collater-
al. In the subprime mortgage market, indeed, inter-
mediaries lend against the house value as collateral,
supposedly after screening borrowers, and charging a
premium over the interest rate paid by most secure,
prime borrowers. 
In addition, financial intermediaries can reduce their
exposure to mortgage-related risk by selling some of it
to other agents in the economy, via the process of
securitisation that will be described below in detail.
By allowing banks to diversify mortgage risks among
market participants, securitisation reduces the risk
faced by each financial intermediary at each level of
lending. As a result, more resources are in principle
available for borrowers in the aggregate. 
Lending against collateral, screening and securitisa-
tion thus result in easier and cheaper access to finan-
cial markets by households and firms which would
otherwise be severely rationed. Their benefits are
however less obvious in the presence of other types
of distortions, e.g., when a bubble leads to mispric-
ing of the collateral, agency problems exacerbate
moral hazard, or opportunities for regulatory arbi-
trage raise the risk exposure of banks beyond pru-
dential standards. The boom in subprime mortgage
market was indeed driven by the interaction of
strong pricing dynamics in the housing market,
agency problems and inconsistencies in regulation
and supervision, to become the engine of overlever-
aging and excessive risk-taking for the world finan-
cial system as a whole. 
1.1.1 Subprime mortgage origination and 
refinancing in the US 
A brief overview of subprime lending and securitisa-
tion in the US is in order, to shed light on the main
mechanisms that played a role in undermining finan-
cial stability in the US and worldwide. (For a detailed
exposition of this mechanism, see e.g., Calomiris
2008, Gorton 2008, and IMF 2008a,b.)
In the period leading up to the crisis, subprime
mortgages in the US were typically adjustable rate
mortgages, with a “hybrid structure”. To see what
this means, consider common labels such as “2/28”
or “3/27”: these referred to 30 year mortgages incor-
porating a fixed rate for 2 and 3 years, respectively,
then switching to a floating rate for the remaining
period, 28 and 27 years. The initial monthly pay-
ments in the first part of the mortgage were based
on “teaser rates”, adding a premium (e.g., 6 basis
points) above the benchmark London Interbank
Offered rate, Libor). After 2 or 3 years, the switch to
floating rates was typically associated with a sub-
stantial increase in the dollar amounts of monthly
instalments.
As further discussed below, these contracts flourished
in a period of continuing house price appreciation.
This is an important observation to understand their
structure and practical implementation (see Gorton
2008). Namely, these contracts included very high pre-
payment fees – de facto, these fees discouraged bor-
rowers from cashing in capital gains on the house by
closing their debt in advance and walking away from
the financial intermediary. On the contrary, they were
designed in such a way that borrowers would have an
opportunity/incentive to refinance their mortgage in
the first few years, possibly before the switch from
fixed to floating rates, when they would face substan-
tially higher monthly payments. So, in an environment
of increasing housing prices, poor households could
avoid payment difficulties through refinancing. In
fact, first subprime mortgages were typically rolled
into second, or even a sequence of subprime loans.
Gorton (2008) reports that for some types of mort-
gages, up to 80 percent were refinanced within five
years from the start. 
In this respect, it is worth stressing that financial
advice was, to say the least, deficient. Adjustable rate
1 See Sinn (1981, 2009) for the implications of limited liability on
risk-taking in general and banking behaviour in particular.mortgages with attractive teaser rates were over-
whelmingly targeted to low-income and poorly uned-
ucated households, who are the least informed about
subtleties of contracts and market evolution (see
Shiller 2008). In other words, complex financial prod-
ucts were sold to financially illiterate people. 
Table 2.1 shows mortgage origination in the US
between 2001 and 2007 by types of products: “con-
forming” and jumbo mortgages (the latter being
larger, against more expensive houses), subprime
and Alt-A mortgages,2 home equity loans (HEL),
as well as Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
and Veteran Affairs (VA) mortgages. The total
value of mortgages originated in the period fluctu-
ates at around $3 trillion per year. For our purpose,
it is important to stress that the share of subprime
in origination of all mortgages rose steadily
between 2001 and 2006, from 7.2 to 20.1 percent.
The share of subprime and Alt-A mortgages com-
bined exceeded 30 percent at the end of the period.
Also, the share of adjustable rate mortgages origi-
nated in each year quickly climbed to 50 percent
between 2001 and 2004, remained above 45 percent
in 2005 and 2006. Finally, refinancing activity was
extremely high, always above 50 percent of origi-
nated mortgages, with a peak of 72 percent in 2003.
Thus, a large share of “mortgage origination” actu-
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Table 2.1 
Mortgage originations by product
Mortgage originations by product ($bn)
Year FHA/VA Conforming  Jumbo  Subprime Alt-A HEL Total ARMs Refinances
2001  175 1,265  445 160  55 115  2,215  355  1,298 
2002  176 1,706  571 200  67 165  2,885  679  1,821 
2003  220 2,460  650 310  85 220  3,945  1,034  2,839 
2004  130 1,210  510 530 185 355  2,920  1,464  1,510 
2005  90 1,090  570 625 380 365  3,120  1,490  1,572 
2006  80  990  480 600 400 430  2,980  1,340  1,460 
1Q06 19  236 103  140  105  102  705 297  348 
2Q06 20  275 126  165  104  110  800 392  382 
3Q06 22  241 128  160  91  113  755 332  368 
4Q06 19  238 123  135  100  105  720 319  362 
1Q07 19  273 100  93  98  97  680  40  388 
2Q07 25  328 120  56  96  105  730 220  377 
3Q07  26  286  83 28 54 93 570  166 263 
4Q07  31  275  44 14 27 60 450  98 234 
% of originations by product (except for total loans)
Year FHA/VA Conforming  Jumbo  Subprime Alt-A HEL ARMs Refinances Total Loans
($Bn) 
2001  7.9% 57.1% 20.1% 7.2% 2.5% 5.2% 16.0% 58.6% 1298 
2002  6.1% 59.1% 19.8% 6.9% 2.3% 5.7% 23.5% 63.1% 1821 
2003  5.6% 62.4% 16.5% 7.9% 2.2% 5.6% 26.2% 72.0% 2839 
2004 4.5% 41.4% 17.5% 18.2% 6.3% 12.2% 50.1% 54.7% 1510 
2005 2.9% 34.9% 18.3% 20.0% 12.2% 11.7% 47.8% 50.4% 1572 
2006 2.7% 33.2% 16.1% 20.1% 13.4% 14.4% 45.0% 49.0% 1460 
1Q06 2.7% 33.5% 19.9% 19.9% 14.9% 14.5% 42.1% 49.4% 348 
2Q06 2.5% 34.4% 15.8% 20.6% 13.0% 13.8% 49.0% 47.8% 382 
3Q06 2.9% 31.9% 17.0% 21.2% 12.1% 15.0% 44.0% 48.7% 368 
4Q06 2.6% 33.1% 17.1% 18.8% 13.9% 14.6% 44.3% 50.3% 362 
1Q07 2.8% 40.1% 14.7% 13.7% 14.4% 14.3% 35.3% 57.1% 388 
2Q07 3.4% 44.9% 16.4% 7.7% 13.2% 14.4% 30.1% 51.6% 377 
3Q07 4.5% 50.2% 14.6% 4.9% 9.5% 16.3% 29.1% 46.1% 263 
4Q07 6.9% 61.0% 9.6% 3.0% 6.0% 13.3% 21.6% 52.0% 234 
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance, Morgan Stanley based on Greenlaw et al. 2008.
2 In the US, Alternative A-paper mortgages, or Alt-A mortgages, are
classified as riskier than A-paper ones (the “prime”) and less risky
than the subprime ones. Alt-A interest rates, which are determined
by credit risk, therefore tend to be between those of prime and sub-
prime home loans.EEAG Report 2009 63
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ally consisted of the refinancing of outstanding
mortgages.
The cumulative issuance of subprime mortgages
between 2005 and 2007 should provide an approxi-
mate measure of the amount of these mortgages out-
standing at the onset of the crisis (see Greenlaw et al.
2008). The outstanding stock amounted to 1.4 tril-
lion dollars. Adjustable rates mortgages, accounting
for 80 percent of the total, then reached 1 trillion dol-
lars. Note that because of widespread refinancing
with increasing housing prices, the performance of
subprime mortgages in the years prior to the crisis
provided little or no guide to risk and loss assess-
ment. With adjustable-rate mortgages, default could
be expected to climb quickly after the first two or
three years in the life of each cohort of mortgages
during which borrowers pay teaser rates. However,
refinancing in 2004 through 2006 allowed many bor-
rowers to postpone the passage to floating-rate instal-
ments, which are usually more expensive than the ini-
tial ones. 
Estimates of the direct losses on subprime mortgages
at the start of the crisis varied widely (see e.g.,
Greenlaw et al. 2008). Initial estimates were in the
range of $50 to $100 billion for subprime – figures
proposed by Bernanke in July 2007 – plausibly corre-
sponding to overall losses as high as $150 billion for
the US mortgage market as a whole. At the end of
2007, estimates of total losses in this market had
already climbed to between $250 to $500 billion,
according to Lehman Brothers (2007) and Goldman
Sachs (2007). Prudential estimates pointed to losses of
the order of 4 percent of US GDP.
These initial estimates were profoundly revised over
time, in view of a sizeable drop in housing prices and
a severe slowdown of the economy, which translated
into higher rates of default also in the prime segment
of the market (accounting for more than three fourths
of all mortgages). The estimates by the International
Monetary Fund were revised from 1 to 1.4 trillion
dollars in the course of 2008 (IMF 2008a,b). As we
write this chapter, cost estimates have been substan-
tially increased. 
To the extent that these losses – although not com-
pletely unexpected – caught the private sector unpre-
pared, they amounted to a sizeable negative shock to
the economy, which would cause concern even if it did
not cause extended malfunctioning in global financial
markets. However, their magnitude was by no means
unprecedented – the losses from the dot-com crash
wiped out $5 trillion in the market value of technolo-
gy companies between March 2000 and October 2002.
1.1.2 Mortgage securitisation 
By their very nature, mortgage contracts are very het-
erogeneous. Not only conditions and terms of these
contracts typically vary over time, i.e., across vintages.
They also display large differences within each vin-
tage, depending on a variety of factors, ranging from
the location of the house to be financed, to the eco-
nomic profile of the borrower and the marketing
strategy of the lender. What follows describes how
financial intermediaries were able to transform vastly
heterogeneous contracts into standardised securities
to be traded in financial markets – while our discus-
sion focuses on mortgages, what we write applies also
to other types of banks’ loans and credit.
It is useful to keep in mind that securitisation developed
vis-à-vis a strong and growing demand for highly rated
assets by individual and institutional investors, the lat-
ter often restricted in their portfolio choice by rules set-
ting quality standards for the securities in their portfo-
lios. Hence, the goal of the process was to satisfy this
demand at the least cost, i.e., by creating the largest pos-
sible pool of standardised, high-rating (possibly AAA)
securities from the underlying pool of mortgages. 
To start with, it is useful to introduce some terms
and definitions. By issuing a mortgage loan to a
household or a firm, a bank or financial intermedi-
ary is the originator of an asset that generates a cash
flow paid regularly over time (the monthly instal-
ments). Securitisation occurs when the originator
sells this cash flow to a special purpose vehicle SPV
(or a structured investment vehicle SIV, or a special
purpose enterprise, SPE, or other kinds of con-
duits/trusts3), administered by a financial institution
called the administrator or the sponsor of the pro-
gramme. Since mortgage holders may default on
their loans, however, the (nominal) face value of the
cash flow is not sure. To deal with default risk, the
SPV (or SIV, SPE, conduits, trust) purchases a well-
diversified portfolio of mortgages, pooling together
the cash flows from many borrowers.
The key to securitisation is that the SPV finances its
purchases of cash flows from mortgages by issuing
securities, which are then called residential mortgage
3 Differences among these are discussed e.g., by Brunnermeier
(2009).backed securities (RMBS), or
commercial mortgage backed se-
curities (CMBS) because they are
backed by the payments by the
holders of the mortgages in the
SPV portfolio. Both RMBS and
CMBS are forms of mortgage
backed securities (MBS), which in
the US account for most of the
larger class of asset backed secu-
rities (ABSs). For simplicity, in
what follows ABSs will be used
as a generic term to refer to
MBSs, RMBSs or CMBSs. 
How can risky cash flows from
heterogeneous mortgage con-
tracts be turned into standard-
ised ABSs? The trick consists of
slicing the cash flow from a
well-diversified pool of mort-
gages into tranches of increas-
ing risk/return profiles. Namely,
the cash accruing from the pool
of assets is used first to pay
interest and the principal to the
tranche with the highest and
most senior status; the remain-
ing cash is then used to pay the
holders of a second tranche,
with lower status; what is left is
paid to a third tranche, and so
on. The basic architecture is
shown in Figure 2.1a.
An example after Gorton (2008)
will help illustrate the mecha-
nism. For simplicity, assume that
the mortgage lasts one period
only. Under these assumptions,
consider an SPV that purchases a
pool of mortgages generating a
cash flow with a face value of
$100. This cash flow is obviously
risky: it will in general pay less
than $100 ex post. To finance its
purchase, the SPV issues RMBS
in two tranches, a senior one with
par value 100-N, and a subordi-
nate one with par value equal to
N. This means that while losses
up to the first N dollars are borne
by the second, riskier tranche;
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larger losses also reduce the payoff of the first, senior
one.
So, let CB denote the cash flow from the riskier
tranche. This will be N-loss if this amount is positive,
or 0 otherwise, as losses in addition to N are borne by
the owner of the senior tranche: 
CB=Max[N-Loss,0].
Conversely, the cash flow from the senior tranche CA
will instead be either 100-N if losses are contained
below N, or 100-Loss:
CA=Min[100-N,100-Loss].
The scheme easily generalises to the case of more than
two tranches. Say, with three tranches, the SPV stipu-
lates that the bottom one bears the first losses up to
NFL dollars (FL stands for First Loss). The second to
the bottom tranche bears losses between NFL and N.
The payoff of the senior tranche will be the same as
above. For the other two, we will have4
CFL=Max[NFL-Loss,0]
CB=Max[Min[N-NFL, N-Loss],0].
In this example, the choice of N and NFL is based on
the sponsor’s best assessment of the risk of default in
the pool of mortgages purchased by the SPV.
Specifically, by setting a very high N, all else being
equal, the sponsor reduces the risk that the owner of
the senior tranche will suffer a loss. Vice versa, a low
N raises the risk of losses on the senior tranche.
An important point here is that by appropriately
choosing N, there will be at least one tranche of first
class AAA securities against the portion of the cash
flow which satisfy the requirements for AAA securi-
ties set by a rating agency. The SPV can then create
additional, risky tranches, e.g., AA mezzanine, BBB
subordinated and first-loss position ones (see Figu-
re 2.1b). The size of these tranches will of course
depend on the overall risk of the pool as well as on the
requirements for the ratings set by the agency.
Interestingly, the worse, i.e., riskier, securities were
generally held by the originator. 
Figure 2.1b also shows that the process of slicing
the cash flows from original mortgages into bonds
of different risk class continues in successive rounds
of securitisation – the figure includes collateralised
debt obligations (CDOs) and so-called CDO
squared. In each step, there are more and more con-
tracts written on this cash flow, supposedly provid-
ing insurance. 
As already mentioned, indeed, the objective of this
process is to turn a pool of heterogeneous risky mort-
gages into the largest possible pool of standardised,
high-rating ABS securities. In this respect, diversifica-
tion of the underlying pool of mortgages is an impor-
tant step but is not the only instruments that SPVs
used to raise the “quality” of the ABS. Indeed, SPVs
resorted to different kinds of so-called internal and
external credit enhancement. The first depends on the
way the programme is structured, the second on the
availability of credit facilities (usually against maturi-
ty mismatches), letters of credit and credit insurance.
Thus, the maps of financial intermediaries involved in
the securitisation process include also insurance com-
panies or other financial intermediaries that buy
default risk from the SPVs (see Figure 2.1c). In this
connection, Box 2.1 examines credit default swaps
and Box 2.2 the special class of synthetic CDOs. 
The quality of ABSs is certified by rating agencies,
usually paid by the sponsor. Different rating agen-
cies may set different criteria for securities to qualify
as triple-A. For this reason, it was often the case that
an SPV shopped around to find the agency whose
rating criteria were the least expensive to satisfy, for
any given quantitative target of issuance of high
quality securities. In some cases, these practices cre-
ated tension along the process of securitisation,
especially when ABSs were further integrated into
structured products promoted by sponsors employ-
ing different rating agencies. Conflicts in ratings of
the same product among less and more conservative
agencies are well documented (see Calomiris 2008).
Further issues concerning ratings agencies are dis-
cussed in Box 2.3.
Market liquidity is an essential element in this process.
Namely, the maturity of ABSs does not in general
coincide with the maturity of the underlying mort-
gages: it is usually shorter. So over time the principal
and interest on ABSs will be paid partly with the cash
flow from the underlying mortgages, partly by issuing
new securities, i.e., by rolling over debt. Namely, SIV,
conduits and other vehicles issued asset-backed com-
mercial paper (ABCP) or medium-term notes, the for-
mer with an average maturity of 90 days, the latter
4 See Gorton (2008) for a generalisation for the case in which mort-
gages could be refinanced. EEAG Report 2009 66
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Box 2.1 
Credit default swaps (CDS) 
Credit default swaps (CDS) are tradable securities that allow investors to swap the risk of debt default. They were introduced as a
financial instrument by JP Morgan in the end of the 1990s. Their development over the past seven years is remarkable: The 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) reports a notional amount outstanding of $US 55 trillion in the first half
of 2008 after reaching its peak of $US 62 trillion in the second half of 2007. The annual growth rate was 103% over the period 
from 2001 to 2007.
Why are CDS so popular in modern credit markets? In principle they can be compared to an insurance contract where the buyer
pays a periodic fee to the seller, who guarantees him a payoff if a well-specified credit event occurs. Usually, protection buyer and
protection seller agree on one of the following events as the trigger for the compensation payment to come into effect: failure-to-
pay, restructuring, bankruptcy or default of the reference entity. The reference entity might be a company, a bond (including
mortgage-backed bonds) or a sovereign. In contrast to the single-name form of CDS, there are also so-called basket CDS, which
normally include up to ten reference entities. Here a first-to-default principle is most commonly applied by which the protection
seller compensates the protection buyer for the first entity that defaults and the contract thereby terminates. Finally, much of 
recent growth in the CDS market is attributed to CDS indices, of which the two biggest insure the investor against the default of
125 corporate entities each. Again, if one of these corporate entities defaults, the protection buyer receives a payment.  
According to a survey of the British Banking Association, hedge funds in particular gained importance, accounting for 28% of
total protection buyers and 32% of total protection sellers in 2006 compared to only 3% and 5%, respectively, in 2000. At first
glance, CDS seem to provide an effective means of hedging broad sources of credit risk while increasing liquidity and ensuring
price discovery. Proponents of the CDS industry also argue that CDS reflect the true condition of companies much better than
ratings of rating agencies do. One reason might be that CDS are more sensitive to market news. However, there are some crucial
differences to an insurance contract that create problematic incentive structures as well as systemic risk.
On the one hand, clarity about the relationship between the protection buyer and the reference entity is important. When buying
an ordinary insurance, the protection buyer and the reference entity must coincide in order to prevent fraudulent manipulations. 
However, since the reference entity does not necessarily have to be related to the protection buyer himself, there is room for
speculative investment as an investor seeking to maximise its profit might buy CDS protection for the default of a reference
obligation whose collapse would otherwise not affect him. This behaviour is problematic insofar as it may feed doubts about the
company’s solvency, up to leading to its default – the inefficiency being apparent if such outcome reflects market power and
manipulation by some participant. On the other hand, CDS have been accused of being traded in a very non-transparent manner.
Although highly standardised, all contracts are privately negotiated and there is no clearing house for CDS. As CDS contracts are
traded frequently, there is uncertainty about the property rights and whether the owner can fulfil his obligations in case of default. 
Lehman Brothers, for example, was an important counterparty of CDS contracts. After Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy the CDS
issued by them provided no protection anymore and there was the threat that a complex interlinked chain of CDS contracts
between financial institutions would unravel. As it was recognised that not only the reference obligation but also the protection
seller might default, CDS are now also blamed for having amplified the financial crisis. Banks’ exposure to risky CDS contracts is
non-transparent, which may have contributed to the decrease in lending activity on the inter-banking market.
The figures on the size of the CDS market are impressive but the actual cash flows are obviously much lower since defaults and
hence settlements have occurred only rarely. The net cash flow is mainly determined by the periodic payments (spreads) the
buyers have to pay to the sellers of a CDS. The crucial question is how much of notional amount outstanding is at risk to default 
during the financial crisis and whether further defaults may initiate a fatal domino effect. Due to the uncertainties and the non-
transparency CDS are still considered a risk to the stability of financial markets and regulation seems to be required. 
Box 2.2 
Synthetic CDOs
A special class of ABSs is synthetic CDOs. These do not buy assets from originators but only the risk underlying their loans. Risk
is bought via credit default swaps (CDS), a form of credit derivative that provides debt insurance (see Box 1). Essentially, the 
originators periodically pay a premium to the administrator of the synthetic CDO in exchange for a compensatory payment if the
mortgage holder fails to pay interest or the principal on its debt (i.e., its financial contract with a third party default). Through 
CDS, the originators could transfer risk to other parties, hence could relax the regulatory requirements on their equity even more.
Synthetic CDOs typically diversified their risk by pooling large number of CDS contracts and then investing in risk-free fixed
income securities, so to collateralise the debt underlying the CDS in case of default. The entire operation is financed by issuing
ABSs, once again in different tranches characterised by different risk-return profiles. The premia and interest payments on the
fixed income securities generate a cash flow which accrues to ABS holders (after deducting compensatory payments for defaults
under the CDS contracts).
If a synthetic CDO issue tranches up to covering the entire amount of debt that underlies the CDS in its portfolios, it is fully 
funded. Otherwise it is partially-funded. The rationale for partial funding for a synthetic CDO lies in the fact that some part of the
securitised portfolio may be assigned an extremely low probability of default. In this case, the originator preferred to cover this
risk by entering further CDSs (as these were quite cheap) with entities called super-senior protection sellers rather than by issuing
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with an average maturity of one year. The drying up
of liquidity in these markets could clearly compro-
mise the activity of these intermediaries. 
Investment banks acquired ABSs, serving as under-
writers, and placed them in the market, where they
could undergo another round of securitisation or
ended up in the portfolios of institutional investors
(mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds) on behalf
of end lenders (households and non-financial firms)
or directly in the portfolio of end lenders.
On the demand side, the new securities found eager
investors who were attracted by the interest spread
between these products over equally-rated triple-A
standard bonds. Recall that many institutional
investors are restricted in their portfolio choice to
securities with high ratings: at a time of low interest
rates, the spread on triple-A ABSs provides a means
to improve a funds’ performance. For sponsors and
administrators, there was an opportunity to earn
large fees as a percentage of the overall volume of
transaction.5
Table 2.2 reports calculations by Moody’s, mapping
subprime mortgages originated in 2005 through
2007 into tranches of MBS with different rating
5 The income for the SPV derived from the spread in interest rates
between their assets and liabilities due to both the maturity mis-




One of the most significant factors in the financial crisis has been that the returns of many financial products have turned out to be
less secure than had been thought. The creditworthiness of many of these products was certified by credit ratings agencies. As
such, these agencies have come under considerable criticism. One typical comment was: “The credit rating agencies occupy a 
special place in our financial markets. The ratings agencies failed this bond of trust.”
1
Credit ratings agencies are independent companies that assess the risk of certain types of debt instruments and institutions. The
highest ratings are AAA, and the lowest are C. Instruments rated at or above Baa or BBB are “investment-grade”, below that they
are “junk”.
The three largest agencies are Standard and Poor’s, Fitch Ratings and Moody’s. The first two of these base their assessments of
credit-worthiness entirely on default probabilities, while Moody’s attempts to incorporate the expected return in the event of
default. As pointed out by Morrison (2008), one problem with both of these approaches is that they entirely ignore the correlation
of outcomes with the rest of the market. A bond that performs well when the rest of the market enters a downturn is valuable; a
bond that performs well when the rest of the market also performs well is much less valuable.
A more common criticism, however, has been that the ratings agencies are employed and paid by the issuers of financial products
not by investors. This is understandable where there are many investors in each financial product. However, this creates an
incentive for the ratings agency to overstate the creditworthiness of a particular product in order to build a good relationship with
the issuer. On the other hand, a rating would have no value in the market if investors lost faith in the agency that issued it. An
agency must therefore balance any short-term gain from satisfying the issuer with its long-run reputation in the market.  
The fact that investors took ratings seriously suggests that the long-run reputation of the agencies was intact, at least until recently. 
However, there is increasing evidence that in assessing some financial products, the methods used by agencies have produced
ratings that are too high. This point is discussed for example by Benmelech and Dlugosz (2008), who examined 4,000 structured
bonds that were backed by loan portfolios. The average rating of the loans was B+, yet 70% of the bonds were rated AAA.
These considerations have led to calls for increased regulation of agencies. But it is not clear that regulation would improve the
situation. In fact, Morrison (2008) argues persuasively that some aspects of existing regulation have exacerbated the difficulties
surrounding ratings agencies. For example, many investors face a minimum ratings constraint on products they are permitted to
purchase. Bank capital regulations also rely on ratings. But this gives significantly more power to the agencies, which effectively
become gatekeepers for financial products. They do not just sell their opinion on creditworthiness, but they also sell admission to
markets for some financial products.
An issuer can combine assets of different risk into a single product with low average risk. Agencies can charge fees to advise
issuers on how to structure products to achieve the rating required for it to be purchased by regulated investors who otherwise
would not be able to purchase the more risky asset. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2008) explain their results by the fact “that most
issuers were using the rating agencies’ model to target the highest possible credit rating at the lowest cost”.
Since regulators require that agencies play this role, the agencies themselves are also regulated. Seven agencies are approved by
regulators in the US – and the three largest account for over 90% of the market. This creates a barrier to entry, which makes it 
more difficult for new methodologies to be introduced and makes it harder for existing agencies to lose out to newcomers.
What is crucial in the market for ratings is for the reputations of agencies to depend on their judgements. When ratings are poor, as
they have been, then future ratings by the same agencies should be treated with more caution. Further regulation, with the
possibility of greater barriers to entry, may undermine this as incumbents face less competition.
1 Henry Waxman, chair of US House of Representatives’ Oversight Committee, quoted in the Financial Times, 22 October 2008.(see again Greenlaw et al. 2008). The most striking
piece of information from the table is that about 80
percent of subprime mortgages’ origination was
converted into triple-A pools. This percentage
remained stable even into the crisis period – the last
quarters of 2007 – although origination activity
contracted. Conversely, less than 5 percent of these
mortgages were converted into triple-B or lower
rate assets. These percentages obviously contained
the seed of the crisis, as securitisation flooded the
market with triple-A products whose risk and
prices were obviously quite sensitive to housing
market conditions.
The evidence in the table raises the key issue con-
cerning the extent to which a risky cash flow from
mortgages could back triple-A securities. Even after
accounting for credit enhancement, a percentage as
high as 80 percent may hardly survive proper stress-
testing of the market conditions underlying securiti-
sation. In this dimension (with the benefit of hind-
sight) the models adopted by financial intermedi-
aries to assess risk appeared to be far from ade-
quate.
It may be useful to point out that the share of MBS
varied widely across the portfolios held by SIV,
conduits and other intermediaries and is not neces-
sarily large. In many case, the exposure to subprime
mortgage risk was very contained. So, when look-
ing at the securitisation process, the main idea is
clearly consistent with a straightforward diversifi-
cation principle and should have resulted in a better
pricing of risk to improve efficiency. What went
wrong?
1.1.3 Regulatory Arbitrage, Diversification and
Opacity
Non-bank financial intermediaries involved in the
securitisation process (SIV, SPV, conduits etc.) bor-
row short and in liquid form, and just as commercial
banks invest in less liquid long assets – thus they form
a “shadow banking system”. However, in contrast to
commercial banks, they are able to operate outside
normal banking supervision and regulation. This
observation suggests a key motivation for financial
houses to promote securitisation, that is, regulatory
arbitrage. 
The Basel Capital Accord requires commercial banks
to satisfy risk-based capital standards, i.e., to main-
tain a minimum percentage of equity against their
portfolio of loans, weighted according to their risk
class. Under Basel I, by selling mortgages to
SPVs/SIVs, banks were able to remove their mort-
gages from their balance sheets, hence they could sub-
tract them from the computation of the Basel I equi-
ty requirements. By the same token, the capital
requirement would not change when the bank extend-
ed some type of credit lines, like reputational credit
lines, providing contingent liquidity assistance to their
SIVs. Indeed, many originators were owned/con-
trolled by financial groups and institutions that pro-
vided “warehouse” lines for their lending. Many
banks owned/controlled SPVs/SIVs where they
parked ABSs, financing them by issuing short-term,
asset backed commercial paper (ABCP). 
Basel II, which came into effect in 2007, ruled out the
above opportunities for regulatory arbitrage but cre-
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Table 2.2  














2005  625  60 31 22  7 
1Q06  140  113  13 7 5 2 
2Q06  165  133  16 8 6 2 
3Q06  160  129  15 8 6 2 
4Q06  135  109  13 7 5 1 
1Q07  95  77 9 5 3 1 
2Q07  56  45 5 3 2 1 
3Q07  28  23 3 1 1 0 
4Q07  14  11 1 1 1 0 
Total 1418  1145  135 71 51 16 
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance, Morgan Stanley based on Greenlaw et al. 2008.EEAG Report 2009 69
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ated others. For instance, by transferring mortgages to
an SIV and providing liquidity enhancement, a bank
could turn its lending into a large amount of triple-A
rated securities, without suffering a downgrade of its
rating to the same extent. By buying back some of the
triple-A securities and placing them back in its bal-
ance sheet, the bank could save on capital charges (see
e.g., Brunnermeier 2009).
The economic rationale of securitisation is that of
improving risk diversification. Was it so? The answer
would be positive in a world in which securitisation
had led to an irreversible transfer of risk from the
originator/sponsor to end-lenders who were not only
distinct from the groups in the chain of securitisation
but also non-leveraged entities. Note that in this case
most of the losses from the subprime crisis would
have been ultimately borne by end-lenders (house-
holds, firms, pension funds, etc.). However, sponsors
only sold a fraction of the securities issued by their
conduits. As mentioned above, banks actually bought
part of the triple-A tranches of ABSs, as these had a
favourable risk weight towards the satisfaction of cap-
ital requirements. Most importantly, ABSs were typi-
cally marketed to end-users with clear (if only implic-
it) guarantees by the financial groups sponsoring
and/or distributing them. Indeed, when the crisis
showed that the risk profile of ABSs was quite differ-
ent than originally believed, banks/sponsors readily
“accepted responsibility”: commercial banks provid-
ed liquidity lines to off-balance-sheet vehicles. SIVs
and banks bought these assets back at guaranteed
prices from their (best) clients and placed them back
on the consolidated balance sheet. De facto, securiti-
sation resulted in an unregulated increase of leverage
for any given bank equity.
Now, let’s conjecture a world in which ABSs remain
quite “close”to the underlying assets in the sense that
(a) there is a single securitisation layer between origi-
nators of ABS and end-lenders and (b) there are no
external intermediaries providing insurance and cred-
it enhancement. In such a world, the risk of these
assets would still be relatively transparent and man-
ageable. In principle, even the discovery that most of
the assumptions used to price ABSs were overopti-
mistic would not be too consequential. Surely, it
would create losses either for the ultimate holders of
ABSs, and/or for the originator, the sponsor and the
investment bank doing the securitisation. But in our
example “closeness” between the originator and the
SPV translates into transparency and quality of infor-
mation about assets, and, accordingly, there would be
no “network externality”, by which the rating of the
securities would depend directly or indirectly on the
rating of different institutions providing insurance. In
this case, there would be relatively little uncertainty
about prices. This uncertainty would mainly relate to
the fundamental components of risk: the percentage
of mortgage holders defaulting, the expected loss
given default and interest rates. One can imagine that
the risk of market illiquidity would be relatively con-
tained. The actual world, however, was far removed
from this model.
A key problem contributing to the implosion of the
market in fact consisted in the opacity and loss of
information inherent in (badly regulated) multiple
securitisation layers, with strong interconnection
among intermediaries. Typically, SPVs pooled togeth-
er ABSs from previous programmes over and over
again, in many successive rounds. In each round, there
would be different forms of credit enhancement,
involving different institutions. Some conduits built
up asset pools exclusively with existing ABSs and
CDOs. In each round, the administrator could only
check the previous programme structure, and had to
trust the assessment by rating agencies employed by
other administrators.6 A rating mistake in the chain
was clearly bound to affect all the tranches issued in
each subsequent step, biasing the risk assessment in
proportion of the exposure of each ABS to the over-
rated securities (see the examples in Stucke and
Tsomocos 2008). Correcting a mistake, or adjusting a
rating in response to a shock along the chain was
clearly a daunting problem, as it required a cascade of
revisions of rating by different agencies, each having
to trust the work of their predecessor. Note that this
makes ABSs particularly sensitive to changing market
conditions or sentiments, as any correction in prices
would be accompanied by a simultaneous increase in
the pure uncertainty about the market value of these
products. 
Because of the complexity of these chains, not only
assessing the value of these products against possible
shocks could easily become nearly impossible for a
single intermediary. It is also apparent that these
assets generated strong interconnection among the
balance sheets of all the intermediaries in the market.
Uncertainty about the price of these products in one
intermediary’s balance sheet had a systemic compo-
6 Lack of transparency may have also facilitated under-reporting of
information. Indeed there is evidence that bankers purposely placed
inferior subprime mortgages into securitisation portfolios thus hid-
ing risk from buyers, including sponsors (see Keys et al. 2008 and
Calomoris 2008).nent, as it depended on price assessment by many
other intermediaries, as well as on their financial
standing.
The lesson to draw from the analysis is straightfor-
ward. First, ABSs, including MBSs, were ultimately
held to a large extent by (highly) leveraged institutions
(such as off-balance sheet vehicles that banks had set
up for the purpose of receiving these assets, or hedge
funds) rather than by non-leveraged investors (this
became apparent after the onset and per effect of the
crisis). Second, because of the complications in the
layers of securitisation, markets faced an unprece-
dented level of uncertainty and confusion about the
incidence of the losses, i.e., which institutions and
portfolios were most exposed to them. Thus, diversifi-
cation of ABSs among intermediaries created net-
work externalities, which actually magnified market
liquidity risks. Securitisation thus resulted in a trade
off between fundamental risk diversification and
exposure to market liquidity risk, in which the second
term quickly became predominant.
The puzzling question raised by these considerations
is then why, exactly, market participants and interme-
diaries let this happen without taking sufficient pru-
dential steps to protect their investment.7
1.1.4 Public subsidies 
The boom of mortgage lending and ABSs occurred in
an environment where different policies and market
dynamics created distortions affecting both origina-
tion and securitisation. Many of the policies playing a
role in the crisis were actually motivated by equity and
efficiency considerations, in part reflecting a long-
standing stance of the US government in favour of
helping low income and disadvantaged groups to
acquire homes. What turned these policies into desta-
bilising factors was a macroeconomic environment
that magnified the mutual inconsistencies among
them.
In the US, home ownership is subsidized via a number
of policy measures (see Calomiris 2008 for detail). As
an important example, mortgage interest payments on
one’s home are deductible from taxes, as opposed to
rent, which is not deductible. If interest rates are low
and buying a house requires a small or no down pay-
ment,8 other things being equal, there is an obvious
tax advantage in buying rather than renting a house
or an apartment. The tax benefits are actually even
more pervasive. Since interest payments on a loan
against a car or other durables are not tax deductible,
there are tax advantages in refinancing housing mort-
gages against general household expenditure – as
many commentators put it: US households could use
their houses as ATM machines.
The mortgage market is also heavily influenced by
the large government sponsored enterprises (or
GSEs, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the
12 Federal Home Loan Banks), which were created
with the explicit goal of enhancing access to credit
by some targeted sectors of the economy as well as
efficiency and transparency of capital markets. In
the scheme of securitisation presented above, these
institutions purchase mortgages from originators
and package them into securities which are sold,
after adding guarantees, to the secondary markets.
They also buy and hold mortgage-related securities –
in 2008 together Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held
up to $5.3 trillion in mortgage risk. Due to public
guarantees, these institutions became simultaneously
a direct and indirect source of market distortions
and a fiscal risk. By virtue of public guarantees on
their portfolios, they provided a large buffer for the
excessive mortgage risk created by private institu-
tions, and indirectly fed the demand for housing.
Their ambiguous nature – not completely public but
benefiting from public guarantees – is now recog-
nised as unsustainable. After multiple initiatives to
make them viable before and after the start of the
crisis in 2007, they were finally placed under conser-
vatorship in 2008, de facto nationalised, under the
direction of a newly created agency, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency, with ample access to spe-
cial funds. This is still not a permanent solution;
their fate will have to be resolved in the future. 
Subsidies to low income households to enter the
housing market may well be part of desirable redis-
tributive policies. They could even be seen as a com-
ponent of a strategy for the democratisation of
finance that Yale economist Robert Shiller has been
promoting in recent years (see Shiller 2008). In the
presence of market distortions, however, they clearly
became yet another factor feeding the disequilibrium
dynamics of prices and facilitating excessive risk-
taking.
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7 For an analysis of securitisation and an in-depth analysis of the
financial crisis focused on Europe,, see European Central Bank
(2008a,b), and Bank of England 2007.
8 The “American Dream Downpayment Initiative” (signed into law
on 16 December 2003) effectively targeted low-income first buyers




Between 2000 and 2006, US housing prices appreci-
ated by 80 percent in nominal terms. To many, this
strong appreciation, shown in Figure 2.2, is evidence
of a bubble. It should be stressed, however, that esti-
mates of the overvaluation in the stock of housing in
the US (in terms of the deviation from long-term
trend) remain in the range of 20–30 percent (see
Shiller 2008). This overvaluation is relative small
when compared to other famous episodes of strong
real-estate appreciation. Namely, in Japan property
prices kept falling for 15 years after their peak in
1991, ending up around 70–75 percent below their
maximum values. Similarly, the Nikkei Index
reached almost 40,000 in 1991, four times the level in
the mid-1980s and five times the level that still pre-
vailed in 2008.
Yet one of most striking dimensions of the crisis is the
puzzling evidence on beliefs of continuing US hous-
ing price appreciation, apparently shared by many
market participants in the US and elsewhere in the
world economy. For many years, market participants
appeared to operate as if prices in the US housing
markets would either not fall at all or fall only mod-
erately. For instance, Shiller (2008) reports that as late
as October 2006, stress tests of the impact of a possi-
ble housing price decline on the portfolio held by
Freddie Mac assumed that prices would drop at most
by 13.4 percent (Shiller 2008, p. 52). 
In our interpretation, beliefs of continuing housing
appreciation were the result of “social contagion of
boom thinking”, an insufficiently understood mecha-
nism underlying social and economic dynamics in the
presence of asset pricing bubbles. For instance, an
argument often quoted during the years preceding the
crisis was that housing prices had never fallen in the
US in the post-war period; as mentioned by Shiller
(2008), ads along US highways stated that “on aver-
age home values double[d] every ten years.”This argu-
ment clearly fails to appreciate the distinction
between real and nominal prices. Correcting for infla-
tion, the real price of housing fell somewhat during
the 1980s and remained stagnant for many years, even
though its nominal counterpart kept rising, driven by
inflation. Yet, the wording of the ads was obviously
designed to appeal to people by providing an argu-
ment that reinforced their beliefs. 
From the point of view of a financial intermediary,
what matters for assessing expected losses from mort-
gage are both the probability of default by the bor-
rower and the expected loss given default.9 Now, we
have seen above that whether or not borrowers had
income or assets in addition to the houses they were
purchasing, contracts were designed in such a way
that they had an incentive to refinance the mortgage
systematically vis-à-vis the appreciating equity value
of their property. In the event of default, banks
expected to be able to limit their losses by capturing
the capital gains on the repossessed houses. 
In spite of the fact that subprime mortgages were rel-
atively new products, these expectations appeared to
be backed by some hard evidence. As stressed by
Calomiris (2008), the market had already experienced
a crisis in the wake of the 2001 recession. Estimates of
total losses from mortgage defaults during this
episode were in the range of 4.5
and 6 percent of the outstanding
stock – figures that appeared to
corroborate fully the relatively
benign view of the magnitude of
possible crises. Unfortunately, the
recession at the beginning of the
decade was special in one crucial
dimension: the contraction in
output was not accompanied by
any drop in housing prices. With
rising prices, both the probability
of default and the expected losses
Figure 2.2
9 According to basic principles of finance,
one should also observe that the value of
such losses generally depends on their
correlation with the performance of the
market as a whole.given default had clearly remained contained. This
was, however, in striking contrast with most historical
records, which suggest that, in general, fluctuations in
economic activity are positively (not negatively) cor-
related with real estate values. 
While estimated losses from the 2001 recession were
widely fed as parameters in exercises of subprime
mortgage risk assessment, the presumption of a per-
sistent appreciation of housing prices was not without
challenge. It clearly came into question in 2006, when
the markets experienced a rapid increase in the num-
ber of sub-prime downgrades and were provided fore-
casts of sharp increases in delinquency rates (see
Gorton 2008). Puzzlingly, however, mortgage origina-
tion and distribution did not slow down immediately,
and for some time it kept developing at the same high
rates as in the previous years. 
For the contributions in the literature that attribute
the US housing market dynamics to a bubble, the
beliefs that reinforced the vast underestimation of risk
during this period were possibly shaped by “social
contagion” (Shiller 2008) or “plausible deniability”
(Calomiris 2008). In this view, the ever-growing secu-
ritisation of mortgages was ultimately fed by different
pieces of distorted information, making investors pro-
gressively blind to any signals that did not agree with
their beliefs. According to anecdotal evidence, for
instance, much of the origination and securitisation
process occurred under the pressure of institutional
investors that were eager to purchase triple-A ABSs.
Sponsors chose rating agencies to maximise the
amount of high quality tranches they could issue from
any given pool of mortgages. 
Yet it is hard to believe that such behaviour and beliefs
could have been sustained without generalised agency
problems and conflict of interests between origina-
tors, sponsors and rating agencies, severely distorting
the securitisation process. As limited liability con-
tained the size of the maximum losses that different
agents faced along the chain of securitisation, the sys-
tem obviously created strong incentives to expand
leverage and take on risk. Supervisory and regulatory
bodies may have been aware of these conflicts and dis-
tortions but failed to act effectively on them. 
1.2.2 Low interest rates
For the US, nominal interest rates were quite low for
many years after 2001. Short-term real interest rates,
calculated by subtracting current inflation from the
short-term nominal rates, were actually negative for
almost three years, from autumn 2002 to spring 2005.
Similarly, over the same period, the long-term rates
remained persistently low and became insensitive to
policy rates – a phenomenon referred to as a conun-
drum by former Fed chairman Greenspan. Long-term
yields are depicted in Figure (1.17) of Chapter 1. 
Low interest rates clearly contributed to keeping
housing prices high. If we formulate the market price
of an asset (q) as the expected discounted value of the
cash flow generated by the asset (CF):
q= E((1/R)*CF).
Here, the discount rate is the inverse of the interest
rate R, and E denotes expectations. For a given cash
flow CF, the lower the interest rate R, the higher the
current price of the asset. Moreover, to the extent that
low interest rates support economic activity in the
short and medium run, they can feed expectations of
higher cash flows. This is true for bonds, equities as
well as for houses.
Less clear, however, is the role of low interest rates in
favouring the expansion of subprime mortgages, i.e.,
the participation of individuals with relatively low
income and credit rating in the mortgage markets. The
available evidence indeed points to apparent changes
in the composition of demand for houses in favour of
the lower segments of the market (see Shiller 2008,
chapter 2). The sustained expansion of the subprime
segment of the mortgage markets accompanies a
widening differential in the price dynamics of houses
– the strongest price increase prior to the crisis was
indeed recorded by the lowest-value segment, i.e., by
the smallest and cheapest houses. 
One could argue that low interest rates make it possi-
ble for poor people to buy a house, taking advantage
of favourable financing conditions. However, while
low interest rates obviously make mortgages cheaper,
they also make houses more expensive. It is far from
clear that low interest rates per se would cause a dis-
proportionate expansion in the subprime mortgage
segment of the market. A plausible explanation is that
low rates were accompanied by mispricing of credit
risk, more so and with a stronger impact at the low
end of the market. The erosion of lending standards
was apparent. Brokers conceded mortgages against
no documentation, allowed the combination of two
mortgages to finance down payments (the called pig-
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gyback mortgages), lend to “NINJAs” – No Income,
No Job or Assets).
A crucial question concerns the extent to which mon-
etary policy-makers have a responsibility in connec-
tion with the strong housing price dynamics – a ques-
tion implying that a stricter monetary policy could
have contained the size of the imbalances leading to
the crisis. The observation that the Fed pursued low
or even negative interest rates after 2001 does not
automatically imply that the increase in housing
prices should be attributed to the Fed policy. First,
these prices kept increasing through different phases
of the Fed monetary stance, even when policy rates
were raised in 2006. Second, and most importantly,
there is the Greenspan conundrum: long-term interest
rates, which are arguably more relevant for mortgages,
remained low irrespective of (and insensitive to) poli-
cy rates. 
Low long-term rates actually call attention to a sec-
ond issue: the global implications of large external
imbalances. According to the so-called “savings glut”
hypothesis put forward by Fed chairman Bernanke,
the large current account deficits run by the US essen-
tially accommodated the strong inflow of resources
from the rest of the world (this thesis is discussed in
detail by the 2006 EEAG report). Not only global
imbalances contributed to keeping long-term rates
low; they generated a substantial flow of resources in
pursuit of financial assets, arguably influencing,
directly or indirectly, US housing demand. We discuss
this issue further in Box 2.4.
I.2.3 Leverage cycles
Before delving into an analysis of the crisis, it is
appropriate to clarify how asset prices are linked to
leverage by financial intermediaries. This is an essen-
tial element to understand not only how continuing
housing appreciation has led to excessive risk-taking
by financial intermediaries, but also how limited loss-
es in a particular market translate into a recessionary
impulse for the economy as a whole. 
Drawing upon Greenlaw et al. (2008), we let A denote
the total (dollar) value of the assets managed by a
financial intermediary (a bank). Let E denote the
value of the bank’s capital. Then the ratio V=E/A
measures the “value at risk” per dollar of assets held
by the bank. Obviously, the larger E, the larger the
total losses that a bank can absorb. By the same
token, define the leverage ratio l as the ratio A/E:
clearly this is just the inverse of the unit value at risk
V, that is, l=A/E=1/V. By targeting some given level of
leverage, the bank implicitly set a given level of “value
at risk”.
Three general features of leverage l are worth stress-
ing. First, leverage varies across type of financial
intermediaries. Commercial banks, which finance
their assets through deposits and operate under rela-
tive strict regulation and supervision, typically main-
tain a leverage ratio close to 10 or 12. Investment
banks maintain much higher ratios, of the order of
20–25. So, to the extent that securitisation raises the
share of business going to investment banks and other
near-banking institution, overall leverage in the sys-
tem increases. Also, these institutions finance their
assets in the market for short-term debt: the maturity
structure of their liabilities tends to be quite short. On
the asset side, commercial banks have a large propor-
tion of loans that are usually carried at face value.
Investment banks instead tend to have a large propor-
tion of short-term claims (e.g., repurchase agree-
ments), so that their balance sheet values closely
approximate the market-to-market values of the secu-
rities they hold. The same applies to the other near-
banking institutions described above. 
Second, historical records show that l moves pro-
cyclically: when macroeconomic conditions are per-
ceived to be good (for instance, in a boom or in a bub-
ble economy), demand for loans is buoyant, and the
balance sheets of banks/financial intermediaries
expand. During a downturn the opposite is true. 
Third, leverage amplifies financial cycles. To see this,
consider the following simple example, featuring a
financial intermediary with securities valued $100 at
market prices, against liabilities consisting of debt for
$90, and equity for $10. 
The initial leverage ratio is 100/10=10. Suppose now
that the price of securities rises by 1 percent, bring-
ing the total value of assets to 101. If debt value
remains constant (this is tantamount to assuming
that debt does not respond appreciably to small
changes in market values), the value of equity
increases by 1:
Assets Liabilities
Securities 100 Debt 90
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Box 2.4 
The crisis and global imbalances
In recent years, the EEAG reports have devoted chapters and comments to the root causes of global imbalances, corresponding to
the emergence of large and persistent US current account deficits associated with financial globalisation, reviewing work on the 
causes and consequences of them and suggesting possible policy corrections. In this box we address a specific question: whether
some of the models in the literature can offer a consistent framework to interpret not only the rise of the imbalances but also their
role in the current crisis. 
The main argument often quoted by the press is that the critical behaviour of the shadow banking system in the US was fed by the 
pressure of money flowing from abroad, chasing investment opportunities. By and large this is a popular version of the idea 
attributed to Ben Bernanke that the US external imbalance has been driven by a global “savings glut”, due to the financial
integration of the US with economies with a much lower level of development and governance of financial markets, especially the
Asian economies.
This vision has been modelled by at least two contributions. A model of a savings glut was proposed by Caballero, Fahri and
Gourinchas (2008a,b), henceforth CFG, who build a comprehensive framework to explain, simultaneously, US current account
deficits, low interest rates at global level, and the emergence and bursting of bubbles (including bubbles in the commodities
market). At the root of this model is “excess demand for assets” by residents in growing emerging-market economies. Excess
demand is due to the fact that weak financial systems in their countries prevent these agents from appropriating fully the income
generated by assets supplied in domestic markets. When capital liberalisation allows these agents to invest abroad, they look for
investment opportunities in countries with better financial systems. As a result, the US (but not Europe) becomes a global
intermediary: loosely, the US supplies (the services from) assets to the financially less-developed world in exchange for goods and 
services. In this interpretation, the US is pushed into a structural equilibrium with low savings and large current account deficits,
with the world real interest rates at historical lows. 
Now, when global growth is high (reflecting the dynamics of China and India in the last decade), the world is “dynamically
inefficient”: the equilibrium real interest rate falls below the world growth rate. Economic theory has long made it clear that in an 
economy with this characteristic, speculative bubbles actually perform a desirable role, i.e., they redress issues raised by a global
shortage of assets. In other words, they create the financial means to satisfy the demand for assets from emerging market
economies. Which bubble performs this role does not matter. In economies with these characteristics, the collapse of one bubble
(internet) is not necessarily bad for the world economy, as long as growth remains high and another emerging bubble (say, in
housing), which still provides the financial means to meet the excess demand for assets. In this sense, the CFG model provides a
rationalisation of the soft-landing phase of the crisis, discussed in the text. In the first part of the crisis period, the collapse of the
housing bubble (which had replaced the previous internet bubble) coexists with a strong rise in the price of commodities, driven
by “financial speculation”.
What is instead devastating for the world economy is a negative shock to growth prospects. To the extent that lower growth means 
that the economy is no longer dynamically inefficient, the fall in the demand of assets forces bubbles to burst and thus causes a 
damaging contraction in asset supply – which can be seen as a deleveraging scenario.
One problem in the analysis by Caballero et al. (2008b) is that as a first approximation, the negative shock to growth is
exogenously given rather than modelled as an implication of the financial crisis. Interestingly, under this maintained assumption,
Caballero et al. show that a hard landing will not necessarily reduce the US external deficit: as long as the world remains
financially integrated, the US will keep its role of world financial intermediary. In other words, the crisis will not influence the 
root problem of global imbalances – excess demand for assets. For the CGF analysis to become a comprehensive model of global
imbalances and a hard landing, however, it must provide an explanation of the link between a financial crisis (associated with a 
collapse of a bubble) and a persistent (permanent) revision of growth expectations.
A second view of the savings glut hypothesis is proposed by Mendoza et al. (2007) and Corneli (2008) among others, who stress
the role of precautionary saving. In this approach, agents in financially less-developed countries have fewer opportunities for
smoothing income and production risk (the latter is stressed by Corneli 2008 drawing on early work by Angeletos and Calvet
2006). Hence, residents in the least advanced countries are in need of a larger financial buffer – they save more because of a
precautionary motive and invest less because of undiversifiable production risk. Given asymmetric financial structures and/or
asymmetric income and production risks across countries, other things being equal, globalization creates a flow of savings from
the countries where agents have fewer opportunities to diversify risk to countries where agents have more opportunities to do so. 
If, as in Angeletos and Calvet 2006, one envisions production uncertainty as a by-product of financial market frictions, the model
can actually account for a strong contraction in production and consumption at the global level following a crisis in financial
intermediation, as this naturally translates into a rise in uninsurable production risk. The challenge for modellers in this case is to
clarify the link between financial crisis and idiosyncratic production and income uncertainty. This link will also be crucial for
understanding the effects of the crisis on global imbalances. Whether US deficits persist after a hard landing will depend on the
relative magnitude of production and income risks in various regions of the world.
As an alternative to the savings glut view of global imbalances, many contributions focus on the role of policies pursued in the US
and abroad, especially from the 2001 recession on. According to many commentators, these policies translated into a
postponement of the required adjustment in savings in the US via the combination of low interest rates, expansionary fiscal
policies and a variety of measures with direct or indirect spillovers in the financial markets. An extreme version of this view
interprets disfunctional aspects in the supervision/regulation of financial markets as a by-product of the goal of maintaining
macroeconomic growth in the US after 2001, even at the cost of excessive macroeconomic risk. In contrast to the analyses
reviewed above, this view establishes a more direct link between global imbalances and the crisis, via lenient monetary, fiscal and 
financial policies in the face of extraordinary housing appreciation.
Independently of what generated global imbalances, the link between financial frictions and growth slowdown is explored by a
variety of business cycle models that stress fluctuations in confidence and risk premia. An interesting example is provided by
Karel Mertens’ (2007) analysis of the deep recession in Korea during the crisis in South East Asia in 1997-98. In his analysis,
financial inputs are essential to production plans before these can be implemented. In this case, events signalling the possibility of
a sharp slowdown in the future can actually create the premise for an expectations-driven, deep slowdown in the short run even if
fundamentals remain sound. Note that according to the model, credit shrinks in conjunction with the crisis, but this is no indicator
of a credit crunch on the supply side of financial intermediation.EEAG Report 2009 75
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If the bank did not react to the change in prices, the
leverage ratio would fall from 10 percent to
11/101=9.18 percent. This would be inefficient.
Maintaining the same target level of value-at-risk
profits can, in fact, be increased by raising the volume
of business up to the point where leverage is brought
back to 10. This would imply an expansion in both
debt and securities by 9 dollars
In this example, for a given V, one dollar of capital
gains in securities raises the level of financing pro-
vided by the financial intermediary to the economy
by 9 dollars. If the positive capital gains occur in an
economic expansion, the growth of financing is
actually likely to be larger, for two reasons. First, to
the extent that the economic boom generates opti-
mism, the bank may be willing to take more risk: a
higher V translates into a lower l. Were the leverage
ratio raised to 11, for instance, the securities on the
balance sheet would be further increased from 110
to A=E*l=11*11=122. Second, as the additional
demand for securities by the bank raises the
demand for assets, this may further increase their
price: the leverage cycle feeds price appreciation.
The graph in Figure 2.3a below illustrates these
considerations:
The argument however works
symmetrically in the case of
capital losses: a drop in the
value of securities translates
into a contraction of credit
which is a multiple of it, see
Figure 2.3b. The contraction
will be crucially sensitive both
to the decision by banks about
their target level of value at risk
and to possible feedback effects
of the credit contraction on
asset values and the level of
economic activity, which gener-
ates the demand for loans.
Experience suggests that the
interactions of these elements
can contribute significantly to
economic downturns.
This scheme is quite useful in
analyzing the dynamics of the
recent crisis, which is apparently
characterised by two distinct
phases. The first phase starts in
2007, with a run on the so called
shadow-banking system, generat-
ing extreme stress in some mar-
kets but leaving other markets
substantially unscathed. Despite
the turmoil, somewhat surpris-
ingly, deleveraging is limited in
this first phase. The second one
begins in summer 2008, when,
apparently in response to some
policy developments, the crisis
Assets Liabilities
Securities 101 Debt  90
Equity  11
Assets Liabilities
Securities 110 Debt 99
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Figure 2.3b
Figure 2.3ageneralises to all markets, generates threats of runs on
commercial banks and spills over to the real economy.
At the time of writing, an important question con-
cerns the extent to which deleveraging will contract
the activity of financial intermediaries, and how much
of this will translate into a constraint on economic
growth.
2. From the panic of August 2007 to the
system-wide crisis in autumn 2008: partial
recapitalisation, limited deleveraging and
liquidity injection
2.1 The onset of the crisis
The crisis erupted at the end of July 2007, after a ges-
tation of a few months. In fact, between autumn 2006
and summer 2007, the macroeconomic context
recorded two important changes, possibly intercon-
nected: the first was a moderate slowdown in housing
price dynamics; the second was the switch by major
central banks toward a more conservative monetary
stance, aimed at stemming high inflation rates, in
large part fuelled by strong appreciation in commodi-
ties. Details about market events and policy initiatives
can be found in the chronology appended to this
chapter.10
Doubts about the sustainability of the mechanism
of refinancing and growth in the subprime mort-
gage markets, and about the real magnitude of risks
in ABSs were clearly spreading. A synthetic indica-
tor of these doubts was provided by the asset-based
securities index, ABX.HE, launched in January
2006 to track the evolution of RMBSs, based on an
equally weighted index of 20 RMBSs, and sub-
indexes of tranches with different rating, for differ-
ent vintages of mortgages. Gorton (2008) stresses
two important functions performed by this index.
First, its creation provided the market participants
with transparent information about aggregate mar-
ket valuation of subprime risk, although pricing in
these markets may have already reflected some liq-
uidity problems. Second, it provided investors with
an instrument to cover their positions in ABSs, by
shortening the index itself. 
At the start of the trading in ABX, sub-indexes for
triple-B securities initially traded at par then moved
slightly downward at the end of 2006. They then
dropped dramatically in 2007: the subindex for the
2007–Q1 vintage started nose-diving upon issuance;
the 2007–Q2 vintage opened far from par, at 60. Most
importantly, a similar behaviour was displayed by the
CMBX, a synthetic index corresponding to the ABX
including 25 credit default swaps on commercial
mortgages. In 2007, the strong doubts by investors
were clearly systemic rather than concentrated on the
subprime RMBS segment.
The high visibility of these indexes obviously had a
strong influence on markets: problems in pricing and
trading ABSs became common knowledge. Anecdotal
evidence points to increasing liquidity problems in
placing portfolios including AAA-rated ABSs ulti-
mately backed by mortgages. Indeed, the period from
January to August 2007 recorded a series of negative
news on late and missing payments on mortgages,
especially in the subprime segment, bankruptcies and
earning warnings for originators, downgrading of rat-
ings for various RMBSs bonds and CDOs, and large
losses for hedge funds, some of which were closed
down.
The panic started at the beginning of August 2007,
with a run on financial institutions, associated with
skyrocketing risk premia and drying up of liquidity –
the economics of panics is briefly discussed in
Box 2.5. However, in contrast to many historical
examples, the panic did not spread among depositors
of commercial banks, with the exception of the case
of Northern Rock in September 2007: instead depos-
itors lining up in front of banks, investors simply
stopped extending credit to financial intermediaries,
and these stopped extending credit to each other, in
fear that direct and indirect contamination of balance
sheets with subprime loans would create solvency
issues. Also unlike other crisis episodes, many markets
were left almost unscathed for many months into the
crisis. What follows analyses what happened and dis-
cuss the reasons for this differential impact of the
panic in different parts of the economy.
2.2 How the financial turmoil has jeopardised the
functioning of the money and financial markets
As explained above, when the adverse news on the
performance of subprime hit the markets, informa-
tion about the size and incidence of losses was scarce
among market participants. The panic spread when
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10 Important collections of opinions and analysis provided in real
time during the development of the crisis are included in Felton and
Reinhardt (2008) and Eichengreen and Baldwin (2008). Real time
news and analysis are available through many blogs, e.g.,
“Maverecon,” by Willem Buiter, and web services, e.g., the Global
Economic Monitor by Nouriel Roubini, or Vox.EEAG Report 2009 77
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markets fully realised the scale and scope of informa-
tion asymmetries engrained in the financial system.
During the previous years, expectations of sustained
and generalised increases in the prices of housing
somewhat reduced the incentive to look carefully into
the fundamental components of different ABSs, while
collateralised and uncollateralised short-term financ-
ing was abundant for the most disparate classes of
securities. In 2007, these two conditions failed to per-
sist. Investors clearly realised that they needed to
know more about the ABSs in their portfolios:
extreme opacity meant that the cost of getting infor-
mation had become very high; at the same time, grow-
ing market illiquidity reduced the benefits from better
fundamental knowledge, as all ABSs were dumped
together in the same class of “toxic assets”. In the
absence of a market mechanism valuing transparency,
investors simply chose to withdraw from any portfolio
exposed directly or indirectly to ABSs. 
The main chapter of the panic included runs and illiq-
uidity, rising default risk and flight to quality (a
Box 2.5 
Panics and information 
To explain the logic of “runs”, it is useful to draw on the seminal work by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to build the following
simple analytical scheme. Consider a three period horizon, 0,1 and 2. In period 0, a financial intermediary, a bank, finances a
project (or an asset) maturing in period 2, by borrowing short from investors in period 0 and 1. In addition to financing this
project the bank also keeps liquid assets in anticipation that some fraction of the investors will have a need for liquidity in period
1, thus they will not roll over their debt. To these investors, the bank promises a short-term return r. To investors who keep rolling
over their debt for two periods, the bank promises R, equal to the long-run returns on the projects, unless the bank is forced to
close down by a “run” in the first period. In the event of a run, the fact that many investors withdraw their credit forces the bank 
to liquidate projects in advance at a cost, and pay all investors pro rata using the liquid assets and the proceedings of the fire-sale
of projects.
A fundamental solvency problem for a bank arises when the return on the projects in period 2 is below what it has promised to
investors. Due to the maturity mismatch between the banks’ assets and liabilities, however, insolvency may also arise because of
the risk of illiquidity, independently of fundamental solvency. The key reason is liquidation costs, which in the event of a run 
reduce the value of the banks projects below their fundamental value, say R-k. Because of liquidation costs, financial fragility 
arises because of what economists call “strategic complementarities” among investors.
For given fundamentals, in fact, there are two possible equilibria, vastly different, on which markets can coordinate their
expectations: one with, the other without runs. First, suppose that the bank benefits from a good reputation, and markets are calm.
In this case, there is little incentive for a single investor to withdraw his/her credit to the bank in the first period, unless he/she
really needs the cash – by assumption, this will be true only for a fraction of investors. Waiting until the second period yields a
much better return. As everybody follows the same reasoning, everybody ends up following the same strategy: roll over the credit 
to the bank unless in need of liquidity in the first period. This is the first, good equilibrium. However, suppose now that rumours
spread, hinting that people have lost confidence in the bank and a run is likely. Every investor knows that if a sufficiently high
number of investors decide to withdraw their credit, the bank will be forced to liquidate all projects and fail. Anticipating a run,
he/she will have a good reason to act pre-emptively, and try to withdraw his/her credit as soon as possible. Following this line of
reasoning, all will run, confirming in equilibrium the initial rumours, even if these were completely unjustified based on
fundamental analysis.
Information and beliefs are key to runs. Asymmetric information of course matters in shaping investors’ beliefs about the
fundamental value of projects that banks finance, i.e., of their portfolios. The argument above, however, also stresses the
importance of beliefs about the behaviour of other investors. Some pieces of information are common knowledge among market
participants (public signals), some are owned by specific investors (private signals). As information is costly to produce, the
amount and structure of information is in large part endogenous.
In the scheme above we have referred to rumours, which may be interpreted as a public signal reaching all market participants.
The literature after Diamond and Dybvig has provided many more insights on the role of information in a run (see e.g., Jacklin
and Battacharya (1988), Postlewaite and Vives (1987), Morris and Shin (2001,2003) and Rochet and Vives (2004)). A relevant
point for our chapter is that the amount of information in the market will depend, to large extent, on the efforts by investors and
intermediaries to process data. A recent contribution by Zwart (2008) will help us understand how, starting with a situation of
imperfect, noisy information, this could contribute to generate a run, and in turn the run will coincide with further loss of
information.
In the first few months of 2007, we saw that public signals (common to all market participants) about the quality and value of
ABSs were unequivocally negative. In principle, investors could have improved their judgement by acquiring or producing
“private signals”, i.e., private research on portfolios. However, given the uncertainty surrounding the chain of securitisation, 
getting accurate estimates of values was clearly a daunting and costly task. Under the circumstances, the costs of acquiring or
producing private signals with sufficient precision were unusually high.
As shown by Sanne Zwartz (2008), if agents expect fundamentals to be relatively bad, they will choose to run and give up
investment in private information altogether, as, in equilibrium, the expected benefits (in terms of profits) from acquiring an extra
piece of private information is low relative to its cost. In light of this analysis, one could conjecture that the recent panics in 2007 
and 2008 actually exacerbated opacity in the market, as during the run investors had little or no incentive to spend resources in
figuring out the size and location of subprime risk in different market segments and portfolios. Opacity was at the same time a
cause and a result of the crisis.detailed description can also be found in many texts,
including IMF 2008a,b, Gorton 2008, and Calomiris
2008). 
The run on structured investment vehicles (SIVs). A
classical run on intermediaries hit vehicles such as
SIVs and ABCP conduits, which (a) contained some
percentage of securities ultimately backed by sub-
prime mortgages, however small and (b) were fund-
ed with short maturity papers. Because of the latter
feature, investors could run quite simply, that is, by
ceasing to roll over their credit and no longer buying
the ABCPs issued by these vehicle (see below). As
financing dried up, sponsors intervened and
absorbed many of these portfolios back onto their
balance sheets: in practice, the SIVs disappeared as a
result of the crisis.
The ill-fate of SIVs is revealing with regard to the
main features of the crisis. These vehicles did not have
a large direct exposure to subprime risk: only a minor
portion of their portfolios were invested in CDOs of
ABSs, although one could argue that they were
exposed indirectly because they held a large share of
assets issued by the financial sector. As information
problems prevented in-depth scrutiny of their portfo-
lios, the fear of losses of undefined entity and location
made investors walk away from them. 
Illiquidity of structured products. As investors retreat-
ed from any institution and portfolio exposed, if only
to a small extent, to mortgage risk, liquidity dried up.
The most apparent victim of market illiquidity was
the market for repurchase agreements, “repos”. Repos
are secured loans, i.e.,, lending against collateral.
They constitute the basis for
inter-bank borrowing and lend-
ing, and are one of the largest
financial markets in the world.
Starting in August 2007, dealer
banks would no longer accept
any structured product as collat-
eral, because they anticipated
that there would be no market to
sell it in case they had to seize it.
Once again, there is a clear ele-
ment of self-fulfilling prophecy:
since there was no market to
evaluate the price of assets
offered as collateral, these assets
could not be employed in repos;
on the other hand, as these assets
were not employed in repos, no
one wanted to trade them in the marketplace. Not
only subprime RMBS were rejected as collateral but
virtually all types of asset backed securities. A key
source of bank financing essentially disappeared.
Spreads and illiquidity of money market instruments.
The drying up of liquidity caused a sharp increase in
the cost of borrowing in key short-term funding mar-
kets for financial intermediaries. This can be mea-
sured by the spreads between interest rates that inter-
mediaries charge each other and interest rates paid on
instruments which are not exposed to the default risk
of intermediaries. 
A good example to illustrate this pathology is provid-
ed by the spread between the London Interbank
Offered Rate, Libor, and the Overnight Indexed Swap,
OIS, of the same maturity, both in dollars and in
euros. This spread is an indicator of the markets eval-
uation of credit and liquidity risk of banks. The Libor
is an index of interest rates at which banks borrow
unsecured funds from each other – the market of ref-
erence being the London wholesale money market; it
results from the sum of the interest rate on a “sure”
loan with a certain maturity and a premium due to the
possibility of counterparty default over the terms of
the contract. The overnight interest swaps instead
track daily (floating) overnight rates – it is a geomet-
ric average of them and is referred to as the Fed
Funds Rate in the US, or Euro Overnight Index
Average (EONIA) in the euro area. 
Before the crisis, regardless of the currency denom-
ination, the Libor–OIS spread averaged slightly
above 10 basis points. As shown by Figure 2.4, there
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are two apparent discontinuities in the series. One
occurred in 10 August 2008, when the spread shot
up to 50 basis points, after which date it kept fluc-
tuating widely and far above its pre-crisis average.
The other occurred in September 2008, when the
spread more than doubled relative to the previous
months – this date is marked by a vertical line in the
graph.
Since the inception of the turmoil, interbank markets
became essentially illiquid for maturities longer than a
few days: the maturity structure of the interbank mar-
ket collapsed. Banks only agreed to trade Libor
deposits over a few days. Markets for one or three-
month deposits became one sided, raising issues over
the meaning of quoted prices used to construct the
interest rate indexes. To date, these markets are still
not functioning.
Cross-border and cross-market contagion. The crisis
spread rapidly among European banks with large
holdings of dollar assets, thus in need of cross-border
dollar financing. When the crisis hit the wholesale
market in the US, these banks faced higher rates and
a lack of liquidity in an important source of their
short-term financing need. Their initial response con-
sisted in raising funds in other currencies (euro, yen,
sterling) and then turning them into dollars by means
of foreign exchange and cross-currency swaps.
Through this channel, the crisis rapidly infected cur-
rency swap markets, driving up spreads and causing
illiquidity.
Marking-to-market and collateral calls. The demand
for cash was also fuelled by collateral calls from cred-
it derivative markets. In these markets, collateral calls
rise when the spread increases: a rise in the spread
means that, in the markets assessment, the sellers of
protection are more likely to pay. Hence, these are
requested to put down some cash.11
As the new Financial Accounting Standard Board
Rule 157 became effective, many new positions by
financial intermediaries were required to be marked-
to-market. For the banking and the near-banking
system as a whole, a much larger fraction of assets in
their balance sheets were thus linked to market
prices. While such practice has many merits, a prob-
lem arises during illiquidity crises, when asset prices
arguably move away from fundamental, fair values.
Once again, this can generate a self-fulfilling mecha-
nism; as banks try to sell assets and clean up their
balance sheets, this depressed asset prices even fur-
ther.
The spread of the crisis across mortgage markets. We
have seen above that the whole ABS sector was fully
infected by the crisis. It is worth stressing once again
that doubts about the sustainability of the mortgage
market clearly spread well beyond the subprime seg-
ment. Clear evidence is provided by the spread
between jumbo mortgages and conforming mortgage
rates. The first are mortgages exceeding the cap defin-
ing the “conforming” status, that is, they are large.
They are originated in relatively wealthy areas or in
locations where the housing price bubble was
stronger: roughly 50 percent of them are originated in
California. The spread picked up in August 2007,
clearly showing that markets were wary about housing
prices and anticipated bigger problems exactly where
capital gains had been large in the past and values at
stake were substantial. 
Flight to quality and the price of government debt. In
the first phase of the crisis, the loss of confidence in
the system of private intermediaries generated a
“flight to quality”, with a corresponding increase in
the demand for government assets. The effect of this
flight in the US can be fully appreciated looking at the
spread between Treasury Bills and the Libor, the so-
called TED (Treasury–Eurodollar Deposit) spread.
This spread can be seen in Figure 2.4. This shows the
T-Bill–OIS spread together with the Libor–OIS
spread: the TED spread is the (negative) difference
between the two.
Mirroring the Libor–OIS spread, the absolute size of
the TED spread also jumped at the onset of the crisis
and fluctuated widely afterwards, vastly exceeding any
previous records, e.g., during the 1998 Long Term
Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund crisis. The
sign of the spread is negative, however: government
assets were perceived as much safer than private
assets. Also the TED spread shows two apparent dis-
continuities: one in August 1997, the other in Sep-
tember 2008.
Interestingly, however, for many months into the cri-
sis the flight to quality did not hit sovereign debt from
emerging market economies, which maintained their
access to international markets at relatively favourable
conditions.
11 An interesting observation is that in a situation of market illiquid-
ity, there is a specific funding advantage for the buyer of protection
to make a collateral call. Funds received as collateral are paid the
Libor. As market rates were well above Libor, collateral usage in
derivative markets became an attractive means of financing.Contraction in the market for commercial paper. The
stock of asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) also
dropped dramatically with the crisis, by more than
30 percent in the first few months of the crisis. This is
shown in Figure 2.5, where the outstanding stock of
ABCP is plotted together with the stock of non-asset
backed commercial paper.
The figure illustrates two important and crucial fea-
tures of the crisis. First, the contraction in the size
of the market for asset-backed commercial paper
after August 2007 was abrupt and enormous –
reflecting the above mentioned speculative run, with
investors walking away from financial ABCPs. The
crisis completely eroded the extraordinary growth
experience by that market since 2004, hitting the
shadow banking system the most. Second, for a
number of months after its eruption, while illiquid-
ity affected money and interbank markets, together
with the market for structured products, many
important classes of assets and markets remained
largely unaffected. Indeed, as shown by the figure,
the market for non-asset backed commercial paper,
unrelated to financial firms, remained on trend until
summer 2008.
Similar considerations could be made for US equi-
ties, high-yield bonds and emerging market debt. For
instance, the Dow Jones Industrial Average reached
an all-time high on 9 October 2007. A clear divide
between financial and non financial assets emerged –
while the market for financial commercial papers
contracted immediately, non-financial commercial
papers kept being traded for many months into the
crisis. 
Virtually no market was spared,
however, when the crisis gener-
alised in September 2008, corre-
sponding to the second widening
of the spreads in Figure 2.4. 
2.3 Liquidity or solvency crisis?
Especially during the first
months into the crisis, a view that
informed much of the debate was
that the crisis was essentially due
to illiquidity, not to insolvency, of
financial intermediaries. Using
again the simple balance-sheet
example at the end of the previ-
ous section, it is worth exploring
the differences in these views in
some detail. The premise of the liquidity view of the
crisis is that fundamental losses from the subprime
segment of US mortgages – the segment where the cri-
sis was perceived to be originated – were not too large
relative to the capital of financial intermediaries. In
other words, consolidating the balance sheets of all
intermediaries in the market (netting out their bilater-
al credit and debit position), one should have
obtained according to this view an aggregate balance
sheet like the following:
In this example, losses are arbitrarily set equal to $2,
out of $100 of original securities (this example is
actually far more pessimistic than the initial estimates
of losses from subprime mortgages). Losses on assets
obviously reduce equity, in the example from $10 to
$8. As a result of the crisis, the value at risk, measured
by the ratio of equity to assets, falls from 10/100 to
8/98, which is from 10 percent to 8.16 percent.
Leverage (the inverse of value at risk) increases from
10 to 12.25. Note that if financial firms wished to
restore the initial (pre-losses) target of value at risk, in
the aggregate the reaction to the loss of 2 would con-
sist in either an increase in equity by the same amount
or a contraction in debt and securities by 10, accord-
ing to the logic of de-leveraging cycles described
above.
However, even if the consolidated aggregate losses
were indeed small relative to equity, at the onset of the




Securities 100-2 Equity   10-2 
Debt  90EEAG Report 2009 81
Chapter 2
2007–2008 crisis the balance sheet of each single
intermediary looked more like the following
where the estimate for aggregate losses (2) is re-
placed by question marks, reflecting the inability to
locate risk with any precision. Specifically, neither
the managers nor the investors and creditors were
able to produce a precise assessment of losses on the
balance sheet of an intermediary – although, obvi-
ously, the amount and quality of information would
typically differ across creditors, equity holders and
managers.
In our example, equity will remain positive as long
as the losses specific to an intermediary (bank or
near-bank) remain below 10, at which point the
value of equity would be completely wiped out.
Because of limited liability, the value of equity can
be written as the maximum between “10-losses”
and 0. Correspondingly, debt is safe for losses up to
10. For larger losses, the value of debt will decrease
by the size of losses minus equity. Hence, the value
of debt will be 90 less the maximum between 0 and
“losses minus 10”.
If the consolidated financial sector’s aggregate losses
were indeed below aggregate equity, a number of
financial intermediaries should have been in relatively
good shape. Yet, the high level of uncertainty appar-
ently prevented investors from telling insolvent insti-
tutions apart from sound ones. This uncertainty was
clearly conducive to financial fragility, as investors
were weary of the quality of the intermediary’s assets.
Since August 2007, this has been enough to create
generalised illiquidity in money markets, notoriously
characterised by zero risk tolerance.
Opacity also blurred the assessment of the amount
of resources required to intervene in support of the
banks. This amount should be measured up to their
net liabilities: if two banks insure each other against
different events, ex post only one will be paying the
other, thus at most one will be in trouble, of course
to the extent that it had not priced risks appropriate-
ly – including the risk of being unable to raise cash
from the market when this becomes illiquid.
However, a high level of opacity about magnitude
and incidence of risk and generalised market illiq-
uidity considerably complicates the picture. Given
the strong interconnection among intermediaries via
opaque securitisation, it is ex ante unclear which
bank will be in trouble under which contingency.
Hence, the perceived need for ex-ante public support
to banks tends to be measured up to their gross lia-
bilities – i.e., the sum of liabilities of all intermedi-
aries (see the discussion in Buiter 2008 and Caballero
and Krishnamurthy 2008).
Consistent with the liquidity view of the crisis, the dis-
covery of the aggregate magnitude of losses would be
facilitated by some institutional arrangement result-
ing in a de facto large, economy-wide clearing house
for all structured products – an institution which
would stand ready to purchase all outstanding assets
at their fundamental value, financing these purchases
by issuing clearinghouse securities to the market.
Some of the initial plans were indeed inspired by this
view.
Over time, the confidence in the liquidity view of the
crisis was shaken not only by adverse news about fun-
damentals but also by protracted illiquidity of mar-
kets. Consider the event of a run on a financial inter-
mediary which is forced to sell its assets in an illiquid
market at a loss (see the box on panics). As the total
value of the assets on its balance sheet is not neces-
sarily in line with their fundamental values (whatever
this is), the expectations that drive the run in the first
place are validated ex post. For the representative
intermediary, asset and liabilities look as follows:
The illiquidity-related cost k can be high, up to wip-
ing out equity and eroding substantially the value of
debt. By the very nature of illiquid markets, the exact
amount of k is uncertain and volatile: even small sales
may move prices substantially. Any ex ante estimate of
asset sale prices may turn out to be far removed from
what is effectively realised in a fire sale (see e.g., Allen
and Carletti 2008).
In principle, since asset backed securities (ABSs) in
the portfolios of intermediation are collateralised, one
may expect that losses are bounded from below by the
market price of the collateral, e.g., ultimately the price
of houses for residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBSs). However, first, a run on financial institu-
Assets Liabilities 
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Debt   900-Max[0,50+k-100]tions may exacerbate the decline in house prices that
undermine financial stability in the first place.
Second, the (illiquid) market price of houses, which is
relevant for the owner, is above what accrues to the
intermediary in case of repossession.
These considerations suggest that during a crisis con-
cerns about fundamental solvency and illiquidity
become strictly interwoven: it is quite hard to disen-
tangle their role in market assessments of bank-spe-
cific risk. Indeed, studies addressing this issue by
looking at the determinants of the Libor–OIS spread
reach contrasting conclusions (see e.g., ECB 2008a,b,
IMF 2008a,b and Michaud and Upper 2008). These
empirical exercises are nonetheless valuable as they
tend to show the overwhelming weight of systemic
aspects of the distress, for instance, by detecting an
“epicentre” for the turmoil consisting of a relatively
small group of intermediaries playing a major role in
the interbank market.
Whether because of fundamental considerations or as
a result of the erosion of values due to persistent illiq-
uidity, the view of the crisis switched to “insolvency”
in summer 2008.
2.4 The dynamics of the crisis and public 
interventions: the hopes for a “soft landing”
A crucial feature of the turmoil is that for a number
of months after the eruption, many markets
remained untouched by the crisis. Most importantly,
there was little evidence of spillovers on to the real
economy, of the gravity that the ongoing financial
turmoil could be expected to generate. What exactly
can account for the relatively benign transmission in
the early phase?
In the literature on global imbalances, a soft-landing
is generally envisioned as a dynamic equilibrium in
which the US reduces the current account deficit with
contained dollar depreciation and no deep recession
(see e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff 2007, Krugman 2007,
Faruqee et al. 2007).12 In many dimensions, this soft-
landing scenario appears to describe well the first
phase of the crisis, from early 2007 to summer 2008.
This was so despite the fact that the illiquidity of
structured products persistently jeopardised the nor-
mal functioning of money markets and progressively
undermined the viability of highly leveraged financial
intermediaries relying on short-term financing, most
notably investment banks.
Over this first phase, the prevailing view among poli-
cy circles was that the fundamental problems at the
root of the admittedly dangerous pathology in money
markets were relatively manageable, in the sense that
they could be absorbed over time by adopting a two-
armed policy approach. On the one hand, central
banks would make up for the lack of liquidity in the
interbank markets by providing financial intermedi-
aries with enough cash to operate without relying on
each other for credit. Liquidity provision would then
buy time for banks to restructure, namely, to raise new
equity capital and write-down bad debt – while con-
taining the need for sharp de-leveraging with the asso-
ciated negative effects on real activity. On the other
hand, treasuries and central banks would intervene on
a case-by-case basis to support banks under threat of
failure – either as a result of a run or because of fun-
damental losses. (The main principle driving interven-
tions being the need to preserve the functioning of
large intermediaries with many market interconnec-
tions, whose failure would have strong systemic
effects.)
In this respect, a first important piece of evidence is
that in the months after September 2007, the finan-
cial sector was able to raise new capital of more
than $430 billion (calculated up to September 2008).
The ability to raise capital under crisis conditions
(i.e., illiquidity and falling bank security prices) was
clearly remarkable relative to previous crisis
episodes (see Calomiris 2008). In 2007, the new cap-
ital came in large part from institutional investors
and sovereign wealth funds – the presence of the lat-
ter raising an issue in the control of large corpora-
tions in the US and Europe by foreign states; in
2008 most of the new capital came from public
investors. Banks raised new capital by issuing hybrid
securities, i.e., combining features of both bonds
and equities, especially in the US, whereas banks
relied more on stocks in European countries (see
IMF 2008b).13
EEAG Report 2009 82
Chapter 2
12 The recent literature on global imbalances has often referred to
“soft landing” and “hard landing” to build scenarios for the rebal-
ancing of international portfolios, i.e., capital and trade flows, asso-
ciated with a reduction in the US current account deficit (a distinc-
tion reconsidered by Bilbiie and Corsetti 2008 in relation to the cri-
sis). In the policy debate on the “excessive US current account”, a
hard landing refers to an abrupt crisis of the dollar, with the US
being forced to close its external deficit in a short time span (see for
instance the analysis of Roubini and Setser 2004, stressing the finan-
cial dimension of the crisis). The EEAG 2008 emphasised that the
function of dollar movements envisioned in these different scenarios
of global adjustment is more that of rebalancing relative national
wealth across regions of the world rather than enhancing narrowly-
defined competitiveness of the US goods market (see also Corsetti
2007, Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti 2008).
13 Over the same period, banking institutions undertook an estimat-
ed $580 billion in write-downs. Write-downs were mostly concentrat-
ed in the US and in Europe (see IMF 2008a,b).EEAG Report 2009 83
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What did this equity injection imply for the interme-
diaries’ balance sheets? To address this question, we
reproduce two figures from from Greenlaw et al.
(2008). For US investment banks and major US com-
mercial banks, Figures 2.6a,b plot total assets growth
against leverage growth (data are adjusted for merg-
ers) at a quarterly frequency between 1998 and the
first quarter of 2008. The two figures confirm two
well-known stylized facts: typically, (a) the correlation
between the two growth rates is strongly positive, and
(b) periods of slowdown and asset market crisis are
associated with a contraction of both leverage and
asset growth, while periods of real and asset market
booms are associated with an expansion in the same
variables. 
Coming to the crisis period, the graphs suggest that
the first quarters into the crisis were special in two
respects. First, in contrast to the
other critical episodes for finan-
cial intermediaries, such as the
LTCM crisis in 1998 and the 2001
stock market turmoil, there was
little evidence of a “deleveraging
cycle”, which should have placed
the observations corresponding
to 2007-Q4 and 2008-Q1 in the
lower left-corner of the graph.
Second, especially for US invest-
ment banks, leverage growth was
actually unusually high, given
total asset growth.
To a large extent, the expansion in
leverage of investment banks
reflected the fact that these inter-
mediaries provided liquidity and
credit support of SIVs and other
ABS conduits – as a consequence
of explicit and implicit contracts
between intermediaries and their
clients, to whom structured prod-
ucts were sold with guarantees.
Whatever the reason, however, the
message from the graphs is that
balance sheets of financial inter-
mediaries did not shrink in the
early months of the crisis. While
this is no evidence that credit con-
ditions remained easy – conditions
for lending could have been tighter
– this behaviour, anomalous rela-
tive to the typical cycle, arguably
contributed to delaying the effect
of the crisis on the real economy.
On the policy side, the strategy of recapitalisation and
write-downs was supported by liquidity interventions
on a progressively larger scale. Over time, central
banks intervened more frequently, with larger
amounts, providing longer term funds, broadening
the collateral and counterparty list and opening lend-
ing facilities for non-commercial banks. Central
banks also reinforced cross-border cooperation in liq-
uidity management and provision by establishing
cross-border dollar swap lines. They made it clear that
they could (and did) adopt non-conventional inter-
vention measures whenever deemed necessary (see
e.g., Bank of International Settlement 2008, and
Borio and Nelson 2008). Indeed, the balance sheets of
central banks changed in composition and size after
2007, and sharply so in autumn 2008 – the compara-
Figure 2.6a
Figure 2.6btive evolution of the size of the balance sheet of the
Fed and the ECB is shown by Figure 2.7.
The strategy appeared to work, at least initially. As
shown in our chronology of the crisis, autumn 2007
was characterised by a series of important write-
downs by major international banks worldwide. It
was clear that the crisis would spare virtually no cor-
ner of the global market, from German banks, which
were particularly exposed to ABSs, to the Bank of
China, which revealed $9 billion losses as early as
4 September 2007. The UK authorities were not able
to avoid a run on the deposits of Northern Rock, the
first bank run after more than a century. Arguably, the
picture of depositors standing in line before the bank
doors became a powerful image, reinforcing aware-
ness of the fragility of the financial system, despite
the fact that no one lost money. The event made it
painfully clear that monetary, fiscal and supervisory
authorities should have quickly verified the consisten-
cy of their framework and action. Coordination
across borders also emerged as a priority but has
remained an unsolved issue – see e.g., the lack of com-
munication among authorities when Société Générale
announced huge losses due to unauthorised activity
by one of its traders in January 2008. 
Central banks intensified liquidity injection and
refined their intervention to make sure they could
reach commercial banks in need of funds. One
important issue faced by the monetary authorities
was in fact the reluctance of banks to ask for assis-
tance, because of the implied “stigma effect”. Banks
wanted to avoid the negative feedback from letting
the market know about their need for emergency
funds – a piece of information
which could have clearly trig-
gered a revision of market as-
sessment of the bank solvency
for the worse. Monetary author-
ities moved to guarantee the
anonymity of banks asking for
funds. For instance, comple-
menting new rules governing the
discount window already in
place for some years, on
12 December 2007 the Fed set up
a Term Auction Facility (TAF),
allowing banks to bid anony-
mously for 28-day loans against
a set of collateral broadened as
to include MBSs. While some of
these measures turned out to be
effective, at different stages of
the crisis the stigma effect remained a key constraint
on the effectiveness of policy intervention.
As the magnitude of losses mounted in size and cross-
border contagion became more pervasive, on 12 De-
cember 2007 the Fed, the European Central Bank and
the Swiss National Bank established a swap line, an
important milestone in international monetary coor-
dination. However, a clear divide emerged regarding
interest rate policy. The Fed had already cut rates in
three steps of 25 points in autumn 2007 and in an
emergency move, it cut them by 75 basis points on
January 22, and by 50 basis points at the end of the
same month; it continued to lower rates in March and
April. Fed officers during this period defended their
choice on the ground that while commodity prices
were rising, headline inflation and core inflation
remained quite subdue. On the other hand, the Bank
of England remained focused on inflation risks and
did not cut rates in the first months of the crisis,
despite the Northern Rock episode; it then cut them
three times between the beginning of the crisis and
October 2008, however keeping rates at 5 percent
throughout the spring and summer of the year. The
ECB also remained focused on inflation risks, explic-
itly pursuing the strategy of separating liquidity sup-
port from the cyclical monetary stance. In the euro
area, rates remained untouched at 4 percent until
summer 2008, when they were actually raised by
25 basis points.
In addition to continuing announcements of losses
and write-downs by major international financial
institutions, the beginning of 2008 saw the emergence
EEAG Report 2009 84
Chapter 2
Figure 2.7EEAG Report 2009 85
Chapter 2
of the crisis among monoline insurers, traditionally
active as insurers of municipal bonds – because of
the guarantees by monoliners, these bonds could ben-
efits from a AAA rating. The markets became aware
that monolines had progressively extended their busi-
ness to ABSs and different types of structured prod-
ucts. Because of their small capitalisation, there was
the risk of a generalised downgrade of monoliners,
with important systemic effects. In fact, a downgrade
of monoliners would have had a cascade effect on the
rating of municipal bonds and other private bonds,
as well as structured products, markets with an esti-
mated face value of $2.4 trillion. In turn, a down-
grade of these securities would have forced many
institutional investors (such as money market funds)
to sell them off, with an obvious dramatic effect on
their prices and the liquidity of these markets (see
Brunnermeier 2009). Not surprisingly, the down-
grade of the monoliner insurer Ambac by Fitch trig-
gered a large drop in stock market values world-wide.
Markets for municipal bonds as well as a number of
other markets (e.g., student loans) suffered a sudden
drying up of liquidity. 
The bailout of Bear Stearns in mid-March 2007 was
interpreted as a successful intervention against the
risk of systemic shocks from the failure of a relative-
ly large, interconnected intermediary. The bailout was
justified on the grounds that the collapse of Bear
Stearns appeared to be driven by marked illiquidity
rather than insolvency. The reliance on short-term
financing by investment banks created a heavy expo-
sure to liquidity risk, pointing to a problem that even-
tually led to the end of the model of investment bank-
ing as highly leveraged institutions financing their
asset positions by rolling over short-term debt instru-
ments. Yet, it has been noted (Vives 2008a) that the
Fed did not have first-hand information on Bear
Stearns, as this was outside its supervision. How can
a central bank with no supervisory power over invest-
ment banks tell whether one such institution is or is
not insolvent?
The extension of the lender of last resort facility out-
side the commercial banks de facto started on
11 March, 2007, when the Fed created the Term
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), which essentially
granted investment banks the same terms of the TAF.
With an endowment of $200 billion, the TSLF
enabled investment banks to swap different mortgage-
related bonds for Treasury Bills for a period of up to
28 days in secrecy.But liquidity support was not
enough to save Bear Stearns, which had suffered from
the collapse of the Carlyle Capital Corp. early on in
the month, and was hit by widespread rumours of
insolvency.14 Over the weekend of March 14–16, the
New York Fed engineered its rescue by granting a
loan of $30 billion to JPMorgan, which in turn agreed
to buy Bear Stearns initially for $2 per share (these
shares were valued $150 one year before). 
At the same time, the Fed announced the Primary
Dealer Credit Facility (PDFC). Since primary dealers
are mostly investment banks, this facility in effect is a
discount window for such intermediaries. This was
regarded an important step, as the bailout of Bear
Stearns was in part justified as a way to prevent oth-
ers institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, from col-
lapsing. The new facility eased liquidity concerns in
the market.
While the stock market reacted positively to the Bear
Stearns deal, markets and commentators noted that
equity holders were severely hit, while bond holders
completely spared in the rescue. Under some pressure,
JPMorgan agreed to raise its initial bid from $2 to
$10 per share. Moreover, emerging political opposi-
tion to the Fed loan to JPMorgan created tension
among the customers of Bear Stearns. To stem politi-
cal opposition, JPMorgan agreed to assume the first
billion of losses in the $30 billion loan by the Fed.
In the same period, the US treasury eased the capital
requirements on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to pre-
vent the negative spillovers from a contraction of liq-
uidity in the ABS markets (and the housing markets).
At the end of May, the crisis seemed under control,
although illiquidity in the money markets remained
somewhat critical.
The essential prerequisite for placing confidence in
the intervention strategy described above was its
macroeconomic counterpart, that is, confidence in the
fact that growth would remain relatively strong in
many emerging markets and to a lesser extent in
Europe, even if the US were to experience a slow-
down. Obviously, without sustained global growth,
the financial side of the soft-landing strategy would
be much more demanding. 
From a macro perspective, real-financial decoupling
corresponded to a growth decoupling: according to
many observers, some trimming of growth expecta-
14 The crisis was apparently triggered by miscommunication by e-
mail between a hedge fund and Goldman Sachs on March 11 and 12,
see e.g., Brunnermeier (2009).tions in the developed world
would have had little impact on
activity in emerging markets.
This view had three important
implications. First, the financial
crisis in the US and elsewhere
could have been addressed in a
context where the US current
account deficit would remain on
a declining path, thus redressing
global imbalances. Figure 2.8
shows the US current account
together with the multilateral
exchange rate of the dollar since
the year 2000. Indeed, there is a
mild sign of a turnaround in the
US deficit after 2006, which per-
sisted in 2007, despite the fact
that the hike in oil prices (see
below) clearly slowed down ad-
justment in this period.
A strong external sector would
have helped sustain the level of
activity in the US. Figure 2.9
shows calculations by the Fed on
the net export contribution to
real GDP in the US, showing
that during the crisis period, ex-
ternal demand was indeed a
strong engine of growth.
Second, a positive growth differ-
ential between the rest of the
world and the US could be ex-
pected to keep the dollar weak in
real terms. Indeed, the dollar
kept depreciating well into the
crisis until summer 2008. Figu-
re 2.10 reports the dollar ex-
change rates over the same peri-
od. On a multilateral basis, the
dollar remained weak in the soft-
landing period. It depreciated
against the euro sharply in
March, at the time of the Bear
Stearns bailout and of the 75 ba-
sis point cut in the target Federal
funds rate. An interesting ques-
tion is whether the progressively
expansionary stance of US mon-
etary policy at the time and the
associated debate on the need to
rebalance growth and inflation
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risk, could have induced market expectations of a
widening in the inflation differential between the US
and Europe over the medium term.
Third, the increase in the price of commodities, espe-
cially energy, experienced already in the previous year,
was not expected to abate. Even observers who attrib-
uted it to speculative forces would recognize that as a
result of world growth and some other intervening
factors (e.g., the expansion of bio-fuel), the world had
entered a new era characterised by higher relative
prices for food and oil. Figure 2.11 shows the devel-
opment of selected indices of commodity prices from
January 2007 on.
Not surprisingly, the soft landing period was domi-
nated by the policy debate on global inflation and
stagflation. As mentioned above, while there was little
evidence that core and wage inflation had accelerated
significantly, the European Central Bank (and other
monetary authorities) preferred to maintain rates at a
constant level, even increasing them at the beginning
of the summer. Thus strong liq-
uidity support to the market was
not matched by a looser stance of
interest rate policy.
To sum up, the financial and
macro policy in a soft-landing
scenario through summer 2008
rested on a double decoupling
hypothesis. Real-financial decou-
pling meant that the problems of
the financial sectors could be
addressed so as to minimize the
negative implications for the real
economy. Growth decoupling
meant that possible difficulties of
the US would not compromise
economic activity in the rest of
the world. Notable by-products
of these two decoupling hypothe-
ses were buoyant commodity
prices, global inflation and a
weak dollar. In 2007 and 2008,
the weak dollar helped the US in
sustaining employment and out-
put, with net exports becoming
the most dynamic component of
demand. The dollar steadily
weakened over the first months
of the crisis, accelerating its
decline during the bailout of
Bear Stearns. 
A descriptive summary of the features of soft-landing
phase is provided by Table 2.3 below. 
2.5. The near collapse of September-October 2008
and the onset of the deleveraging cycle
Coordination of expectations on the soft landing
hypothesis ended in July-August 2008. The assessment
and perception of the magnitude of the financial crisis
rose with new figures on mortgage delinquency rates
and also as the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration took over the California-based Indymac
Bank, then hit by a run on deposits. In response to
spreading financial turmoil, the Treasury stepped up
its commitment to support Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in July, making the government guarantee explic-
it at first, before placing them under federal conserva-
torship at the beginning of September. 
Most crucially, the real-financial and growth decou-
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Case-by-case approach to bailout
intermediaries dence. Figure 2.12 reports the consensus forecast for
the US, euro area and Japan, together with the IMF
forecasts for Brazil, China, India and Russia. As
shown by this figure, and discussed in Chapter 1, they
all started to fall in summer 2008.
With the revision in global growth rates, not only the
price of commodities started to fall synchronically
and dramatically (see Figure 2.11). Most strikingly,
the dollar started to appreciate substantially, despite
the US clearly remaining the epicentre of the crisis
(see Figure 2.10).
In September, the large and generalised run on
financial intermediaries in the aftermath of the deci-
sion to let Lehman Brothers fail – almost turning
into a run on deposits by the public in mid-October
– shattered hopes for a soft-land-
ing. Lehman Brothers had nar-
rowly escaped a collapse in
March, thanks to the positive
effects on market confidence of
the rescue of Bear Stearns in
March as well as by virtue of the
access to the new facilities set up
by the Fed. It was however un-
able to raise new equity, as its
management apparently per-
ceived to be in a Catch-22 situa-
tion: new equity was needed to
restore the economic viability of
the bank; however, trying to
raise new equity would have sig-
nalled to markets severe balance
sheet problems. Lehman condi-
tions sharply deteriorated when
the Korea Development Bank, which had expressed
an interest in buying the firm, decided not to do so.
In mid-September, the NY Fed started a process to
rescue the bank, involving Barclays and Bank of
America. However, unlike in March, the US govern-
ment made clear that no government guarantee
involving taxpayers’ money would be provided.
When Barclays withdrew and the Bank of America
bid for Merrill Lynch, Lehman was forced to file for
bankruptcy.
While Lehman was as interconnected as Bear Stearns,
according to many commentators the US Fed and the
Treasury believed that possible systemic effects from a
collapse would have been contained, as market partic-
ipants had time to prepare for it. This presumption
was clearly wrong. The bankruptcy of Lehman jeop-




Risk assessment of CDSs and CDOs at AIG 
AIG sold insurance on debt securities backed by financial assets such as subprime mortgages, and corporate and personal loans.
The insurance sold took the form of a credit default swap (CDS). AIG promised the buyers of the CDS that if the underlying
securities defaulted, AIG would cover the losses. This obviously exposed AIG to default risks of the underlying securities (say the
subprime mortgages). According to models based on historical data, this type of risk was assessed as being very small. However
selling CDS involved other types of risks that were not contemplated by AIG. Namely, the contracts stipulate that the buyers of the
CDS can demand collateral from AIG if the underlying securities decline in value (it is like a margin call in a futures market) or if
the very rating of the debt of AIG is downgraded. AIG did not consider this type of risk until the second half of 2007. As a result,
AIG was exposed to very large collateral calls (for example from Goldman Sachs) without being adequately protected.
 1
AIG had started in 2004 to provide insurance on complex securities such as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) based in turn on
securities like mortgage bonds. Some of these CDOs were extremely complex, covering many securities backed by different types
of financial products (from mortgages to auto loans to credit cards receivables). In early 2006 AIG decided to stop exposure to
such complex CDOs. In any case from mid-2007 on mortgage securities started to be downgraded and the buyers of insurance 
from AIG grew worried. The demands for collateral by these insurance purchasers started a dispute with AIG – How much
collateral should AIG post? – which was settled with Goldman at some point. Meanwhile in late 2007 and 2008 AIG undertook
major write-downs of the value of the swaps. The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 induced a downgrade of the 
credit rating of AIG, which would have required AIG to post more than $18 billion in additional collateral to the purchasers of
insurance. At this point the US government bailed out AIG. The loan commitment of the government to AIG, up to $123 billion,
seems to have been eaten up to a good portion by further collateral calls from AIG’s counterparties.EEAG Report 2009 89
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ardised counterparties of its contracts around the
world, with far reaching effects. For instance, the
bankruptcy had a strong impact on the industry of
money market funds, many of which “broke the
buck”, i.e., their share prices went below $1, because
the underwriters of their (AAA) assets – then under
severe distress – could no longer buy these assets
back. The price of default risk skyrocketed. 
Nonetheless, contemporaneously, the US authorities
decided to intervene in defence of the US insurance
giant AIG, which, operating world-wide, had become
increasingly exposed to the crisis through business in
the credit default swap market – the case is discussed
in Box 2.6. After providing a $20 billion lifeline on
September 14 (when Lehman Brothers filed for bank-
ruptcy), the US authorities took control of AIG and
injected $85 billion in the firm on September 16.
The decision to let Lehman Brothers fail while sup-
porting AIG was clearly seen by the markets as the
outcome of a piecewise policy lacking coherence and
vision. Both markets and policy-makers understood
that confidence in financial intermediaries (hence
money market standards) could not be restored with-
out a systemic and comprehensive strategy, address-
ing both current market illiquidity and medium and
long-run solvency. With the switch of market expecta-
tions towards a situation of global systemic crisis,
market illiquidity became widespread. Investors ran
from both financial and real private assets, marking
the end of some classes of intermediaries, such as
investment banks – forced by market illiquidity and
turmoil, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs gave up
their status and became commercial banks on
22 September 2008. Following the familiar patterns of
flight to quality, investors raised the demand for gov-
ernment debt which was perceived to be relatively less
risky than private assets. However, risk assessment
worsened for largest and more advanced countries
such as Germany, and risk premia widened interest
differentials across government debt by different
countries, a salient example being the spectacular in
the risk assessment of the UK. Investors ran on frag-
ile economies, causing currency and financial crises
especially in small countries which were perceived as
lacking the tax base and tax capacity to offer credible
guarantees on gross liabilities by their intermediaries
(such as Iceland). Many emerging market economies
which had remained (surprisingly) unscathed for
many months fell victim to the waves of speculation
that jeopardised any hope for continuing financial
and fiscal stability. 
The difficulties of the government to present a coher-
ent and possibly co-ordinated plan to address the cri-
sis almost caused a run on deposits in mid-October,
when nervous investors started to withdraw cash from
banks (many newspapers reported an unusual rise in
the demand for home safe-boxes), and many switched
banks, looking for intermediaries backed by the
strongest government guarantees. 
Most interestingly, the dollar appreciated sharply with
the exacerbation of the crisis, raising issues in the per-
ception of risk by the markets. The response of the
dollar is quite intriguing in light of the vast literature
envisioning the resolution of the global imbalances as
a large and sustained fall in the value of this curren-
cy.15 Envisioning an international run on the US,
many commentators in the past would indeed have
predicted a crisis in terms of large dollar devaluation
possibly associated with a US recession (perhaps
undermining the role of this currency as an interna-
tional vehicle currency). That is obviously quite dif-
ferent from what we experienced in 2008, with the
cross-border run on financial institutions spreading
throughout the largest (and most financially ad-
vanced) countries. 
An important element in our interpretation of the
phase of soft landing is the fact that, initially, the effect
of the crisis on deleveraging was quite contained. In
the hard landing scenario after autumn 2008, it is quite
likely that the world experiences a deleveraging cycle,
possibly with an impact on the level of activity by
firms and the spending plans of households. Since
September 2008, global rebalancing has been proceed-
ing in the form of substantial write-downs by financial
intermediaries. At the end of 2008 total reported
write-downs amounted to around $1 trillion, as shown
in Table 2.4. How much more is to be expected, cru-
cially depends on the total size of losses by financial
intermediaries. The $1.4 trillion estimated by the IMF
(2008b) at the end of 2008 appeared utterly unrealistic
at the beginning of the new year.
A caveat is in order. Looking at banks’ activity it
may be quite difficult to ascertain a strong delever-
15 This argument essentially draws on the tradition of the “transfer
problem” (popularised after the debate between Keynes and Ohlin
regarding German reparations after World War I), whereas a hard
landing consists in the “double punishment” from falling terms of
trade when a country pays back what it owns: intuitively, because of
relative price movements, the economic cost of adjustment raises the
debt. There are variants of this double punishment – most people
stressing the need for quantity adjustment via a US recession (see
EEAG 2008); Corsetti, Martin and Pesenti (2008) work out the eco-
nomics of transfer with product differentiation and sectoral re-allo-
cation of production, showing that high welfare costs may occur
independently of terms of trade movements.aging cycle in the 2008 data – a strong position in
this respect has been taken by Chari et al. (2008) in
a provoking piece showing evidence that credit has
in fact not collapsed with the crisis. However, as
stressed by Adrian and Shin (2008a), in judging the
extent of the contraction in credit, it is crucial to
disentangle the role of commercial banks from
other market-based institutions. Market-based cred-
it (including credit cards, auto loans and student
loans) has shrunk dramatically with the crisis; bank
lending may have held its own or even correspond-
ingly increased, arguably because of the role of
banking in providing a financial buffer when market
conditions deteriorate.
Equally difficult is the assessment
of the potential impact of a cred-
it crunch on real economic activ-
ity (see early calculations by
Greenlaw et al. 2008). Yet, it
should be stressed that even in
the absence of any crunch, a sim-
ple assessment of the wealth
effects from portfolio losses
(stocks and financial instru-
ments) and declining housing
prices (with the caveats stressed
e.g., by Buiter 2008), suggests
that private spending will con-
tract by several percentage
points, dragging output many
points below potential.
Indeed, stock values around the
world fell sharply in 2008 – the
most well-known indexes lost
between 30 and 50 percent in
domestic currencies, in many
cases setting disturbing histori-
cal records. In the context of
the crisis, this global contrac-
tion in financial wealth can be
expected to have far-reaching
implications, well beyond the
immediate impact in demand.
Combined with the loss of con-
fidence in the ability of finan-
cial intermediaries to price,
manage and diversify risk, the
market downturn is likely to
translate into widespread
changes in the modalities of
households’ participation in
financial markets as well as
strong pressure on governments
to intervene beyond normal standards of regulation
and supervision. 
As in the previous subsection, we can conclude our
analysis with a descriptive account of the hard land-
ing as we experienced it by the end of 2008 in terms
of the following scheme, where most entries are the
negative of the soft-landing scenario, but there are
also additional important new entries, listed last,
which refer to the willingness by governments to
counteract the crisis with high doses of fiscal poli-
cies, and possibly pursue some form of coordination
(see Table 2.5).
EEAG Report 2009 90
Chapter 2
Table 2.4  
Writedowns and credit losses
Banks Company 
Total writedowns and credit losses
since Jan 2007 ($bn)
1 Wachovia 95.5 
2 Citigroup  67.2 
3 Merrill Lynch  55.9 
4 UBS  48.6 
5 Washington  Mutual 45.6 
6 HSBC  33.1 
7 Bank  of  America 27.4 
8 National City 26.2 
9 JPMorgan Chase 20.5 
10 Lehman Brothers 16.2 
11  Royal Bank of Scotland  15.8 
12 Morgan Stanley  15.7 
13 Bayerische Landesbank  14.8 
14 Wells  Fargo  14.6 
15 IKB  14.4 
16 Credit Suisse 14.2 
 Worldwide 741.2 
Insurers Company 
Total writedowns and credit losses
since Jan 2007 ($bn)
1 AIG 60.9 
2 Ambac 10.6 
3 Hartford Financial 7.9 
4 Metlife 7.2 
5 Allianz 4.5 
6 Prudential Financial 4.4 
7 Allstate Corp 4.4
8 MBIA 4.3 
9 Swiss Re 4.2 
10 Aegon  3.8 
 Worldwide 146 
GSEs
 Company 
Total writedowns and credit losses
since Jan 2007 ($bn)
1 Freddie Mac 58.4 
2 Fannie Mae 56 
 Total 114.4 
Source: Bloomberg.EEAG Report 2009 91
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Comparing this with the previous scheme raises the
question of whether the soft-landing phase was dri-
ven by misleading expectations of a relatively
benign solution to the crisis, or whether such
prospect was in fact jeopardised by policy mistakes
– ranging from the reluctance by central banks and
treasuries to intervene more directly at the root of
market illiquidity at global level already in 2007, up
to the decision to let Lehman fail, which apparent-
ly coincided with a vast shift in market expec-
tations. 
Perhaps, had expectations of growth and real finan-
cial decoupling been less optimistic, policy makers
would have intervened more swiftly and comprehen-
sively early on, preventing market illiquidity from
eroding progressively the value of banks’ assets well
beyond the toxic ABSs. 
3. The deepening of the banking crisis:
challenges to policy-makers
The sudden worsening of the financial and econom-
ic outlook in autumn 2008 radically changed the
policy landscape. The mix of market pathologies
underlying the crisis posited formidable challenges
to public intervention. In the very short run, policy-
makers had to stop the liquidity crisis from escalat-
ing, up to turning into a run on commercial banks.
At the same time, it became clear that restoring con-
ditions for the normal functioning of markets and
financial intermediaries would not be possible
unless toxic assets were removed from the interme-
diaries’ balance sheets and governments found a
way to deal effectively with widespread bankruptcy
of major global players. All this while the extraordi-
nary slowdown of the economy created enormous
demand on fiscal resources to support growth via
public spending and tax cuts.
Stemming liquidity runs. In the
weeks after the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers, the first issue
governments world-wide had to
address the generalised liquidity
run that stormed intermediaries,
and at some point (in mid-
October) threatened to affect
commercial banks. Political fail-
ures and weaknesses in the
response to the crisis (with the
uncertainty created in the process
of approval of the Paulson plan
by the US congress, and the un-
coordinated and weak response by Europeans govern-
ments) apparently raised the risk of a global financial
meltdown. Eventually reacting to this threat, govern-
ments extended public guarantees to creditors and
depositors. Public funds were committed to this end in
most countries to complement deposit insurance
funds. These measures were indeed effective in stem-
ming the incipient run on commercial banks.
However, they added to the stock of contingent pub-
lic sector liabilities, i.e., implicit government debt
which may become explicit in the event of a financial
turmoil jeopardising people’s trust in banks.
Notably, the initial reaction in Europe revealed the
lack of political will and/or capacity to coordinate in
a timely manner: some countries (notably Ireland)
moved first to raise substantially the ceiling for
deposit guarantees, as to gain first-mover advantages
in the global competition for savers’ deposits, and
thus relax the financing constraint on domestic
intermediaries. This early move forced other coun-
tries to react swiftly in the same direction. Ironically,
agreements at the European level could only be
reached on the floor, rather than the ceiling, for
deposit guarantees. 
Restarting the interbank market. Throughout the cri-
sis period, massive collateral lending by the central
banks and governments virtually came to replace
interbank markets. This is clearly a problem for cen-
tral banks and governments. While potentially affect-
ing the transmission of monetary policy in unknown
ways, it adds to the stock of contingent public liabili-
ties by exposing monetary authorities to massive
default risk. 
The extension of government guarantees also to
transactions among intermediaries to revive the
interbank market did not appear to be equally effec-
Table 2.5  
Hard-landing 
Beliefs: It is no longer a liquidity crisis
No financial-real decoupling  
No growth decoupling 
Financial Write-downs
Deleveraging 
Monetary Liquidity provision 
Government: Search for a comprehensive approach
Fiscal expansions and deficits
International policy coordination in fiscal, monetary
and exchange rate? tive, let alone desirable. With the development of the
crisis, it had become clear that the lack of confidence
among banks is rooted in doubts about one another’s
solvency. A bank contemplating invoking guarantees
on its transactions would be significantly discouraged
by the stigma effect associated with them. On the
other hand, while extending public guarantees on all
transactions would eliminate the stigma effect, it
would also create severe moral hazard distortions,
somewhat defeating the ultimate goal of restarting
these markets.
In the current equilibrium, the commitment of cen-
tral banks to provide ample liquidity against broad
collateral clearly crowds out private collateralised
lending, if anything by exacerbating adverse selection
problems. The magnitude of central bank lending is
boosted by the effect of the crisis on banks’ prefer-
ence for liquidity. Essentially, banks hoard liquid
assets as self insurance against their own liquidity
needs and losses, and perhaps as a means to profit
from future opportunities to acquire assets at mini-
mum fire-sale prices.
Cleaning up financial intermediaries’ balance sheets.
Consistent with the view that the crisis mostly reflect-
ed a large component of market illiquidity, in the US
the initial proposals for a comprehensive approach to
cleaning up the balance sheet of financial intermedi-
aries focused on the idea that the government should
buy illiquid toxic assets from banks at a price closer to
their fundamental value, than to the (fire-)sale price in
illiquid markets. At the root of the Troubled Assets
Relief Programme (TARP) was the notion that the
main distortion jeopardising the economic viability of
financial intermediaries was market mispricing. 
The simple balance-sheet example adopted above
helps illustrate how this strategy could work (see also
Kaplan 2008). Suppose that a bank owns toxic assets
for a face value of $10, which are however valued by
(illiquid) markets at only $5. Accounting for funda-
mental losses, the value of holding them to maturity
at the current interest rates could instead be set at $8.
Through a program like TARP, the government could
buy these assets from the bank for $8, insulating the
overall balance sheet of the intermediary from the
cost of illiquidity. The effect of such purchases is
shown at the bottom of the page.
Note that the intervention does not prevent the bank
from remaining undercapitalised (although not to the
same extent as before intervention), hence in need of
either expanding equity, or reduce assets (loans).
This strategy would pursue two interrelated goals. The
first is to address the distortions due to market illiq-
uidity. By valuing assets at some notion of their “fun-
damental value”, the government can improve the
value at risk of banks, therefore relaxing an important
constraint on bank lending. To the extent that the dif-
ference between the market and the purchase price is
only due to illiquidity, there is not a cost for the tax-
payers: over time the cash flow from the asset will
compensate for the initial disbursement.
The second, crucial goal is to reduce the opacity on
assets and liabilities on the balance sheets of interme-
diaries, which has been feeding the mistrust at the root
of market illiquidity. Cleaning up the banks from
toxic assets could re-create the conditions for inter-
mediaries to trade among each other according to
normal competitive standards. Note that this benefit
could materialise even if the purchase price of assets
were relatively low, i.e., closer to their evaluation by
illiquid markets than to their fundamental value.
This strategy runs into at least two issues. The first is
how to set the purchase price. To pursue the first goal
(addressing pricing distortions due to illiquidity), the
purchase price cannot be set too low, close to the
(illiquid) market valuation of $5. If so, the interven-
tion would not improve intermediaries’ balance
sheets. Not only there would be an unnecessary trans-
fer from bank creditors to taxpayers, but the interven-
tion would do nothing to improve leverage in the
banking system, with the risk of causing a large
reduction in loans and credit. In principle, the price
should be set as close as possible to the “fundamental
value” of an asset: in this case the intervention would
come at no cost to the taxpayers and would contain
the risk of unnecessary deleveraging. But toxic assets
are quite heterogeneous, and informa-
tion on them is limited and strongly
asymmetric: the scheme exposes the
government to severe adverse-selec-
tion distortions. At any given price,
intermediaries would be willing to sell
only assets for which their subjective
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Assets Liabilities 
Securities (face value 100) Debt: short   10 
   a. Value in illiquid markets   95  Debt: long   80  
   b. Value after intervention  98 Equity
   a. before intervention   5 
   b. after intervention  8EEAG Report 2009 93
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evaluation is lower than the cash offered by the gov-
ernment. The government could then end up paying
systematically too much, implying a transfer of tax-
payers’ resources in favour of bank owners and man-
agers, and raising the cost of the desired clean up of
the financial system. 
The issues related to taxpayers protection can howev-
er be addressed by entitling the government to some
of the capital gains accruing to banks from the inter-
vention. Among the possible measures, banks can be
required to issue to the Treasury equity warrants
(which entitle the Treasury to buy a certain amount of
equities at a pre-specified price) or senior debt securi-
ties – in either case, the Treasury would acquire no
voting rights, thus there would be no public interfer-
ence on the intermediaries’ decision process. By the
same token, banks benefiting from public funds
should be required to adopt high standards of disclo-
sure and transparency.
Consistent with the logic of this approach is the use of
funds to help marginal mortgage holders to avoid
default, for instance, supporting families whose house
price has fallen marginally below the value of the
mortgage (Feldstein 2008a,b, Geanakoplos and
Koniak 2008). Some public help would not only spare
banks the cost of repossession – it could substantially
reduce the risk of a fire-sale of a large stock of hous-
es, which could feed a negative spiral on market
prices. Once again, the taxpayer could be protected by
requiring families or firms benefiting from the pro-
gramme to entitle the public sector with a claim on
future capital gains on their houses. A well-designed
intervention avoiding the spread of default on mort-
gage could clearly limit the magnitude of fundamen-
tal losses undermining the price of ABSs.
The toxic assets bought by the government should be
placed in a large intermediary, which would possibly
act as a clearinghouse and therefore net out the com-
plex web of debt and credit positions created by the
securitisation process. Once again, to the extent that
toxic assets are bought at their fundamental value,
there is no loss for the taxpayers. This large interme-
diary should be in charge of liquidating the bad assets
slowly over time, or holding these
assets to maturity. In either case, it
can be expected to remain in oper-
ations for decades.
Note that the purchase of bad
assets can be “leveraged”, as the
funds initially provided by governments could be
complemented by the issuance of “clearinghouse”
bonds. If so, the intervention scheme would not nec-
essarily place an undue demand on the current gov-
ernment budget. It would however raise the supply of
bonds with some implicit public guarantees, hence
indirectly subject to the scrutiny of markets as regards
public sector solvency.
As an alternative to outright purchase of toxic assets,
the same goals could be pursued with the injection of
new equity in distressed banks, with the government
acquiring a participation in the capital of troubled
institutions. The government would then have a more
direct role in the process of restructuring, and could
scrutinize more closely the assets in the balance sheet.
To be consistent with its ultimate objective, however,
this form of intervention should be strictly temporary,
with well-defined goals shaping the mandate of the
government participation in a bank decision. 
Direct public participation in banks’equity would not
per se offer an alternative solution to setting up a cen-
tralised clearinghouse for toxic assets in some form.
Rather, public acquisition of equities in banks should
be seen as a different strategy for selecting toxic assets
in the process of restructuring, possibly reducing
information asymmetries and increasing the public
control on bank resources, accompanying the removal
of those assets from the balance sheet of banks. 
Cleaning up toxic assets would obviously be insuffi-
cient and ineffective, however, when fundamental
losses are large enough to jeopardise the solvency of
the financial intermediary, that is, when a bank’s bal-
ance sheet before and after intervention would look
like the one shown below.
Regardless of the purchase of assets, the equity of the
bank would be zeroed. All the revenues from the pub-
lic intervention would go to repay existing debt.
Unfortunately, the same would be true for new equity:
any injection of new capital would in part go to bond
holders. In this condition, a debt overhang problem
jeopardizes attempts to raise new capital. Note that,
in principle, restructuring could take the form of
Assets Liabilities 
Securities  (face value 100) Debt: short   10 
   a. Value in illiquid markets    80  Debt: long  (face value 80)
   b. Value after intervention     85     a. before intervention      70 
   a. after intervention    75
Equity    0debt-to-equity swap, by which bond holders would
recognize part of the losses. The advantage of some
form of debt-to-equity swap consists of providing an
instrument to rebalance equity ratios directly, and
therefore restructure bank balance sheets without the
need to raise new capital or to decrease credit (see
Zingales 2008).
There are a number of policy trade-offs in the alter-
native between buying assets from banks and finan-
cial intermediaries, and acquiring some form of con-
trol over these institutions. The second alternative is
more effective if fundamental losses are large, since
market-based restructuring of intermediaries may
turn out to be a slow and costly process and if the dis-
tressed bank is a major player in the markets, so that
its bankruptcy could create systemic distress. In the
short and medium run, with a direct stake of the gov-
ernment in banks, it may be possible to ensure the
adoption of competitive lending standards (reducing
the risk of a credit crunch, if any) and a faster return
of financial intermediaries to the interbank market.
However, the government will also be tempted to
direct banks’ behaviour towards specific policy objec-
tives and delay its withdrawal from the participation
for an indefinite period of time. How to design a time-
consistent plan of temporary public participation in
the banking system is an open issue.
In the current crisis, many banks are turning out to be
essentially in the situation illustrated by our second
balance sheet above, including both small (regional)
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Box 2.7 
The Savings and Loans Crisis
The savings and loans industry in the United States, made up of several hundred savings and loans associations (S&Ls), originally
undertook the straightforward business of accepting retail deposits and using the funds to provide residential mortgages. It had its
own regulator and had its own insurance fund to protect depositors, which was funded by the industry but backed by the US
government. Despite this, it was the subject of a major financial collapse which between 1985 and 1995 cost US taxpayers more
than $120 billion.
Problems in the industry first arose in the 1970s as a result of high inflation, and deregulation of US interest rate markets. These 
factors led to high and volatile nominal market interest rates which created problems for S&Ls as a result of their structure. That
structure was essentially that funds were raised from short-term deposits subject to an interest rate ceiling and used to fund long-
term mortgages, mainly on a fixed rate basis.
Higher market interest rates made deposits in S&Ls unattractive compared with that available elsewhere in less regulated
institutions. But in trying to compete for new funds by paying higher rates on deposits, S&Ls found themselves paying rates above
those that they were charging on fixed rate mortgages. By the end of the 1970s, hundreds of S&Ls were close to insolvency. And
the insurance fund (the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Company, FSLIC) did not have the funds to meet the insured deposits.
In the early 1980s, the response of the US government and regulators was to loosen restrictions on S&Ls. Regulatory rules were
changed to allow them to diversify away from mortgages into more lucrative, but more risky, assets. Accounting rules were
changed in ways that made it seem that their “net worth” positions were stronger. The level of deposits insured per depositor was
raised from $40,000 to $100,000, which made S&Ls appear to be a safe haven for depositors. The interest rate ceiling was phased
out. And regulations on ownership were also abandoned, allowing smaller groups to take control of S&Ls.   
As a result of these reforms, S&Ls changed their nature, in particular their investments became much riskier. For example, many
S&Ls became closely involved with risky real-estate development that paid upfront fees and high interest rate margins but that
were particularly susceptible to a downturn in a cyclical market.
It seems clear that just as in the events leading up to the current crisis, S&Ls greatly underestimated the risk of the new ventures
into which they entered. In addition, the easing of regulation meant that bad management practices were allowed to develop, and
some accounting practices were at best dubious, and at worst fraudulent.
Developments in the oil, property and farming sectors in the US in the second half of the 1980s effectively revealed the risks that
were by then in S&L investment portfolios. By 1986, the FSLIC was itself insolvent in the face of huge losses. The government
attempted to recapitalize it, and for 3 further years it continued to operate and restructure S&Ls mostly through mergers and
acquisitions.
However, in 1989, Congress finally passed a new law (the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act) which
abolished the regulator and the FSLIC, created a new Office of Thrift Supervision, and set up the Resolution Trust Corporation 
(RTC) to oversee the liquidation of hundreds of S&Ls. The RTC effectively took ownership of the failed S&Ls and sold off their
assets. In 1989 and 1990 alone, it liquidated over 500 S&Ls with total assets of over $260 billion. By 1996, when it was wound up,
the RTC had overseen the liquidation of 747 S&Ls, with a total value of nearly $400 billion.
The model of the RTC has been advocated as a sensible policy in dealing with the current financial crisis. However, the situation 
now is different. While scale of failures during the S&L crisis was huge, the current crisis is bound to be several times larger.
Moreover, individual S&L institutions under distress were relatively small, and none of them posited systemic threat (although the 
sector as a whole did). The RTC in effect could take ownership of toxic financial assets as part of a process of liquidation, in effect
taking ownership of the failed S&L. In the current crisis, many distressed institutions are actually large (global) and
interconnected. As discussed in the text, the liquidation strategy pursued by the RTC is less appropriate in this case.EEAG Report 2009 95
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and large (leading global) institutions. Small interme-
diaries can and should be simply liquidated – as hap-
pened during the Savings and Loan crisis (see
Box 2.7). For major lenders, however, liquidation may
not be desirable or politically feasible – for some vari-
ant of the too-big-to-fail doctrine. Governments have
indeed been increasingly involved in taking over and
recapitalizing major banking institutions, acquiring
majority stakes. It may not be impossible to envision
a financial system with many banks ending up being
completely nationalised. 
As suggested by the case of Citibank at the end of
2008, we may expect governments to follow a model
in which, after taking control of a major bank with
zero equity, these are split into a good and viable
intermediary, and a residual “bad bank”. The bad
bank or some part of it could still be liquidated,
merged with or taken over by another institution.
The toxic assets extracted from the bank could be
placed in some vehicles like the one described
before. The equity stake of the government is in
exchange for taking care of the bad assets. The
experience of Sweden in this respect is discussed in
Box 2.8.
From September 2008 on, different countries have
pursued variants of the above strategies, with the US
struggling to design an effective version of the
TARP, and the UK acquiring direct control over
troubled intermediaries. However, while virtually all
governments have so far struggled to commit
resources to the rescue of banks, details are often
vague and contradictory. The process of disclosure
of losses is expected to bring more negative news to
light, hampering banks’ attempts to raise new equity
Box 2.8 
The Swedish banking crisis
The background to the Swedish banking crisis can be traced to 1985, when Sweden decided to lift the regulation on banks’ lending 
volume. This in combination with generous rules for tax deductions of interest payments led to a very large credit expansion and 
high growth rates of prices on houses and commercial property. Fiscal policy was not sufficiently contractive and wage inflation 
was high. When the international business cycle turned down in 1990, banks and other credit institutions started to encounter
problems. Many investments in Swedish commercial property had been financed with loans denominated in foreign currency. The
Swedish central bank feared that a devaluation of the Swedish currency would cause credit losses of a scale endangering the whole
financial system. In the end the futile attempt to defend the Swedish fixed exchange rate lead to very high interest rates – the 
discount rate hiked to 1.5% per day. The high real interest rate together with bleak forecasts for Swedish economic growth and a 
reduction in the possibility to deduct interest payments against tax liabilities led to a collapse of the inflated real estate market, in
particular for commercial property, in 1991–92.
The major Swedish banks where hit by massive credit losses totalling around 12% of Swedish GDP. These losses threatened to
quickly put all but one of the seven major Swedish banks, controlling most of the Swedish market, below the capital requirements 
of 8%. The Swedish recession developed into the worst since the 1930’s. Swedish GDP fell by almost 5% between 1990 and
1993, unemployment rose from 3% to 12%, the output gap fell to -8% and the government budget surplus changed into a deficit of
11% of GDP.
In September 1992, the conservative Swedish government decided to guarantee all Swedish banks. All debt of the banks should be
honoured and repaid in a “timely fashion”. It was, however, clear that a) shareholders of the banks should not be bailed out, and b)
the government should not be a permanent majority owner of banks that needed support. The guarantee was formulated in an 
explicit and transparent way.
The guarantee received wide support in the parliament, also from the social democratic opposition. The broad political consensus 
around the unlimited mandate to the government to safeguard the financial system was arguably of key importance for the
credibility of the support programme.
The bank support was administered by a newly created agency under the finance ministry, the Bank Support Authority. It required
a full disclosure of the best estimates of the true value of the asset side of each troubled bank’s balance sheet. As a consequence of
the crisis, the government took control over Nordbanken (now Nordea) that took over the failing Gotabanken. Non-performing
assets, largely in the form of commercial real estate, were lifted from the two banks and put in separate companies (Securum and 
Retriva) leaving a bank that soon became profitable.
Föreningssparbanken (now Swedbank), giving shares as collateral, received a guarantee from the Bank Support Authority that its
capital requirements should be safeguarded. Also the SE-bank started discussion with the Authority regarding support. However,
neither of the banks in the end needed any direct support but was recapitalized by their owners.
The support programme succeeded in its major goal – to prevent a collapse of the financial system. No bank runs occurred and the 
financial system continued to function during the whole crises. The budgetary cost of the bank support between 1992 and 1994
totalled 63 billion krona, corresponding to about 4% of GDP. In 1997, it was estimated that the net cost, including the value of
shares and dividends from Nordea, Securum and Retriva, was around 35 billion krona, i.e., approximately half the gross cost.
1 By
1997, both Securum and Retriva had been dismantled, but the Swedish government still holds a minority position of 20% in
Nordea.
1 Jennergren & Näslund, (1998), Ekonomisk Debatt 26:1 (in Swedish).capital – as recapitalisation could be seen as an indi-
cator of bank distress and need for funds – and cre-
ating uncertainty about the size of fiscal costs of the
crisis. Perhaps for this reason, the emphasis of the
policy debate is currently on its quantitative dimen-
sion, i.e., on the required size of public intervention.
The truth is that the protracted period of market
illiquidity and the sudden spread of the crisis to the
real side of the economy have profoundly dented the
value of intermediary’s assets, producing losses that
are a multiple of those that could directly be attrib-
uted to the “toxic assets”produced by securitisation.
Yet it is hard to envision the end of the crisis without
linking banks bailouts to some coherent and possi-
bly concerted framework to reform the international
financial system. 
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Box 2.9 
Banks bailout and competition policy
Competition policy enforcement in banking is under attack worldwide.
Vives (2008b) issues a strong warning that the ongoing massive bank bailouts are distorting competition in financial services, both
in the US and in the European Union. Instances are provided by the British government, which blocked a referral of the HBOS-
Lloyds TSB merger to the national competition commission on the grounds that the stability of the U.K. financial system was an
overriding concern. By the same token, potential threats to competition policy are implicit in harsh complaints by the French, 
German and other governments that the European Commission is too slow in approving bank-recapitalisation packages, on the
ground that the process is delaying the much needed resume of credit to firms and consumers.
In other words, the bailout is doing much more than recapitalising failing institutions. Public help is reaching even relatively sound
institutions, which are therefore gaining a competitive advantage in terms of a lower cost of capital and probability of failure. This
race to recapitalize national banking systems has the flavour of a national champion contest. Not surprisingly, its positive effects 
on getting credit to the private sector are not really apparent, as banks will resume their credit policy only if and when they find it
profitable.
Moreover, political spillovers from the systemic banking bailout to other sector also pose severe fundamental risks for competition
policy in general. With the automotive industry at the forefront, many sectors are now calling for help on the grounds of
“horizontal” equity across industries. A key issue is how to prevent the present distortions in banking not only from becoming
permanent but also from spilling over to other sectors.
It was not long ago that competition was considered detrimental to financial stability, an idea that often made central banks and
regulators quite complacent about monopoly practices and collusion agreements among banks. This has changed over time, as it
became progressively clear that lack of competition meant costly inefficiency. Competition policy is now taken seriously also in
the banking sector. For instance, the European Commission has intervened against national protectionism, cartels and
anticompetitive mergers. The new thinking shaping this intervention is that competition per se cannot be responsible for the 
fragility of the banking system: even a monopoly bank may be subject to a run.
Yet, the question remains. Should competition authorities treat banks as if they were exactly like any other sector? One issue is
that excessive competition may erode the charter value of a bank – that is, its value as a going concern – and create incentives to
take excessive risks: when there is not much to lose, there is a tendency to gamble. This tendency is accentuated in the presence of
limited liability, which restricts the losses but not the gains. As is well understood, zombie institutions, distressed and barely alive,
may awake to gamble for resurrection, using very risky strategies with scant chance of success.
Another, obvious, problem is that systemic failure of banking may create large real costs, or even grind an economy to a halt.
Arguably, this is what happened during the Great Depression, and it is a concrete threat nowadays. No sensible government will
allow this to happen if it can prevent it. In recognition of the risks of a systemic crisis, banks are strictly regulated and supervised
to a larger extent than other sectors in the economy. Policy-makers should also recognise the uniqueness of the banking sector as
regards to competition policy. In other words, we should reconsider whether some degree of market power could be tolerated, and
define conditions under which some limits to competition could be established. Regarding mergers, one should consider whether
the standard concentration thresholds – which, roughly speaking, proscribe unions that would create a company with market share
above a certain level – should be modified in banking. More market power may make a merged entity more prudent but if the
bank becomes systemic and “too big to fail” then the outcome may be excessive risk taking.  State aid rules should account for the
need for swift intervention when there is a systemic problem, and should be adapted to the specific restructuring needs of banks.
By the same token, rules should strictly limit activities of severely distressed institutions, as these have the stronger incentives to
gamble for resurrection. The same should apply to institutions that are de facto fully insured, because they are “too big to fail”.
The view that banking is like any other sector in the economy and should be treated as such in all circumstances is naïve. In
addition to what we have already discussed, moving somewhat away from it would have the following important benefit: it would 
contain the risk that adding ex post some flexibility to competition policy for banking would automatically relax the standards for
other sectors. Partial exceptions to the competition policy regime for the banking sector would be founded in its systemic position 
in the economy.
As stressed by Vives (2008b), recognising the singularity of the banking sector would allow Europe’s competition policy to retain
its fundamental role of keeping markets open and protecting the single market: these goals are today under threat because of the 
uneven playing field generated by banking bailouts that have activated lobbies from other sectors to seek help based on horizontal
equity considerations. There is a danger in the alternative of remaining or becoming pragmatic and flexible – today with banking,
tomorrow with another sector, that is, making competition policy progressively weaker and weaker. Arguably, the Great 
Depression was aggravated by the protectionist, anticompetitive spiral that ensued. This mistake can and should be avoided.EEAG Report 2009 97
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A massive bailout will not provide a solution for all
the problems raised by the crisis. First, it would not
necessarily prevent a credit crunch. We have stressed
above that the contraction of credit is mostly driven
by the collapse of trade in market-based instruments,
not by bank lending. A bailout can hopefully avoid a
financial meltdown, but could be effective against a
possible credit crunch only to the extent that restoring
market liquidity helps halt the turmoil in market-
based credit, thus recreating conditions for markets to
provide financing.
Second, for a variety of (politico-economic) reasons,
a massive bailout could create zombie banks, i.e.,, it
could result in the survival of insolvent banks that
would use massive liquidity injection to maintain non-
performing assets on their balance sheets. Arguably,
the experience of Japan shows that this could ulti-
mately jeopardise a speedy resolution of the crisis.
Banks without a large enough probability of survival
should simply not be recapitalised but closed down or,
if too large to disappear, taken over by the govern-
ment, split, restructured and merged with others. 
Third, a massive bailout could raise the temptation to
protect national champions and restore state aid as a
normal instrument of “industrial policy”.16 In the
European Union, this risk has potentially important
negative implications for the single market. But the
political call for extending the bailouts to industries
other than the financial one (e.g., cars) is a global phe-
nomenon. In Box 2.9, we discuss reasons why the spe-
cific feature of the financial industry should be
emphasised as the foundations of a differential treat-
ment in the case of crisis, consistent with competition
policy principles.
4. Restoring stability and reforming the
international financial architecture
4.1 General lessons from the crisis
What are the main lessons to be drawn from the cri-
sis? In this section we single out a few lessons from
our analysis, and relate them to broad-based princi-
ples for strengthening the stability of the internation-
al financial system after the current crisis. Our con-
siderations refer to the following four points: central
bank policy, banking regulation, market regulation,
corporate governance/incentive systems.
Central banks’ policy and mandate. Monetary autho-
rities have been criticised for keeping interest rates
too low for too long in the years preceding the onset
of the crisis, thus either feeding asset market bub-
bles, or failing to act to stem them. Yet, there is little
or no consensus in monetary theory and policy
analysis on whether and how central banks should
react to strong asset price dynamics, and the extent
to which interest rate policy is an efficient way to
address the issue. It would be difficult to draw any
conclusion regarding specifically the monetary poli-
cy reaction function.
However, it seems clear that central banks should
have a mandate for maintaining financial stability. In
some cases this mandate is formally already in place.
But the current crisis clearly requires a reconsidera-
tion of past strategies and experiences, especially as
regards the role of the analysis of balance sheet
quantities in shaping monetary decisions. The explic-
it recognition of the importance of monetary analy-
sis in the strategy of the European Central Bank has
been seen as a potential advantage of this institution
relative to others, which have sharply focused on
inflation targeting. Nonetheless, the analysis of the
evolution of monetary aggregates in relation to the
risk for inflation may not be effective or sufficient for
identifying threats to financial stability – on which
the ECB has limited or no jurisdiction. It is reason-
able to expect some important development in the
direction of restructuring central banking so as to
address these issues (see e.g., Adrian and Shin
2008a,b, Buiter 2008).
For a year and a half, the too-big-to-fail argument
has driven massive government support to private
institutions, confirming the expectations of bailouts
ex post. Central banks found it necessary to extend
their lender of last resort facilities outside the realm
of traditional commercial banks to entities like Bear
Stearns that they do not supervise and, therefore,
over which they have no first-hand information (see
e.g., Buiter 2008, Buiter and Sibert 2008a, and Vives
2008a). In this respect, early Fed interventions in
support of the investment bank and other similar
institutions are not consistent with Bagehot’s doc-
trine of helping illiquid but solvent institutions (see
Vives 2008a).
The basic lesson emphasised by the crisis is that any
institution that does maturity transformation is sub-
ject to runs and needs the coverage of a lender of last
resort and, therefore, cannot escape supervision.  16 See Chapter 4 in our 2008 EEAG report.Banking regulation. In the years preceding the onset of
the crisis, the shadow banking system grew at extraor-
dinary rates within and across borders, linking differ-
ent markets in a global network of intermediaries.
Many of these perform the basic functions of a bank
– maturity transformation and monitoring of opaque
loans – without being regulated as such.
The second lesson from the crisis is that any institu-
tion that performs the function of a bank needs to be
regulated and needs a safety net because of the sys-
temic concerns from its failure. This is particularly so
for large institutions that occupy a central place in the
financial system, for which the TBTF doctrine applies
more forcefully. Because of the presence of these insti-
tutions in global markets, global regulatory standards
should be set with internationally coordinated super-
vision.
A third lesson is that a piecemeal approach to finan-
cial regulation will not work: what is needed is a clear
alignment of incentives covering the overall system
and in particular every step from the board room to
the customer going through executives, analysts, sales-
people and rating agencies.
With Basel II, the foundations of banking regulation
rest on three pillars: risk-based capital requirements,
supervision and market discipline (disclosure).
Relative to Basel I, the new framework has disciplined
the treatment of some types of off-balance sheet
activities, and has included an attempt to weight dif-
ferent risks towards the satisfaction of the capital
requirement. Still, this framework did not prevent the
accumulation of large risks in offshore conduits not
included in the balance sheets, which turned out to be
a major problem for German banks. The new frame-
work neither tackles systemic risk (whose underesti-
mation has arguably played an important role in gen-
erating the crisis), nor prevents adverse pro-cyclical
lending effects of regulation (effects that are currently
generating concerns about a possible credit crunch).
Some countries, such as Spain, regulated banks more
strictly and forced them to accumulate reserves in
excess of the Basel requirement, but this was on their
own initiative. 
The core problem remains risk assessment. We have
already discussed the potential failure and limits of
internal models. The crisis also made clear that
agency problems can severely distort the perfor-
mance and effectiveness of rating agencies. Rating
agencies are bound to underprovide “transparency”
when paid by issuers of assets rather than investors.
Their role should thus be redesigned so to make sure
that no conflicts of interest interfere with their
activities. 
Transparency in the form of risk disclosure and
information to investors is enhanced by accounting
rules that require intermediaries to mark-to-market
their asset. The crisis has nonetheless confirmed ex
post early concerns that asset price distortions in
periods of market illiquidity would misrepresent risk
in the balance sheet of the intermediary. Note that,
by symmetry, one should recognize that similarly
dangerous distortions arise in periods of “irrational
exuberance” and bubbles causing asset overvalua-
tion: possible solutions to the problem should tackle
both cases. 
Modifying the accounting rules going back to less
transparent standards would hardly help. Regardless
of accounting rules, agents are well informed about
the current market conditions, i.e., about the extent of
illiquidity, or exuberance. Reducing the information
on a bank’s assets only raises uncertainty and specu-
lation. What instead can make a difference is to make
sure that banks pursue prudential standards, with
rules that reverse adverse cyclical patterns in banks’
behaviour. An instance of theses rules consists of pre-
scribing higher accumulation of reserves in periods of
strong price dynamics – as was the case for Spanish
banks in the years of booming housing prices, thanks
to the wisdom of the Bank of Spain.
Despite the effort placed in designing good rules, the
effectiveness of prudential regulation and supervision
can be expected to be systematically impaired by
financial innovation. New instruments can create
loopholes and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.
In view of this consideration, many observers recent-
ly have increasingly focused on limited liability as the
root of moral hazard. Limited liability raises the
temptation for equity holders of a bank to engage in
large risky bets, as they are able to appropriate the full
extent of the profits in case of success, while shifting
the cost of failure onto other stakeholders (including
society at large). As is well known, this problem is
exacerbated in crisis periods, when equity holders may
hope to restore the economic viability of the bank
with some ultimate stroke of luck. 
There is widespread consensus that new rules should
guarantee higher capitalisation of financial interme-
diaries and avoid the combination of high leverage
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and dependence on short-term financing that jeopar-
dised the viability of the international financial sys-
tem in 2007 and 2008. A possible approach in princi-
ple consists of directly raising the minimum equity-
asset ratios. The argument is that with more equity
capital at stake, shareholders will require their boards
to adopt more prudent business models, as they
would suffer higher losses in the case of failure, con-
taining the inefficiency resulting from the ability to
impose part of the losses on creditors or tax payers
would be. However, in light of Basel II and the crisis,
it is clear that the main issue is not so much a numer-
ical requirement for the equity ratio, but how the
value at risk of a bank is assessed. 
Market regulation. Transparency is the key concern in
reforming the regulation of financial markets. With
the extraordinary development of market-based cred-
it, an over-the-counter (OTC) organisation of trade
resulted into generalised opacity. To wit, in our
account of the crisis, markets appeared to react
strongly to the introduction of the ABX derivative
market for mortgage backed securities, which for the
first time provided aggregate information about mar-
ket evaluation. Market regulation can be expected to
(and should) foster a shift from OTC to organized
exchanges, with clearing houses assuming counter-
party risk. 
More controversial is the adoption of rules limiting
alleged destabilising practices, such as short sales.
Should short-sales restrictions be part of market
rules, if only to be invoked contingent on some well-
defined market conditions? An important concern
motivating such rules consists of market manipula-
tion, since when there is no ability to manipulate the
market the possibility to short sell should be efficien-
cy enhancing. Furthermore, in those circumstances
short-selling  reduces volatility by bringing today’s
prices more in line with tomorrow’s prices, whenever
the latter are expected to fall.
Corporate governance. The “new attitude” towards
corporate governance is summed up well by the
famous quote of Alan Greenspan:
“I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest
of organisations, specifically banks and others, was
such that they were best capable of protecting their
own shareholders” (A. Greenspan, 23 Oct. 2008).
This late confession is bound to have an impact on the
current debate among academics and practitioners.
Namely, should we consider the crisis to be the result
of a paradigm failure (shareholder value), or rather
should we see it as the consequence of failure in the
current system of corporate governance? We tend to
side with the latter interpretation. 
The moral hazard distortions already discussed in
relation to limited liabilities of equity holders can
clearly be referred to executive compensation
schemes, rewarding generously good performances in
the short run without punishing losses at any horizon.
These distortions can be corrected by realigning man-
agers’ incentive with the interests of the shareholders
and a firm’s stakeholders at large. Proposals discussed
in this respect include the reduction or elimination of
cash bonuses and resorting to compensation in the
form of restricted shares, to be held for years after
leaving the firm.17 Whether these proposed correc-
tions to past and current practices are efficient, how-
ever, is an open question.
4.2 Problems and perspective of reforms of the
European financial architecture
The crisis created the first true stress-test of the
European financial and monetary architecture. In this
architecture, the European Central Bank occupies a
unique position to address liquidity issues at the euro-
area level and preventing gridlocks in the payment
system. However, it is up to the national central banks
to provide emergency liquidity to individual institu-
tions. Furthermore, as discussed in the 2003 EEAG
report, banking supervision in the euro area is in the
hands of member states, according to the home coun-
try principle. The same home country principle
applies to deposit insurance. Corresponding to the
fragmentation of supervision and deposit insurance,
there is fragmentation of market regulation.
The response to crises is de facto left to “improvised
cooperation”. In May 2005, the European Union
agreed on a financial crisis plan, through a memoran-
dum of understanding between central banks, regula-
tors and finance ministries. In light of this agreement,
but only as late as May 2008, ECOFIN invited the
EFC to organize an EU-wide crisis simulation exer-
cise for spring 2009 to report in September 2009. 
This architecture suffers from at least four well-known
problems. First, the line of command in a crisis situa-
17 The chapter on private equity in this report discusses the benefits
of compensation schemes rewarding performances in the medium
run.tion is left unspecified. Who is responsible for which
action if a large pan-European bank with systemic
interconnection is threatened by a liquidity run? The
large number of institutions with a direct or indirect
role in a rescue is so large that even communication
among them could in principle translate into a waste
of valuable time, hampering speedy reactions to incip-
ient crises. Second, trans-national crises are likely to
create conflicts among national agencies and trea-
suries, which will require a (possibly time-consuming)
political arrangement. Not only could this delay ini-
tiatives whose success crucially depend on their tim-
ing, but these conflicts could also generate dangerous
setbacks in other areas of cooperation, indirectly rel-
evant to the financial turmoil as indicators of cohe-
sion.  Third, such architecture is bound to lead to
excessive help at the country level and insufficient
help at the EU level, hampering the development of a
single market and cross-border institutions. Namely,
and this is a fourth problem, the current framework
provides no effective guideline for how to provide liq-
uidity support and address solvency problems of pan-
European institutions.
How could the framework be improved in light of
recent experience? It seems apparent that crisis resolu-
tion cannot be left to a memorandum of understand-
ing, i.e., de facto improvised cooperation, but it
requires a more explicit framework. In this frame-
work, the European System of Central Banks should
assume an explicit role of guarantor of the system. In
particular, it makes sense that the European Central
Bank should acquire supervisory powers over
European groups, and coordinate with national cen-
tral banks the national financial intermediaries.
A readily possible reform could pursue the construc-
tion of a two-tier system. For pan-European finan-
cial groups, supervision should be attributed to the
European Central Bank. These groups should then
be required to subscribe to a European Deposit In-
surance Fund, to complement national deposit
insurance schemes. This does not solve all possible
conflicts about commitment of public resources by
member states to rescue a European bank. But it
could definitely help address solvency problems and
provide centralised resources and information to be
used in the restructuring of distressed banks. All
other institutions could be left to decentralised
supervision and support, although it would be nat-
ural to foster some form of coordination and infor-
mation sharing within the ESCB. However, the
extension of the power of the ECB would of course
not address issues raised by the internationalisation
of banks outside the euro area – experienced for
example by banks operating in the UK and some of
the countries adopting the euro.
As discussed in Box 2.8 it would also be important to
recognise explicitly and formally the specificity of the
banking sector in competition policy. This would
ensure coherence between competition policy and
financial stability policy, and help stem the political
pressure to extend financial bailouts to other sectors
of the economy.
Ten years into the introduction of the euro, the glob-
al turmoil has challenged our thinking on optimal
currency areas, stressing the need to understand
financial stability preconditions for adopting a com-
mon currency without political union. Not only inef-
ficient provision of the public good of financial sta-
bility appears to be a threat to the balance of bene-
fits from a common currency; it may also create and
magnify political divides. In fact, the main issues at
stake are only in part technical. The resolution of
the crisis will require political initiatives that address
international policy cooperation and institution
building. In this sense, the future of Europe is at the
cross-roads.
4.3 Fiscal policy and the financial crisis
Before this crisis, scepticism on fiscal policy as a sta-
bilisation tool dominated the intellectual and policy
debate. Quantitative fiscal interventions were con-
sidered irrelevant if not counterproductive. Monet-
ary policy was instead praised as the main stabilisa-
tion tool, effective and flexible. With the crisis, this
climate has completely turned around, with a spec-
tacular “rediscovery” of fiscal policy (see our dis-
cussion in chapter 1). The call for commitment of
public resources is almost universal. Governments
are supposed to spend to restore the health of the
financial system and sustain growth. The Keynesian
multiplier in its simplest form is shaping the politi-
cal debate, with parametric exercises assuming a
value in the range between 1 and 2 – extremely high
given the empirical evidence – but nonetheless
deemed acceptable on the grounds that the current
situation is unprecedented. This commitment of
public resources is mirrored by market assessment
of default risk. 
Figure 2.13 shows the spreads for the credit default
swaps for 5 year bonds issued by 7 governments – US,
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the UK, Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Spain.
The spike in the market perception of sovereign risk is
apparent in autumn 2008. Note that the premium on
Italy and Spanish euro-denominated debt, very low at
the onset of the crisis, already rises at the end of 2007
– in the case of Italy, arguably because of the high
public debt; in the case of Spain, because of the con-
traction in the housing sector after the recent large
boom. Most striking is the case of the UK, whose pre-
mium moves much closer to that of Spain and Italy, in
October 2008 – this move is accompanied by a sharp
depreciation of the pound. Within the euro area,
interest differentials among sovereign borrowers have
risen to levels unseen for more than a decade.
The high level of the premia shown in the graph clear-
ly reflects market apprehension about the state of
public finances in the face of the rapidity in the dete-
rioration of all economic indicators in autumn 2008,
motivating a generalised flight to quality.
The state of government budgets is in fact emerging
as the key dimension to understanding the dynamics
of the crisis at a global as well as at a country level.
As an important instance, the implications of the
flight to quality are actually strongest for small
countries with independent currencies, whose inter-
mediaries are highly leveraged in international mar-
kets, hence potentially exposed to the crisis but
without a large tax base and/or the fiscal capacity to
back their external liabilities – as is the case of
Iceland (see Buiter and Sibert 2008b and Portes
2008). Arguably for a similar reason, the effects of
the flight to quality are apparent for countries
exporting commodities that suffer from a strong
negative terms of trade shock,
due to the sharp fall in com-
modity prices triggered by the
crisis which in most cases erodes
the core sources of their public
revenues.
Interestingly, in the euro area,
large international banks in crisis
have eventually been broken up
into independent national institu-
tions, arguably as a function of
the bailout resources and guaran-
tees that each independent state
in the area is able to provide. In
this sense, the effect of the crisis
on banking size and competition
has been quite different in the
euro area relative to the US. In
the euro area, the crisis has reversed the movements
towards the development of pan-European financial
intermediaries. In the US, mergers and bailouts have
created larger intermediaries, while at the same time
shifting the weight in favour of universal banking
(Angeloni 2008).
What if the size of the bailout of financial intermedi-
aries, and the fiscal support to the economy, ends up
deteriorating the balance sheet of governments
beyond their political ability to engineer a correction
via higher tax revenues and spending cuts? Could this
lead to a reconsideration of the trade-off between fis-
cal distortions and inflation in favour of the latter?
We first reconsider how inflation can help correct
budget imbalances.
In their celebrated model of “unpleasant monetarist
arithmetic”, Sargent and Wallace (1981) stress the
link between a permanent deterioration of fiscal
deficit, and the role of inflation in generating real
resources for the public sector – seigniorage. A
steady monetisation of the public debt raises infla-
tion and nominal interest rates: unless the economy
operates on the “wrong side” of the Laffer curve,
rising inflation increases seigniorage revenue. While
the intellectual merit of this model cannot be
overemphasised, however, there are empirical and
theoretical arguments that cast doubts on seignior-
age revenue as a meaningful source of public rev-
enues. Nobody can seriously consider the option of
pursuing an increase in long-run inflation to this
end, simply because there would be very little gains
from it.
Figure 2.13Recent literature has indeed shifted attention to other
possible fiscal gains from temporary and possibly
moderate inflation, which operate via devaluation of
nominal liabilities of the government. A striking
example of an assessment of these gains is provided
by Persson, Persson and Svensson (1998), with a case
study of the potential benefits of moderate inflation
on the Swedish budget. The same idea is at the core of
the models by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo
(2001) and Corsetti and Mackowiak (2006) in their
study of the link between (prospective) deficits and
currency crises. In these contributions, a currency cri-
sis cum temporary inflation occurs when agents antic-
ipate large future deficits that will not be adjusted by
explicit taxes or cuts in spending – in the first study
the information used by agents to predict the large
future deficits is precisely the state of the financial sec-
tor, in particular of the banking system (see also
Corsetti Pesenti and Roubini 1999). A crisis depreci-
ating the currency and raising the price level lowers
the real value of outstanding nominal liabilities and
spending commitments in nominal terms, so as to bal-
ance the intertemporal budget of the public sector.
Key to this argument is the recognition that most of
government liabilities, both in the form of debt and in
the form of commitments to future spending, are only
partially indexed, if at all, to inflation. Then, an unex-
pected change in the price level, achieved with tempo-
rary inflation, amounts to a cut in real spending and
a reduction in the real burden of debt.
Based on these considerations, many contributions
have suggested that, in response to a large negative
fiscal shock, countries face a trade-off between
adjusting (distortionary) tax rates and (useful)
spending, and a temporary increase in inflation.18
Yet we should note here that the efficiency of mod-
erate inflation in redressing fiscal issue is heavily
dependent on the ability of the central bank to main-
tain credibility. If this is lost in the process, the bal-
ance of costs and benefits from the policy may well
tilt in favour of the former. Obviously, deteriorating
inflation expectations usually generate a premium
raising the costs of borrowing.
These trade-offs in raising resources through moder-
ate inflation has an interesting institutional counter-
part. On the one hand, this option is more readily
available in countries where the fiscal and monetary
authorities are not entirely independent, for it is triv-
ially easier to coordinate monetary and fiscal policies
when both are ultimately handled by the same institu-
tion. Marimon (2008) recently argued that China is in
this position, and Sims (2008) provides some evidence
to the extent of interdependence between US public
finances and Fed’s balance sheet. For exactly these
reasons, however, inflation expectations may deterio-
rate more quickly in a crisis situation. On the other
hand, regions in which the central bank is truly inde-
pendent and has a clear mandate for price stability, as
is the case in the euro area, have much less flexibility
of the type reviewed above for using inflation to
address public sector budgetary concerns. Yet this
may anchor market expectations better, leaving more
room for such policies.
From a macro perspective, the foregoing arguments
suggest that, at least in some countries in which cen-
tral banks are not fully independent, it may be possi-
ble to witness some inflationary pressures resulting
from balance sheet interactions, were public budgets
to deteriorate sharply. In a severe fiscal crisis situa-
tion, however, even central bank independence would
be sufficient to counteract inflationary pressure from
fiscal instability. If prospective deficits are perceived
by the public as too large relative to the current value
of outstanding debt, either government debt will
experience credit rationing, facing the alternative
between retrenchment and default, or the price level
will carry the adjustment via depreciation of nominal
debt. Were the crisis to require a large financial sector
bailout, it would not be unreasonable to expect some
adjustment in the price level, taxing the holders of the
government’s nominal liabilities. These fiscal benefits
would of course be counterbalanced by whatever dis-
tortionary costs, including fiscal costs, inflation may
generate. 
Once again, one obvious danger is that inflationary
financing, whether pursued as an explicit policy or
implied by fiscal instability, would undermine the
credibility of monetary policy for years to come.
Another danger is that any explicit choice for infla-
tionary financing would also motivate some form of
financial repression (such as caps on interest rate),
which would enhance the fiscal benefits from the
choice, at least in the short run.
Conclusions
This chapter has conducted a broad analysis of the
current financial crisis. To begin with, we have ana-
lysed the process of securitisation of subprime mort-
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gages in the US. Through this process, cash flows
from heterogeneous mortgage contracts between bor-
rowers and banks were transformed into homogenous
asset backed securities (ABSs), with distinct rating,
traded in global markets. Per se, securitisation is a
good idea: by favouring diversification of mortgage
risk, it can allow intermediaries to increase lending, to
the benefits of households and firms. However,
because of a combination of macroeconomic factors,
bad/insufficient regulation and agency problems, in
the last few years this process was fundamentally
flawed. First, massive undervaluation of fundamental
risk and market liquidity risk caused the amount of
ABSs with AAA rating derived from the underlying
pool of mortgages to be too large by any reasonable
standards; second, several layers of securitisation,
each involving some form of credit enhancement and
insurance, translated into high opacity of ABSs,
which hampered the ability of an intermediary to
assess the amount and the location of risk in its port-
folio; finally, risk diversification was only apparent, in
the sense that the high-rating ABSs sold to end-
investors (pension funds, mutual funds, etc) were
guaranteed by intermediaries – when the crisis erupt-
ed, in large part ABSs were absorbed back by highly
leveraged financial institutions. With a high level of
opacity, diversification of ABSs among intermedi-
aries actually created systemic risk, by generating
dangerous network externalities which eventually
undermined market liquidity for many classes of
assets and financial markets. 
Looking at the development of the crisis, we distin-
guish two distinct phases. The initial phase, from 2007
to the summer of 2008, is consistent with a model/
expectations of a soft-landing. Over many months
into the crisis, markets and policymakers tended to
attribute the crisis to liquidity, rather than solvency
problems: estimates of fundamental losses were rela-
tively small. On the macro side, there were expecta-
tions of a financial-real decoupling as well as growth
decoupling – initially, the crisis left many market
unscathed, and emerging market economies and to
some extent the EU were expected to continue to grow
independently of cyclical development in the US.
Monetary authorities granted unlimited liquidity pro-
vision to financial intermediaries, while governments
adopted a case-by-case approach to bailout (Bear
Stearns being the primary example). The main idea,
or hope, was that over time the financial system would
find ways to digest and eliminate the “toxic assets” in
the balance sheets of the intermediaries, matching
write-downs with re-capitalisation.
Perhaps unfortunately, this approach appeared to
work for some time. While banks were indeed able to
raise new equity, the US kept growing, in part driven
by a weak dollar and global demand, correcting the
external deficit despite the peak in oil prices. Global
growth remained high. But the scenario completely
changed in the summer of 2008, when it became clear
that fundamental losses were much larger than sug-
gested by early estimates, and hopes for financial/real
decoupling and growth decoupling vanished. The
market response to the US decision to let Lehman
Brothers go bankrupt, while saving AIG, dramatical-
ly showed the inadequacy of a case-by-case approach
to the crisis. A generalised run on financial intermedi-
aries and a large fall in asset prices marked the begin-
ning of the deleveraging cycle and a large contraction
in global economic activity.
The soft-landing scenario in the first months of the
crisis was arguably an illusion. Had expectations of
growth and real financial decoupling been less opti-
mistic, perhaps policymakers would have intervened
more swiftly and comprehensively early on, prevent-
ing market illiquidity from eroding progressively the
value of banks’ assets well beyond the toxic ABSs. 
At the end of 2008, governments worldwide had to
adopt emerging measure to stem incipient runs on
commercial banks; commit the largest resources to
bank bailout and the cleaning up of the balanced
sheets of financial intermediaries; and attempt to
design effective plans to resurrect market activity and
guarantee market liquidity.
With the deepening of the crisis, the strain on gov-
ernment budgets is apparent. Large quantitative fis-
cal stimulus is called for in the hope that it will have
a strong multiplier effect on output. Combined with
the cost of bailouts, the next few years will record a
sharp increase in public debt and deficits. There are
reasons to be cautious in assessing the effect of the
stimulus on the real economy. The multiplier effects
of government spending and tax cuts may be quite
contained, especially in light of uncertainty about
economic conditions that may induce precautionary
saving by households. Large interventions do
increase uncertainty about the tax burden, and the
associated distortions in the economy (as it may have
been the case in Japan since 1995). There is even the
possibility that large interventions paradoxically
exacerbate the fall in consumer and business confi-
dence, by conveying the message that the crisis is far
worse than expected. While one may argue that even a small multiplier
makes spending valuable when output is in free fall,
the ongoing massive transfer of risk from the private
to the public sector may in fact destabilise the trust of
markets in sovereign debt. Not only would this raise
the cost of the interventions; it could also create the
temptation to return to forms of financial repression
and/or public control of financial intermediation.
Possible short-run benefits from such moves would,
however, run into the cost of inefficiency over the
medium and long run, as is vastly documented by the
literature.
It is hard to see a way out of the current crisis without
creating the conditions for a new, stronger and more
stable, international financial system. While the temp-
tation to go back to the golden days of plain over-reg-
ulated commercial banking may seem attractive, it is
doubtful that this model would be feasible and desir-
able in a globalised economy. Rather, the crisis has
planted the seed for a deep reform, addressing the gap
between markets on the one hand and institutions and
rules on the other.
Proposals of reforms abound. In this chapter, we
have focused on deriving a small set of lessons from
the crisis towards the definition of broad-based prin-
ciples to follow in correcting the flaws in the system.
The merits of different proposals do not necessarily
lie in their being radical but in their consistency with
the ultimate goals of public governance of financial
system.
Some of these lessons are shared by many other insti-
tutions and scholars. Intermediaries that, like banks,
engage in maturity transformation and are exposed to
liquidity runs should be subject to the same principles
of regulation and supervision as banks. Regulation
and supervision is motivated by the implicit govern-
ment commitment to bail out the intermediaries when
their default would have systemic effects and negative
externalities on the payment system. Bankruptcy of
commercial banks threatens the payment system
directly, via its implications for depositors. For other
intermediaries, one argument is that such threat is
rooted in the network externality, via the systemic
implications of their bankruptcy for market liquidity
and the balanced sheets of other intermediaries.
Indeed, with the subprime crisis, trust among banks
evaporated: the interbank market virtually disap-
peared. A different view is that the activities of these
intermediaries grew into a threat to financial stability
because bailout guarantees according to the too-big-
to-fail doctrine provide an incentive for them to grow
excessively, take on excessive risk and become too
leveraged. However, unless these guarantees can be
eliminated completely – which is not credible in light
of past and recent experiences – it is rational to asso-
ciate the provision of contingent public resources to
regulation and supervision.
Thus, a first lesson is that investment banks, as well as
any other institution that perform bank functions
must be subjected to the same rules that apply to com-
mercial banks. The regulatory constraints should be
dependent on the type of business rather than the
legal status of the bank that pursues this business.
This applies in particular to capital requirements. 
Second, broad international agreements must be
finally reached on the harmonisation of banking
supervision. These agreements can be based on a
reformed Basel-II system, which encompasses all
institutions performing banking functions and takes
into account systemic and cyclical factors. Minimum
equity requirements in Basel II should be reconsid-
ered, so as to increase the incentive for shareholders to
pursue more prudent business models and choose
more conservative incentive schemes for bank man-
agers. In any case, failures of corporate governance
controls and pitfalls in executive compensation
should be addressed. 
The apparent failure of the current system to elicit the
use of proper models of risk assessment by interme-
diaries and guarantee transparency is perhaps the
main sticky point for rebuilding trust in the financial
system. Simply increasing a coefficient of equity
requirement will not do. What matters is instead a
standard of asset valuation that (eventually) address-
es the main problems in prudential regulation: the
possibility of mispricing due to bubbles and market
illiquidity, generating non-fundamental volatility of
asset prices; procyclicality of lending; and transparen-
cy and information to investors.
Third, whenever possible, derivative products, such as
CDS, should be traded in transparent organized mar-
kets and not in opaque OTC markets. A common
argument is that, while centralised trade may be feasi-
ble for some derivative products, many others are spe-
cialised and designed specifically for an investor/com-
pany, so that no organised market would be econom-
ical. However, following the recent problems of mark-
ing to market when no market exists, those buying
such products probably now realise a major benefit
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from having centralised, transparent and liquid mar-
kets for derivatives. The specific needs of customers,
in many cases, can probably be addressed by forming
appropriate portfolios of existing contracts traded on
liquid markets. By the same token, short sales should
not be prohibited; instead vigilance of potential mar-
ket manipulation should be enhanced.
Fourth, Europe needs a common system of financial
regulation and supervision. The European System of
Central Banks should assume an explicit role of guar-
antor of the system, acquire supervisory powers over
European groups and coordinate with national cen-
tral banks the national financial intermediaries. We
propose a two-tier system. For pan-European finan-
cial groups, supervision should be allocated to the
European Central Bank. These groups should then be
required to subscribe to a European Deposit In-
surance Fund to complement national deposit insur-
ance schemes. Otherwise countries should individual-
ly have the responsibility for bearing losses created by
their own intermediaries.
Fifth, the specificity of the banking sector in compe-
tition policy should be recognised explicitly and for-
mally. This would ensure coherence between competi-
tion policy and financial stability policy and help stem
the political pressure to extend financial bailouts to
other sectors of the economy.
Furthermore, it is highly advisable to reconsider lim-
ited personal liability limitations for mortgages and
other real-estate loans where they exist (such as in the
United States). The promotion of house ownership
should be examined carefully from a financial point of
view, given the potential systemic implications of
incentives raising the risk profile of borrowers against
public guarantees.
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Appendix:
The chronology of the financial crisis
Market events Date Policy actions
February 7, 2007  US Senate Banking Committee holds hearing
on predatory lending in subprime sector.
HSBC losses top $10.5 billion. Head of HSBC US
mortgage-lending business is fired.
February 22, 2007
March 7, 2007  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
issues a cease-and-desist order against
subprime lender Fremont Investment & Loan,
which had been “operating without adequate
subprime mortgage loan underwriting criteria”.
Donald Tomnitz, the CEO of D. R. Horton, the
largest US homebuilder, tells investors: “I don’t
want to be too sophisticated here, but 2007 is going 
to suck, all 12 months of the calendar year.”
March 8, 2007 
Lenders to New Century Financial, a large subprime 
lender, cut off its credit lines. Trading in its shares
is suspended by the New York Stock Exchange.
March 12, 2007 
Subprime lender Accredited Home Lenders to sell,
at a heavy discount, $2.7 billion of loans.
March 16, 2007  The New York Attorney General announces an
investigation of subprime lending.
New Century Financial files for bankruptcy. April 2, 2007 
The National Association of Realtors announces
that existing home sales fell 8.4% during March, the 
greatest drop in 18 years.
April 24, 2007 
GMAC, the finance arm of General Motors, reports
losses of $1 billion.
UBS closes its US subprime business.
May 3, 2007  First comprehensive plan to help homeowners
avoid foreclosures presented in US Senate.
June 6, 2007 The Bank of England reduces the overnight
bank rate by 25 basis points to 5.5%.
Bear Stearns injects $3.2 billion into two of its
hedge funds hurt by falling CDO prices.
June 22, 2007 
July 4, 2007  UK authorities take action against five brokers
selling subprime mortgages.
All three major credit-ratings agencies announce 
review of subprime bonds.
July 10, 2007 
General Electric to sell WMC Mortgage, its
subprime lending business.
July 13, 2007 
US housing starts down 20% from the previous
year.
July 18, 2007 
July 20, 2007  Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke gives 
a warning that the US subprime crisis could 
cost up to $100 billion.
The two Bear Stearns hedge funds that were under
stress file for bankruptcy protection.
July 31, 2007 
American Home Mortgage, one of the largest US
home-loan providers, files for bankruptcy.
August 6, 2007 
BNP Paribas suspends three investment funds hit by 
subprime crisis.
AIG warns that mortgage defaults are spreading 
beyond subprime sector.
August 9, 2007 
The interest rate on 15-day triple-A asset-backed
commercial paper hits 6.14% for a historic high.
August 10, 2007 The ECB provides 61 billion of funds for
banks. The Federal Reserve says it will 
provide as much overnight money.
Goldman Sachs to pump $3 billion to rescue a
hedge fund.
August 13, 2007 The ECB and central banks in the United
States and Japan continue supplying liquidity
to markets.
Countrywide draws down its $11.5 billion credit 
line.
August 16, 2007
August 17, 2007 The Federal Reserve cuts the primary discount
rate to 5.75%, warning the credit crunch could
be a risk to economic growth.
Four large US banks announce coordinated 
borrowing of $2 billion from the Federal Reserve’s
discount window.
Bank of America purchases 16% of Countrywide 
Financial for $2 billion.
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Market events Date Policy actions
German regional bank Sachsen Landesbank faces
collapse after investing in the subprime market; it is
sold to larger rival Landesbank Baden-
Wuerttemberg.
The S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index for the
second quarter 2007 is down 3.2% from a year
earlier, the greatest drop in the 17-year history of
the index.
August 28, 2007
Subprime lender Ameriquest files for bankruptcy. August 31, 2007
IKB, a German regional lender, records $1 billion
loss due to US subprime market exposure.
September 3, 2007 
The rate at which banks lend to each other rises to
its highest level since December 1998; banks either
worry whether other banks will survive or urgently
need the money themselves.
Bank of China reveals $9 billion in subprime losses.
September 4, 2007 
The delinquency rate on FHA mortgages on one- to
four-family houses reaches 5.1% in the US,
according to the Mortgage Bankers Association.
September 6, 2007 
Global Alpha, a hedge fund managed by Goldman 
Sachs, reveals that it lost 22% during August.
September 13, 2007 British mortgage lender Northern Rock has
asked for and been granted emergency 
financial support from the Bank of England.
A run on the deposits of Northern Rock begins:
Depositors withdraw £1 billion in what is the
biggest run on a British bank in more than a
century.
September 14, 2007 British government steps in to guarantee 
depositor savings of Northern Rock to stop 
bank run.
  September 18, 2007 The Federal Reserve cuts the federal funds rate
by 50 basis points to 4.75%. This is the first
cut since 2003.
September 19, 2007 After previously refusing to inject any funding 
into the markets, the Bank of England
announces that it will auction £10 billion.
UBS and Citigroup announce losses of $3.4 billion
and $3.1 billion, respectively.
October 1, 2007 
The Dow Jones Industrial Average closes at 14,164,
its all-time high.
October 9, 2007 
  October 10, 2007  The US government teams up with mortgage 
servicers and investors to launch the HOPE
NOW alliance, to encourage the voluntary
modification of adjustable-rate mortgages to
fixed rates.
Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America,
with the support of the Treasury Department,
announce a plan to form a Master-Liquidity
Enhancement Conduit (M-LEC) that would 
purchase asset-backed commercial paper from 
liquidation SIVs.
October 14, 2007 
Citigroup and the Japanese bank Nomura announce 
subprime losses of $5.9 billion and $621 million,
respectively.
October 15, 2007 
The National Association of Home Builders
confidence index hits 19, the lowest since the series
began in 1985.
October 16, 2007 
Countrywide Financial reports a loss of $1.2 billion
for third-quarter 2007. This is its first loss in 25 
years.
October 26, 2007 
Merrill Lynch announces losses of $7.9 billion and
the resignation of the CEO, Stan O’Neal.
 October 30, 2007 
Deutsche Bank reveals a $2.2 billion loss. October 31, 2007  The Federal Reserve cuts the federal funds rate
by 25 basis points to 4.5%.
Credit Suisse discloses a $1 billion loss.
Fed injects $41 billion.
November 1, 2007 
Citigroup announces that its $55 billion portfolio of
subprime-related investments has declined in value 
between $8 billion and $11 billion. The CEO,
Charles Prince, resigns.
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Morgan Stanley and BNP Paribas disclose mortgage 
losses of $3.7 billion and 197 million, respectively.
AIG writes down $2 billion of mortgage
investments.
November 8, 2007 
Wachovia announces $1.7 billion loss. November 9, 2007
Bank of America announces $3 billion subprime 
loss.
November 13, 2007 
Japan’s second largest banking group, Mizuho,
reports full-year operating profit fell 13%.
HSBC reports losses of $3.4 billion.
November 14, 2007 
Barclays reveals $2.7 billion loss. November 15, 2007  The US House of Representatives passes the 
Predatory Lending and Mortgage Protection 
Act.
Goldman Sachs forecasts financial losses due to
subprime crises at $400 billion.
November 16,  2007 
The reinsurance company, Swiss Re, to lose $1 
billion on insurance of clients hit by subprime 
crises.
November 19, 2007 
Freddie Mac reports a $2 billion loss. November 20, 2007
Freddie Mac and Citigroup raise $6 billion and $7.5
billion of capital respectively.
US house prices record biggest quarterly drop in 21 
years.
November 27, 2007 
The Bank of England reveals the number of
mortgage approvals has fallen to a near three-year
low.
November 29, 2007 
  December 5, 2007 The New York Attorney General sends 
subpoenas to major investment banks to
investigate subprime mortgage securitization.
UBS and Lloyds TSB report $10 billion and £200m
losses due to bad debts in the US housing market.
December 6, 2007 US President George W. Bush outlines plans
to help more than a million homeowners facing
foreclosure.
The Bank of England cuts interest rates by a
quarter of one percentage point to 5.5%.
Washington Mutual subprime losses to reach $1.6
billion.
December 11, 2007  The Federal Reserve lowers the federal funds 
rate by 25 basis points to 4.25%.
  December 12, 2007  The Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the 
European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve
and the Swiss National Bank announce 
measures designed to address elevated 
pressures in short-term funding markets.
Actions taken by the Federal Reserve include
the establishment of a temporary Term
Auction Facility and the establishment of
foreign exchange swap lines with the European 
Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank. 
  December 13, 2007  The US Federal Reserve co-ordinates an 
unprecedented action by five leading central
banks around the world to offer billions of
dollars in loans to banks. The move succeeds
in temporarily lowering the rate at which banks
lend to each other.
Citigroup takes $49 billion worth of SIV assets back
on its balance sheet.
December 14, 2007 
  December 17, 2007  Federal Reserve makes $20 billion available to
commercial banks.
  December 18, 2007  The Federal Reserve Bank tightens rules on
subprime lending.
The ECB lends European commercial banks
$500 billion.
The Bank of England makes £10 billion
available to UK banks.EEAG Report 2009 111
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As subprime losses reach $9.4 billion, Morgan
Stanley sells 9.9% stake in the company.
Ratings agency Standard and Poor’s downgrades its
investment rating of a number of monoline insurers.
There is concern that insurers will not be able to pay
out, forcing banks to announce another big round of
losses.
December 19, 2007 
The spread of 15-day AAA asset-backed
commercial paper over equivalent duration AAA 
non-financial commercial paper hits 173 basis
points as banks scramble for funding through the 
end of the year. The spread is usually less than 10 
basis points.
December 21, 2007 
The M-LEC plan to rescue struggling SIVs is
abandoned by the sponsoring banks.
December 22, 2007 
US job losses in residential construction and
mortgage lending for 2007 estimated at $35,000.
January 4, 2008 
Bear Stearns reveals subprime losses of $1.9 billion.
The CEO, James Cayne, steps down.
The World Bank says that world economic growth
will slow in 2008 due to subprime crisis credit
crunch.
January 9, 2008 
Bank of America buys Countrywide for $4 billion
after its shares plunge 48%.
Merrill Lynch doubles projection of subprime losses
to $15 billion.
January 11, 2008 
Citigroup reports a $9.8 billion loss for the fourth
quarter, including $18 billion loss in mortgage
portfolio.
January 15, 2008 
Lehman Brothers withdraws from wholesale 
mortgage lending and will cut 1,300 jobs.
January 17, 2008 
Crisis of monoline insurers: Fitch Ratings
downgrades Ambac Financial Group’s insurance 
financial strength rating to AA, Credit Watch 
Negative. Standard and Poor’s place Ambac’s AAA 
rating on CreditWatch Negative.
January 18, 2008 
Global stock markets suffer their biggest falls since 
11 September 2001.
January 21, 2008 
Stock markets around the world recover the 
previous day’s heavy losses.
January 22, 2008  The Federal Reserve cuts rates by three
quarters of a percentage point to 3.5% – its
biggest cut in 25 years – to try and prevent the
economy from slumping into recession.
It is the first emergency cut in rates since 2001.
The French bank Société Générale announces that it
lost 4.9 billion due to the unauthorized activity of
one of its traders. While the bank closed out the
trades of this trader during a holiday weekend in the
United States, stock markets plunged round the 
world.
January 24, 2008 
Regularly scheduled auctions for municipal debt of
the state of Nevada and Georgetown University fail
due to lack of bidders and uncertainty about
monocline insurers. The debt issuers are forced to
pay a penalty rate.
January 30, 2008  The Federal Reserve cuts the federal funds rate
by 50 basis points to 3.00%.
A major bond insurer MBIA, announces a loss of
$2.3 billion – its biggest to date for a three-month
period – blaming its exposure to the US subprime
mortgage crisis.
January 31, 2008 
February 7, 2008  US Federal Reserve boss Ben Bernanke adds
his voice to concerns about monoline insurers,
saying he is closely monitoring developments
“given the adverse effects that problems of
financial guarantors can have on financial
markets and the economy”.
The Bank of England cuts interest rates by a
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February 10, 2008 Leaders from the G7 group of industrialised 
nations say worldwide losses stemming from
the collapse of the US subprime mortgage 
market could reach $400 billion.
February 13, 2008 President Bush signs the Economic Stimulus
Act of 2008. The Act provides approximately 
$100 billion of tax rebates to be distributed
during summer 2008 and $50 billion of
investment incentives. 
UBS announces fourth-quarter 2007 loss of
CHF12.4 billion ($12 billion). 
February 14, 2008
Problems in the auction-rate securities market
continue to spread; over 1,000 auctions
fail this week. Investment banks do not allow
investors to withdraw funds invested in those 
securities.
February 15, 2008
February 17, 2008 British government announces that struggling
Northern Rock is to be nationalised for a
temporary period. 
AIG announces fourth-quarter 2007 losses of $5.3 
billion due to more than $11 billion of losses on its
credit-default swap portfolio. 
February 28, 2008
The delinquency rate on family mortgages was
5.82% during the fourth quarter of
2007, up 87 basis points from a year earlier,
according to MBA’s National Delinquency 
Survey. 
 March 6, 2008 
March 7, 2008  In its biggest intervention yet, the Federal 
Reserve makes $200 billion of funds available
to banks and other institutions to try to
improve liquidity in the markets.
 March 11, 2008  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
announces the creation of the term securities
lending facility (TSLF), which lets primary
dealers swap AAA-rated securities for
Treasury securities.
The Federal Reserve, the ECB and SNB 
increase the size of their dollar swap lines to
$30 billion and $6 billion respectively
The investment firm, Carlyle Capital, defaults on 
$17 billion of debt. The fund is
leveraged more than 30:1 and invests mostly in
agency-backed  residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS).
March 14, 2008 
March 16, 2008  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
announces the creation of the primary dealer
credit facility (PDCF), which essentially opens
the discount window to primary dealers,
including non-depository institutions. 
Wall Street’s fifth-largest bank, Bear Stearns, is
acquired by larger rival JPMorgan Chase for  
$240 million in a deal backed by $30 billion of
central bank loans. A year earlier, Bear Stearns had 
been worth £18 billion.
March 17, 2008  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York agrees
to guarantee $30 billion of Bear Stearns assets, 
mostly mortgage-related.
March 18, 2008  The Federal Reserve cuts the federal funds rate
by 75 basis points to 2.25%.
March 24, 2008  The Fed announces that it will provide term
financing to facilitate JPMorgan Chase&Co’s
acquisition of the Bear Sterns Companies, Inc.
Washington Mutual, one of the largest US mortgage 
originators, raises $7 billion from TPG, a private
equity firm.
The IMF’s Global Financial Stability estimates that
the total credit losses will be $1 trillion.
April 8, 2008 
April 10, 2008  The Bank of England cuts interest rates by a 
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Alpha magazine reports that hedge-fund owner John 
Paulson was the highest-paid trader in 2007. His
fund, Paulson & Co., rose more than $20 billion in
value during the year by shorting the mortgage 
market.
Confidence in the UK housing market falls to its
lowest point in 30 years.
April 15, 2008 
Citigroup announces another $12 billion of losses
related to subprime mortgages, leveraged loans,
exposure to monoline insurers, auction-rate
securities and consumer credit.
April 18, 2008 
National City Corporation, a large regional US
bank, announces a $7 billion capital infusion from
Corsair Capital, a private-equity firm.
April 21, 2008  The Bank of England announces details of an 
ambitious £50 billion plan designed to help
credit-squeezed banks by allowing them to
swap potentially risky mortgage debts for
secure government bonds.
Royal Bank of Scotland announces that it will raise 
about £16 billion from investors by selling assets. 
 April 22, 2008 
In UK, the first annual fall in house prices in 12 
years is recorded by Nationwide.
April 30, 2008  The Federal Reserve lowers the federal funds 
rate by 25 basis points to 2.0%. 
May 2, 2008 The Fed expands Term Auction Facility (TAF)
auctions from $50 billion to $75 billion.
UBS announces CHF11.5 billion ($11.1 billion)
loss during first-quarter 2008.
May 6, 2008 
Monoline insurer MBIA announces a $2.4 billion
loss during first-quarter 2008.
May 12, 2008 
UBS, one of the worst affected by the credit crunch,
launches a $15.5 billion rights issue to cover some
of the $37 billion it lost on assets linked to US
mortgage debt.
May 22, 2008  The Federal Reserve has auctioned $75 billion
in loans to squeezed banks to help them 
overcome credit problems.
Standard and Poor’s downgrades monoline bond 
insurers AMBAC and MBIA from AAA to AA.
June 5, 2008
June 17, 2008  The FBI arrests 406 people, including brokers
and housing developers, as part of a 
crackdown on alleged mortgage frauds worth 
$1 billion.
Separately, two former Bear Stearns workers
face criminal charges related to the collapse of
two hedge funds linked to subprime
mortgages.
June 19, 2008 
Barclays announces plans to raise £4.5 billion in a
share issue to bolster its balance sheet. The Qatar
Investment Authority, the state-owned investment
arm of the Gulf state, will invest £1.7 billion in the
British bank, giving it a 7.7% share in the business.
June 25, 2008 
US mortgage lender IndyMac collapses – the 
second-biggest bank in US history to fail.
July 13, 2008  Financial authorities step in to assist America’s
two largest lenders, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. As owners or guarantors of $5 trillion
worth of home loans, they are crucial to the US
housing market and authorities agree they 
could not be allowed to fail. 
July 15, 2008  The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
issues an emergency order temporarily 
prohibiting naked short selling in the securities
of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and primary 
dealers at commercial and investment banks.
July 30, 2008  President Bush signs into law the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008, which,
among other provisions, authorises the
Treasury to purchase GSE obligations and 
reforms the regulatory supervision of the GSE 
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UK house prices show their biggest annual fall
since Nationwide began its housing survey in 1991,
a decline of 8.1%.
Britain’s biggest mortgage lender HBOS reveals
that profits for the first half of the year sank 72% to
£848m, while bad debt rose 36% to £1.31 billion as
customers failed to repay loans.
July 31, 2008 
HSBC profits fall 28% as bad debt rises £10billion.
US inflation hits 27-year high.
August 4, 2008 
Freddie Mac reports $821 million loss. August 6 2008
RBS reports a pre-tax loss of £692 million in the
first half, after writing down £5.9 billion on
investments hit by the credit crunch 
August 8, 2008  European Central Bank cuts growth forecast
2009 to 1.2% from 1.5%
August 17, 2008 Following an intermeeting conference call, the
Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) releases a statement about the current
financial market turmoil, and notes that the
“downside risks to growth have increased 
appreciably”.
US unemployment rate rises to 6.1% September 5, 2008  US government decides to take control of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac announce outstanding
liabilities of about $5,400 billion.
September 7, 2008  The Federal Reserve has auctioned another
$25 billion in loans to squeezed banks to help
them overcome credit problems. 
Lehman Brothers shares fall by more than 40 
percent because of worries about its ability to raise
capital. 
September 9, 2008 
Lehman Brothers posts a loss of $3.9 billion for the
three months to August.
September 10, 2008 Treasury Secretary Paulson claims that there 
will be no public funds involved in a possible 
rescue of Lehman Brothers.
Lehman Brothers seek rescue. Bank of America is a 
candidate for taking it over.
September 12, 2008
Bank of America and Barclays head list of potential
purchasers of Lehman Brothers.
September 13, 2008
Lehman Brothers battles to avoid bankruptcy. 
Barclays pulls out of the bidding.
Bank of America bids for Merrill Lynch.
AIG seeks help for $10-20 billion.
September 14, 2008 US authorities trying to put a rescue package 
together for insurance giant AIG agree a $20 
billion lifeline.
US bank Merrill Lynch, also stung by the credit
crunch, agrees to be taken over by Bank of America 
for $50 billion.
Lehman files for bankruptcy.
Shares in HBOS, Britain’s biggest mortgage lender,
crash 34% in early trading.
On Wall Street the Dow Jones industrial average 
plunges 504 points to close at 10,917.51 
September 15, 2008 US government takes control of AIG, after an 
injection of $85 billion.
Goldman Sachs reports 70% drop in profits. September 16, 2008 The Federal Reserve Board authorizes the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to lend up
to $85 billion to the American International 
Group (AIG) under Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act.
Lloyds TSB announces it is to take over Britain’s
biggest mortgage lender HBOS in a £12 billion deal
creating a banking giant holding close to one-third
of the UK’s savings and mortgage market. The deal
follows a run on HBOS shares.
Panic grips credit markets, causing huge flight to
safety. US treasury yield at a minimum since 1941.
September 17, 2008 Central banks around the world pump $180
billion into the system in a concerted effort to
end the crisis.
The SEC announces a temporary emergency 
ban on short selling in the stocks of all 
companies in the financial sector. 
Russian stock markets remain closed for a second 
day.
Nikkei drops 260 points to 11,489.
Wall Street closes 410 points higher as the US
Federal Reserve starts briefing on an ambitious plan 
to create a federal “bad bank”.
September 18, 2008 US plan is announced.  US government
pledges $50 billion to guarantee money market
mutual funds.
British government rushes through increase in
guarantees for bank deposits to £50,000.EEAG Report 2009 115
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Asia starts the recovery, with the Nikkei closing up 
431 points at 11,920.
FTSE roars back, up 315 points in early trading to
5,195 thanks to the short-selling ban and the US
“bad bank” plan.
Russian stock markets bounce back after the 
government pledges 500 billion roubles to fight the
crisis.
September 19, 2008 The US treasury secretary, Henry Paulson,
spends the weekend trying to thrash out his
$700 billion “bad bank” plan. 
The Federal Reserve Board announces the 
creation of the Asset Backed Commercial
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity
Facility (AMLF) to extend non recourse loans
at the primary credit rate to U.S. depository
institutions and bank holding companies to
finance their purchase of high quality asset 
backed commercial paper from money market
mutual funds.
The US Treasury Department announces a 
temporary guaranty program that will make
available up to $50 billion from the Exchange
Stabilization Fund to guarantee investments in
participating money market mutual funds.
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs give up their
status as investment banks and become traditional
commercial banks
September 22, 2008 Political opposition to the $700 billion bail-out 
plan grows in Washington.
New figures show UK mortgage approvals hit a 
record low in August.
September 23, 2008 Henry Paulson bows to intense pressure to
include limits on what Wall Street bankers can 
be paid in his $700 billion bail-out plan. 
Warren Buffett invests $5 billion (£2.7 billion) in
Goldman Sachs and warns that failure to agree a 
$700 billion bailout could result in an “economic 
Pearl Harbour”.
September 24, 2008 Overnight the $700 billion bail-out plan in the
US appears to have stalled.
Ireland becomes the first state in the eurozone to fall 
into recession.
Jobless figures are up and orders are down in the 
US, signalling the dire state of the economy.
In the largest bank failure yet in the United States, 
Washington Mutual, the giant mortgage lender,
which had assets valued at $307 billion, is closed
down by regulators and sold to JPMorgan Chase.
September 25, 2008 Traders are worried about the possible failure
of the $700 billion bail-out plan. The plan
appears to be coming apart despite Paulson 
actually begging before congress on one knee 
for the deal to be passed.
  September 26, 2008 The government of Belgium, the Netherlands
and Luxembourg rescue insurance giant Fortis.
In the US, lawmakers announce they have 
reached a bipartisan agreement on a rescue 
plan for the American financial system.
The package, to be approved by Congress,
allows the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion
buying bad debts from ailing banks. It will be
the biggest intervention in the markets since
the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Spain’s Santander buys Bradford & Bingley’s 200 
branches and £22 billion savings book and the UK
taxpayer gets lumbered with the mortgages.
September 28, 2008 Congress rejects $700 billion plan: George
Bush takes the podium to urge the House of
Representatives to pass the $700 billion bail-
out plan. His short speech falls on deaf ears
and a few hours later the House of
Representatives votes down the bail-out. 
Nationalisation of Bradford and Bingley in the
UK.
Iceland takes control of Glitnir (country’s third
largest bank).
Germany underwrites 35 billion bailout of
Hypo Real Estate.  
Citigroup saves Wachovia, with a $12 billion
stake by the government.EEAG Report 2009 116
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Markets plunge around the world.
Wall Street is in turmoil. The Dow Jones plunges
777 points, its biggest ever fall in points terms.
As news of the Bradford & Bingley rescue sinks in,
the London Stock Market plummets in what will 
end up being one of the FTSE 100 index’s worst
ever trading days.
As a result of the intense fear among bankers about
which institution will be next to fold, the interbank
lending rate goes through the roof despite desperate 
attempts by central banks to pump cash into the 
system
The FDIC announces that Citigroup will purchase
the banking operations of Wachovia Corporation
September 29, 2008 Ireland extends bank guarantee, covering an 
estimated 400 billion bank liabilities including
deposits, covered bond, senior debt and dated 
subordinated debt for two years, de facto 
putting other countries at a disadvantage.
Rescue of Dexia (6.4 billion) by France
Belgium and Luxembourg.
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the managing 
director of the IMF, believes a bail-out is the
only option for the US economy.
The Fed expands Term Auction Facility (TAF)
auctions to a total of $150 billion.
Problems in money market intensify.
Asian stock markets react to the shock news that the 
$700 billion Wall Street bailout has failed.
In the US, July recorded the biggest ever fall in
house prices.
The banks themselves are finding it increasingly 
difficult to raise financing, with the cost of
interbank borrowing experiencing its biggest ever
one-day rise.
September 30, 2008 European leaders do not agree on a common 
fund (300 billion estimate). 
New data shows British manufacturing shrinking at
the fastest rate since records began nearly 17 years
ago.
Share traders are praying that a rescue package can 
still be put together in the US. 
Warren Buffett decides to snap up $3 billion worth
of General Electric as part of a $15 billion
fundraising by the industrial conglomerate.
October 1, 2008  The US Senate votes in favour of the Wall 
Street bail-out. 
EU focus shifts from common fund, to tighten
regulation of rating agencies, improve 
coordination among supervisors, review
accounting rule and, common standards for
deposit insurance.
Greece extends guarantees on bank deposits.
European leaders are considering their own 
bail-out, which could cost up to 300 billion.
The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, leads
the push.
  October 2, 2008  US Congress finally passes the $700 billion
financial rescue package.
Sarkozy urges EU government to “play by the 
rules” and form a common front.
UK raises deposit protection cap to £50,000. 
Dutch government announces that it will take
up full control of Fortis; this is an effective
nationalization of ABN Amro.  
Iceland takes step to avoid bank meltdown 
(repatriation of pension funds).
Reaction in financial markets is subdued.
Wells Fargo announces a competing proposal to
purchase Wachovia Corporation that does not
require assistance from the FDIC.
The State of California is in need of $7 billion.
US jobs data are worse than expected.
October 3, 2008  Emergency summit in Paris to discuss the
crisis with French, German, British and Italian 
leaders.
Congress passes and President Bush signs into
law the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008, which establishes the $700 billion
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).
  October 4, 2008  Germany guarantees all private German bank 
accounts (up from 20,000).
US Treasury working on details of the plan. EEAG Report 2009 117
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Italian Unicredit raises capital by 6 billion. October 5, 2008  EU leaders vow to use any measure necessary.
Germany announces a 50 billion plan to save
Hypo Real Estate. 
Iceland announces part of a plan to shore up its
troubled banking sector. The country’s largest
banks agree to sell some of their foreign assets. 
Germany is criticized for its deposit guarantee
policy. Danish government extend its own.
Fed ready to move into unsecured loans.
Currency and financial crises around the world.
Very strong in Iceland, but also Korea, Pakistan etc.
The FTSE sees its largest one-day fall in points.
October 6, 2008  UK unveils rescue plan for £35–50 billion,
with the government injecting capital into the
country’s largest lenders. Recapitalisation as a 
step towards restoring confidence: but by how
much?  
The Icelandic government takes control of
Landsbanki, the country’s second largest bank,
which owns Icesave in the UK.
FED announces intervention in commercial
paper markets – with little effect on markets.
Spain follows US lead, offering to buy assets
from banks.
EU leaders agree on set of “principles” but not
on detailed guidelines. Coordination was
achieved only on “minimum deposit 
insurance”, not on cap.
Bank shares fall sharply.
The Icelandic internet bank Icesave blocks savers
from withdrawing money.
October 7, 2008  Historic coordinated rate cut by central banks
around the world (FED, ECB,BoE,
BoC,SwissNB, Swedish Riskbank). People’s
Bank of China joins without formal
coordination. ECB changes its procedure,
making unlimited funding available at the
current interest rate (banks no longer have to
bid for funds), and reduce the penalty to its
lending rate to 50 basis point (down from 100 
basis points).
Iceland: State ownership of the three largest
banks.
Ireland extends guarantees to foreign owned 
banks.
The UK government announces details of
a rescue package for the banking system 
worth at least £50 billion. The government is
also offering up to £200 billion in short-term
lending support.
The FDIC announces an increase in deposit
insurance coverage to $250,000 per depositor.
Large fall in commodities prices.  
Russia, Ukraine and Romania close down stock 
exchanges.
Iceland suspends all trading on stock exchanges.
October 8, 2008  Resistance to adopt UK approach around the 
world. Disagreement among G7.
ECB sharply focuses on growth risk, signalling
rates cut.  
The International Monetary Fund announces
emergency plans to bail out governments
affected by the financial crisis, after warning 
that no country would be immune from the 
ripple effects of the credit crunch.
House prices fall at record rate during the year to
the end of September, losing 13.3% of their value,
Halifax reports.  
The Dow falls to a five-year low, ending the day 
7.3% lower at 8579 points.
October 9, 2008  President Bush urges confidence in the US
government’s ability to manage the worsening
financial crisis, but his words have little effect. EEAG Report 2009 118
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The end of a week of panic: stock markets plunge 
by 20 percent around the world.
A global rout starts in Asia as recession fears
deepen, with Japan’s Nikkei index falling almost
10%, its biggest drop for 20 years.
The Dow plunges nearly 700 points to 7882 in the 
first few minutes of trading, a fall of 8%.
The FTSE 100 plunges more than 10% to 3847 
points, falling under the 4,000 mark for the first
time in five years. The sell-off wipes more than
£100 billion off the value of Britain’s biggest
companies.
Signs that panic is spreading to retail banking,
pointing to the possibility of a run on deposits. 
Oil prices slump as the International Energy Agency 
revises its demand forecast downwards.
October 10, 2008  Meetings of the G7 finance ministers and the 
IMF in Washington: The G7 comes up with a 
five-point plan, which includes spending
billions of taxpayers’ money to rebuild the
global banking system and reopen the flow of
credit.  
  October 11, 2008  European governments present a 1.8 trillion 
bail-out plan.
FED makes available unlimited dollar funds
offshore, facing intense demand for dollars in
Europe. ECB SNB and BoE announces
unlimited funds at current rates.
ECB switches to a regular weekly injection of
funds.
The British government announces it will
pump £37 billion of emergency recapitalisation
into the Royal Bank of Scotland, HBOS and
Lloyds TSB.
Global stocks rebound. Small positive effects in
money markets.
The Dow Jones rockets by 936 points to 9387, its
biggest one-day gain by points. It closes up 11%,
the largest daily jump in percentage terms since
1933.
October 13, 2008  Historic bank rescue plan by the US. $250 
billion for recapitalisation. $125 billion to be
injected into 9 banks (Bank of America, JP
Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Citigroup,
Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
Stanley, Bank of New York Mellon and State
Street), in exchange for non-voting preference
shares paying 5 percent for five years, then 9
percent, plus warrants for common stock equal
to 15 percent of the preference share 
investment.
Cost of insurance against big US bank default drops
sharply. However, interbank loan rates ease only 
modestly.
Shares in Asia, and Europe rally for a second day.
The Icelandic Stock Exchange resumes trading for
the first time since last Wednesday, but six financial
stocks remain suspended. The stock market
plummeted 76% after the opening.
October 14, 2008  European Leaders back call for a “New
Bretton Woods”.
ECB announces plan to boost funding for
commercial banks, extending the range of
collateral and currency denomination.
Non-eurozone EU states back bail-out plan.
EU regulators accept emergency changes by
the International Accounting Standard Board
regarding reclassification of assets from
trading to banking books.
Iceland rushes to stave off economic ruin by
slashing interest rates by 3.5% and pursuing 
talks with Russia over the possibility of a
multibillion euro loan. 
US Treasury Department announces that
TARP will purchase capital in financial 
institutions ($250 billion). EEAG Report 2009 119
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Recession fears drive down stocks around the 
world. The foreign exchange market “almost ceases
to function” amid row with UK over assets. 
The Hungarian florint falls by 7 percent, as the 
stock market plunges by 12 percent.
Run on Russian banks intensifies.
Dow Jones industrial average drops by 7.8% – its
biggest percentage fall since 26 October 1987.
Unemployment figures in the UK showed the 
biggest rise since the country’s last recession 17
years ago, up to 5.7% – 1.79 million people.
US banks JPMorgan and Wells Fargo report big 
falls in profits
Figures for US retail sales in September show a fall 
of 1.2%, the biggest monthly decline in more than 
three years, with the drop in car sales hitting 3.8%. 
October 15, 2008  European Central Bank sets 5 billion facilities
to help Hungary. This is the first time support 
is extended outside the eurozone: the ECB
signals its willingness to do more.
Swiss National Bank provides $60 billion to
take on most of the US toxic debt held by UBS
(third capital raising by UBS in the year), after
UBS suffered $50 billion capital outflows in
the third quarter of the year.
An EU summit ends in Brussels with a clear
message that there is no time to lose in coming
up with concerted action to tackle the financial 
emergency.
OPEC calls an emergency meeting in Vienna
as the oil price falls to less than half the $147 it 
traded at in July. 
Japan’s Nikkei Index suffers its worst fall since 
1987.
In the US, Citigroup suffered its fourth consecutive
quarterly loss after taking hits of more than $13 
billion to cover liabilities arising from the credit 
crunch.
October 16, 2008 
Sharp fall in US consumer confidence (sharpest
monthly fall since 1978).
French savings bank Caisse d’Epargne 
announces a loss of 600 million euros in a “trading
incident”, which the bank says was triggered by 
what it called “extreme market volatility” amid the
market crash during the week of 6 October.
October 17, 2008 Korea launches a $130 billion loan and
liquidity rescue; tax cuts and spending
increases announced.
Dutch savings bank  ING accepts 10 billion
capital injection (granting no voting right to
government but 2 out of 12 supervisory board 
seats), to bring Tier 1 capital up to 8 percent. 
Debt to equity falls from 15 to 10 percent. 
October 19, 2008  Federal Reserve backs plan for second US
stimulus package.
Iceland to announce a $6 billion IMF rescue
package.
Sweden’s government sets out its own bank 
rescue plan, with credit guarantees to banks
and mortgage lenders up to a level of 1.5 
trillion krona ($205 billion). The government
says it will also set aside 15 billion krona as a
bank stabilisation fund. 
India’s central bank unexpectedly cuts its
short-term lending rates in response to
continued pressure from the global financial
crisis. The Reserve Bank of India cuts the repo 
rate by a full percentage point to 8%. 
Small signs of relief in the money markets.
UK: Mortgage lending slumped by 10% in
September to its lowest level for more than three-
and-a-half years.
China revises growth down to 9 percent.
October 20, 2008  Fed ready to finance up to $540 billion to
purchase short term debt from money market
mutual funds through 5 special purpose 
vehicles managed by JPMorgan, complement-
ing previously set  vehicles to purchase
potentially unlimited three month debt from
banks and non-financial companies. The size 
of Fed balance sheet has nearly doubled. Each 
of the five vehicles purchase paper from 10
financial institutions. The size of the
programme is $60 billion.
IMF forecasts sharp squeeze in business credit.
For the EU, growth forecasts are down from
1.7 to 0.6 percent.EEAG Report 2009 120
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Anticipation of Argentina’s pension funds
nationalization plan drives down Argentina’s
markets.
October 21, 2008  Hungary lifts rates 300 basis point to support
currency.
Pakistan seeks emergency bail-out funds from 
the IMF.
The stricken US bank Wachovia reports the biggest
quarterly loss of any bank since the onset of the 
credit crunch, with a deficit of $24 billion.
October 22, 2008  Former Fed chief Alan Greenspan admits he 
had been “partially wrong” in his hands-off
approach towards the banking industry. The 
credit crunch had left him in a state of
“shocked disbelief”, he admitted before a
congressional committee.
Daimler, maker of Mercedes cars, issues its second 
profits warning this year after third-quarter earnings
plunge by two-thirds.
October 23, 2008  In Denmark, the central bank raises its key 
interest rate by 0.5 percentage points to 5.5%. 
Large fall in share prices worldwide.
Yen and dollar strengthen. Yen appreciation,
attributed to a reversal of the “yen carry trade”,
creates global concern.
The UK is on the brink of a recession according to
figures released by the Office for National
Statistics. The economy shrank for the first time in
16 years between July and September, as economic
growth fell by 0.5%.
October 24, 2008  IMF unveils a plan for $16.5 billion to support
the Ukraine
The spectre of a cascade of failing economies from
the Baltic to Turkey is raised as a $16.5 billion IMF
bailout for Ukraine is mired in political infighting
and Hungary seeks its own $10 billion rescue
package.
October 25–26, 2008
Swedish banks, relatively immune to the crisis, 
move to recapitalise
October 27, 2008  Iceland raises interest rates to 18 percent, in
negotiations for a loan by the IMF ($2 billion)
and other countries.
Autumn’s market mayhem has left the world’s
financial institutions nursing losses of $2.8 trillion,
according to the Bank of England.
October 28, 2008  The US Treasury Department purchases a total
of $125 billion in preferred stock in nine US
banks under the Capital Purchase Program.
The International Monetary Fund, the Euro-
pean Union and the World Bank announce a
massive rescue package for Hungary.
The prospect of fresh cuts in interest rates on both
sides of the Atlantic helped propel Wall Street
stocks to a dramatic rebound, with the Dow scoring
its second-biggest points gain ever, just short of
900.
October 29, 2008  The Federal Reserve cuts its key interest rate
from 1.5% to 1%.
Deutsche Bank reports steep falls in pre-tax and net
profits and a further series of write-downs in the 
third quarter.  
The Commerce Department issues figures showing 
the US economy shrank at an annualised rate of
0.3% between July and September.
October 30, 2008  The Bank of Japan cuts interest rates for the
first time in seven years in response to the
global financial crisis. The bank cuts the key 
interest rate from 0.5% to 0.3%, a move some
criticise as half-hearted.
Barclays said it will raise up to £7.3 billion, mainly
from Middle East investors who could end up 
owning nearly a third of the UK’s second largest
bank.
October 31, 2008  The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
approves a $16.4 billion loan to the Ukraine to
bolster its economy, shaken by global financial
turmoil. 
The Bank of England slashes interest rates 
from 4.5% to 3% – the lowest level since 1955.
The European Central Bank lowers eurozone
rates to 3.25% from 3.75%.
  November 6, 2008  China sets out a two-year $586 billion
economic stimulus package to help boost the 
economy by investing in infrastructure and
social projects, and by cutting corporate taxes.
  November 9, 2008  US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson says the 
government has abandoned plans to use some
of the $700 billion bail-out money to buy up
banks’ bad debts and has decided instead to
concentrate on improving the flow of credit for
the US consumer.EEAG Report 2009 121
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  November 12, 2008  Leaders of the G20 and emerging economies
gather in Washington to discuss ways to
contain the financial crisis and agree on
longer-term reforms.
The eurozone officially slips into recession after EU
figures show that the economy shrank by 0.2% in
the third quarter. 
November 14, 2008  The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
approves a $2.1 billion loan for Iceland, after
the country’s banking system collapsed in
October. It is the first IMF loan for a Western
European nation since 1976.
  November 20, 2008  The US government announces a $20 billion
rescue plan for troubled banking giant
Citigroup after its shares plunge by more than 
60 percent in a week.
  November 23, 2008  The UK government announces a temporary 
cut in the rate of VAT – to 15% from 17.5%.
November 24,  2008  The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
approves a $7.6 billion loan for Pakistan to
shore up the country’s economy. Pakistan 
needs the money in order to avoid defaulting
on international debt. 
The US Federal Reserve announces it will 
inject another $800 billion into the economy in
a further effort to stabilise the financial system
and encourage lending. About $600 billion will 
be used to buy up mortgage-backed securities
while $200 billion is being targeted at
unfreezing the consumer credit market.
November, 25 2008  The European Commission unveils an 
economic recovery plan worth 200 billion
euros which it hopes will save millions of
European jobs. The scheme aims to stimulate 
spending and boost consumer confidence.
  November 26, 2008  The UK government becomes the majority
owner of Royal Bank of Scotland with a stake 
of almost 60 per cent after the bank revealed 
that just 0.24 per cent of its capital raising had
been taken up by investors.
The Labor Department reports that the US lost
533,000 jobs in November, the biggest monthly loss
since 1974. This raises the unemployment rate from
6.5% to 6.7%.
The US recession is confirmed by the NBER; the 
US economy started to contract in January 2008.
December 1, 2008
US carmakers appeal to Congress for $34 billion in
emergency loans
December 3, 2008 The European Central Bank announces a three-
quarters of a percentage point cut in its main
policy interest rate to 2.5 per cent – its largest 
cut ever – just hours after Sweden’s central
bank surprised markets by reducing the 
country’s official borrowing costs by a record
175 basis points. The Bank of England slashes
its rates by another 1 percentage point to 2 per
cent, equal to the lowest rate since the central
bank was founded in 1694.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy unveils a 
26 billion stimulus plan to help France fend
off financial crisis, with money to be spent on
public sector investments and loans for the 
country’s troubled carmakers.
  December 4, 2008 Bank of Canada lowers its key interest rate by
0.75% to 1.5%, the lowest it has been since 
1958; at the same time the Bank officially
announces that Canada’s economy is in
recession.
Canada lost 70,600 jobs in the month of November,
the most since 1982.
December 9, 2008 The European Central Bank as well as central
banks in England, Sweden and Denmark, slash 
interest rates again in an effort to prevent a
deep recession.
Bernard Madoff, former Nasdaq chairman, is
arrested after confessing to running a 50 billion
dollar Ponzi scheme.  EEAG Report 2009 122
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Bank of America announces up to 35,000 job losses
over three years following its takeover of Merrill
Lynch in the New Year.
December 11, 2008 
The dollar slides to its lowest in 13 years against the
yen as the Senate fails to agree on a bailout for the 
three US automakers. The number of new workers
filing claims for unemployment benefits jumps to a 
26-year high.
December 12, 2008 
  December 16, 2008  President Bush says the US government will 
use up to $17.4 billion of the $700 billion
meant for the banking sector to help the Big
Three US carmakers, General Motors, Ford
and Chrysler.
Japan’s central bank and cuts rates from 0.3%
to 0.1%. The government says the world’s
second largest economy will not grow in 2009.
The US Federal Reserve slashes its key interest
rate from 1% to a range of zero to 0.25% – the 
lowest since records began.
  December 19, 2008  The US Treasury unveils a $6 billion bail-out
for GMAC, the car-loan arm of General
Motors. 
The FTSE 100 closes the year down by 31.3%,
which is the biggest annual fall in the 24 years since 
the index was started.
The Dax in Frankfurt loses 40.4% for the year,
while the Cac 40 in Paris drops 42.7%.
December 31, 2008  The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
begins purchasing fixed-rate mortgage-backed 
securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac and Ginnie Mae under a programme first
announced on November 25, 2008.
January 5, 2009  German Commerzbank partly nationalised as
the government buys 25% of shares to rescue 
one of the biggest German banks.
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